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Abstract
Existing research has considered the effect of domestic unrest on repression and the
effect of repression on subsequent unrest. However, governments’ strategic incentives
to use repression as a targeted measure in order to prevent – as opposed to respond to
– unrest altogether are understood little. This thesis analyses armed ethnic conflict as
well as government repression targeted at ethnic groups in order to prevent them from
rebelling. More specifically, this thesis consists of three parts. The first part analyses
the effect of information about foreign conflicts on the likelihood of domestic conflict.
Here, the argument is that information about foreign conflicts that is transmitted via
mass media can inspire groups with similar grievances like the foreign group in con-
flict to take up arms. This argument is tested empirically in a large-n study on the
country level. The second part analyses the concept of repression as a pre-emptive
strategy. In this part I argue that governments use group-specific repression to strike
a perfect balance between domestic ethnic groups’ costs and benefits for fighting in
order to prevent them from taking up arms in the most efficient way. Quantitative data
on group-specific repression levels is used to empirically test this argument. The third
part analyses government reactions to information about foreign conflicts transmitted
via mass media in order to prevent domestic unrest. I argue here that governments
are aware of the mechanism discussed in the first part and use repression in order to
prevent conflict contagion altogether. Again, this argument is tested empirically using
group-level repression data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Arab spring has brought the possibility of the spread of collective action between
different countries to the forefront of public and academic interest. However, even be-
fore the Arab spring, groups in similar situations in different countries were aware of
each others’ struggles and have supported each other. This thesis poses the question of
whether the struggles of ethnic groups can inspire groups in other countries to take up
arms as well. It argues that such inspiration can take place when domestic ethnic groups
perceive a grievance similar to the one addressed by the foreign group in conflict. For
this, information flows between countries are expected to be important as domestic
groups need to be informed about foreign conflicts and their underlying causes in order
to be inspired by them under the mechanism suggested. This thesis explores the role of
information flows via mass media in the process by which groups in different countries
can inspire each other to rebellion. The analysis presented here is the first to opera-
tionalise shared grievance explicitly and thus test whether this mechanism can trigger
inspiration between groups. Moreover, it is the first to explore the role of information
flows via mass media in processes of armed conflict contagion.
How do governments react to foreign conflicts that may inspire domestic ethnic
groups in such a way? This thesis argues that governments use repression as a strategy
to prevent domestic ethnic groups from rebelling, both in general and as a response
to foreign events that may inspire domestic groups in particular. In empirical repres-
sion research, the notion of pre-emptive repression is rarely considered, and if it is,
country-level measures are applied to operationalise governments’ incentives for pre-
emptive repression. This thesis advances and tests a theory of pre-emptive repression
as a tool targeted at specific domestic groups in order to prevent them from taking up
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arms against the government. I test this notion both in a domestic setting by exploring
government repression as a function of domestic and group-specific factors that can be
expected to influence an ethnic group’s utility for rebellion. In a second step, I test this
notion by exploring government repression against ethnic groups in response to foreign
events that may inspire these groups to rebellion under the mechanisms developed in
the first part of the thesis. Again, information flows via mass media are expected to
be a crucial factor in this process as only groups with information about foreign events
should be expected by the government to be inspired by them.
The first part of this thesis analyses armed ethnic intrastate conflict, that is armed
conflicts within states that are fought predominantly by members of and in the interest
of at least one ethnic group (Cederman et al., 2010). Conflicts within states generally
have become a prevalent phenomenon since the end of the Second World War. The
year 2013 saw 33 armed civil conflicts in the world while not a single armed conflict
between states was recorded (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014a). This observation
is part of a larger trend as is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The number of ongoing armed
interstate conflicts has stagnated since the end of the Second World War. The number
of ongoing armed intrastate conflicts, on the other hand, has increased considerably
since then1.
Figure 1.1: The yearly number of ongoing inter- and intrastate conflicts in the world.
1Data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset V4-2014 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themne´r and
Wallensteen, 2014).
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One of the most widely used data sources (Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
2014b), the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data, defines a conflict as “(...) a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at
least 25 battle-related deaths” (Harbom, 2010, 1). Such a conflict is considered an in-
trastate conflict if the opponent of the government is a non-government actor and the
conflict takes place on a state’s territory and an interstate conflict if all opponents are
state governments (Harbom, 2010).
Intrastate conflicts have had an intolerable human cost since 1946, both among
combatants and civilians. Between 1945 and 1999, intrastate wars have caused five
times as many fatalities as wars between states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It can easily
be argued that civil war is one of the largest threats to human security and well-being
in the 21st century.
The world-wide proportion of ethnic groups involved in armed civil conflicts has
increased considerably since the end of the Second World War as is shown in Figure
1.22. Ethnic conflicts can be long-winded and bloody. For example, the ethnic conflict
between groups representing the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan government
was active – with rare interruptions – for 26 years and led to almost 60.000 fatalities3.
However, the absence of ethnic or intrastate conflict more generally is not a suffi-
cient condition for the security and well-being of civilian populations. Instead, govern-
ment repression, the second type of political violence this thesis analyses, is a prevalent
phenomenon as well despite the “(...) right to life, liberty and security of person” (UN
General Assembly, 1948) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ef-
forts of human rights groups. “By most accounts, repression involves the actual or
threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as
2The figure shows the percentage of politically relevant ethnic groups represented in at least one
armed civil conflict in a given year based on data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version
2.0 (Cederman et al., 2010), the Non-State Actor Dataset Version 3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the
ACD2EPR Docking Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Ver-
sion 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
3Based on data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version 2.0 (Cederman et al., 2010),
the Non-State Actor Dataset Version 3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the ACD2EPR Docking Dataset
(Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002),
and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c).
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Figure 1.2: The percentage of ethnic groups in conflict.
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well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to govern-
ment personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport (2007a, 2) drawing on Goldstein
(1978, xxvii)). Figure 1.3 shows the yearly mean of the physical integrity rights index
from the CIRI Human Rights data (Cingranelli et al., 2014), “(...) an additive index
constructed from (...) Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Dis-
appearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to
8 (full government respect for these four rights)” (Cingranelli et al., 3). It can be seen
that on average, states use these repressive measures to a considerable degree and little
has changed over time.
In some cases, repression might be the very reason why rebellion does not break
out. In Libya, the regime under Muammar Guaddafi showed little respect for citizen’s
physical integrity rights and was able to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict from
its outset until the year 2011. Similarly, Zimbabwe has not seen armed conflict since
Robert Mugabe came to power, likely also because of at times widespread abuses of
human rights4.
Considering intrastate conflict in isolation establishes a false dichotomy between
situations where civilian populations are safe and where they are not. The causes of
government repression are as important to be understood in order to be able to develop
tools to protect civilians effectively as are the causes of armed conflict. The scholarly
4Based on Cingranelli et al. (2014) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014c).
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Figure 1.3: Government repression in the world.
community acknowledges the importance of explaining why both civil conflicts and re-
pression occur and academic fields that concern themselves with either one of these is-
sues have developed. Existing research has considered the effect of domestic unrest on
repression and the effect of repression on subsequent unrest. However, governments’
strategic incentives for using repression in order to prevent – as opposed to respond to
– unrest altogether are understood little. If pre-emptive government repression is con-
sidered, it is usually addressed on the country-level. The idea that repression may be
targeted at specific ethnic groups in order to affect their incentives for action has not
been tested empirically to date. This thesis analyses government repression targeted at
groups in order to prevent them from rebelling alongside armed ethnic conflict.
More specifically, this thesis consists of three parts. The first part adds to current
understanding of the underlying causes of armed intra-state conflict. It explores the
possibility of and mechanism behind armed civil conflicts spreading between countries,
a phenomenon that has increasingly drawn attention of researchers in recent years.
Research into the causes of armed intra-state conflict is a vibrant and long-standing
academic field and considerable progress has been made towards explaining the oc-
curence of civil wars. For example, we know that the likelihood of intra-state conflict
breaking out is influenced by country-specific factors such as a country’s economic
wealth (for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and actor-specific factors such as eco-
nomic (Cederman et al., 2011) and political inequality between domestic ethnic groups
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(Cederman et al., 2010, 2011). Finally, a more recent research programme has found
that conflicts can be contagious between countries (Forsberg, 2008; Buhaug and Gled-
itsch, 2008; Gleditsch, 2007) and groups (Bormann and Hammond, 2013; Forsberg,
2013).
The first part of this thesis adds to the understanding of processes of conflict conta-
gion, that is processes by which conflicts in other countries can inspire domestic actors
to take up arms against their own government. Conflict contagion has been studied to
date mostly as a phenomenon occurring between states that are geographically close
to each other. The only exception is Weidmann (2015) who studies whether conflict is
contagious between states where populations communicate frequently by cell phone.
The first part of this thesis adds to this research agenda by exploring whether inter-
national conflict contagion can also occur between geographically distant countries and
groups as a result of information flows via mass media. Moreover, this part explores the
causal mechanism behind potential conflict contagion via mass media. It argues that
groups are inspired to rebel by observing other groups with similar grievances fighting
in other countries. This argument is tested empirically using quantitative data and a
number of different approaches and operationalisations.
Conflict contagion is a phenomenon that has come to the forefront of academic
and public interest as a result of recent developments in the context of the Arab spring.
However, older examples of collaboration and identification between groups in differ-
ent countries can be found as well. For example, and as is discussed further in chapter
three, the ANC in South Africa was aware of similar struggles all over the world. More-
over, it has been reported that ETA in Spain had links with and received training from
the provisional IRA in Ireland (Coogan, 2002). Similarly, when Kurdish leader O¨calan
was captured in 1999, Fatah officials reportedly protested alongside other Palestinians
in his support (Anatolia news agency, 1999). These demonstrations may have been
triggered in part by the suspicion that Israel was involved in O¨calans capture (on the
latter point see Budeiri, 1999) but there are also signs of a deeper identification of
Palestinians with the Kurds. For example, an Associated Press Worldstream article
about one of these demonstrations states that “[s]ome of the protesters said there was
a special bond between the Palestinians and the Kurds.” A protester is quoted as say-
ing: “O¨calan ‘leads a liberation movement and we, the Palestinians, are part of the
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international liberation movements”’ (Budeiri, 1999).
In addition, the case of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict introduced above may be a case
of conflict contagion by inspiration. The Tamils, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka,
felt that government policies like for example the change of the official language to
Sinhala, the language of the ethnic majority, were discriminatory against them. These
perceptions fuelled the demand for the state to be transformed to a federal system, but
“(...) in 1976, encouraged by the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and
the creation of the state of Bangladesh, the FP transformed itself into the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) and began to push for a separate Tamil or Eelam state5. Cam-
paigning on this platform at the elections of 1977, the TULF won a majority of seats
in the northern province (...)” (Samaranayake, 2007, 173, italics in the original). An
ethnic insurgency began in the mid-1970s (Samaranayake, 2007), but only in 1984 the
25 battle deaths threshold has been crossed (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c).
Samaranayake (2007, 174) suggests that the Bangladeshi case “(...) while also showing
what could be achieved by armed struggle indicated, too, the possibility that the Indian
government might be persuaded to take up the Tamil cause as it had that of the peo-
ple of East Bengal”. However, it could also be that the increase in violence in the Sri
Lankan case was inspired by the Bangladeshi conflict more generally because of shared
grievances. After all, reasons for Bangladeshi calls for autonomy in the 1960s was that
“[t]he area of East Pakistan (...) suffered marginalisation and economic neglect from
the main Pakistani entity (...)” as well as “linguistic issues” (Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, 2014c). Similarly, DeVotta argues that the experience of ethnic discrimina-
tion as such “(...) together with the numerous “liberation” clashes taking place in the
Third World and Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 inspired Tamil youth to believe
eelam was realizable, especially if India supported its creation” (DeVotta, 2009, 1027).
The second part of this thesis adds to current knowledge about the causes of gov-
ernment repression against the domestic population by testing whether repression is
not only used to punish collective action post facto but also to prevent armed conflict
from breaking out altogether. If that is the case, the interpretation of the absence of
civil war as a situation of relative security for civilians is incorrect. Again, quantitative
5However, talk about secession was present in the party already since the 1960s (Samaranayake,
2007).
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data as well as a number of different specifications are considered to empirically test
the argument.
Contrary to conflict contagion research which is a relatively recent academic field,
the study of government repression is an established academic endeavour. While some
have focused on structural factors such as the role of the regime type, others have fo-
cused on the interaction between the government and the domestic opposition (for an
overview see Davenport, 2007a). Repression is usually seen as a reaction of the govern-
ment to actions of the domestic opposition such as protest or the use of violence. This
thesis explores the relationship between repression and conflict from a different angle:
It considers whether repression is also used by governments in an attempt to prevent
conflict, that is against groups that are conflict-prone without actually engaging in con-
flict. For this, I argue that repression is targeted at specific domestic actors and the spe-
cific likelihood with which they are expected to engage in conflict. Quantitative data on
group-specific repression levels is used to empirically test this argument. This approach
differs greatly from existing empirical approaches to repression that tend to consider
repression as a country-level phenomenon and are usually tested on the country-level
(on the latter point see Hill and Jones, 2014). There are many cases of group repression
without actual group action. For example, the Baha’is in Iran are a heavily repressed
group between 1996 and 2003, the time period under scrutiny in the analyses on gov-
ernment repression in this thesis, even though they have neither engaged in protest nor
rebellion. This group could be expected to have reason for rebellion as it faces severe
ethnic discrimination (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009).
Finally, with one exception, events in other countries tend to be ignored as poten-
tial explanations of government repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). However, if
conflicts are contagious and if governments are keen to counter threats with repression
before they materialise – as is argued in the first and second part of this thesis – , it
follows that governments should react with repression to foreign events they expect
may have an effect on domestic groups (also see Danneman and Ritter, 2014). The
third part of this thesis builds on the foregoing analyses and findings. Here I argue that
governments have incentives to react with pre-emptive violence to processes by which
they expect foreign conflicts to be contagious to domestic actors. More specifically, I
analyse empirically whether information about conflicts by similarly aggrieved groups
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or their successes in other countries trigger government reaction against domestic ag-
grieved groups. Again, quantitative data and research methods are used to answer this
question.
This thesis offers three contributions to the study of political violence. Firstly,
current conflict contagion literature considers geographical proximity as the main trans-
mission channel for conflict contagion. This thesis explores whether information flows
via mass media are also sufficient transmission channels for the contagion of armed
conflict. Moreover, it disentangles the mechanism behind information-based conflict
contagion by operationalising grievance-based inspiration processes explicitly. Sec-
ondly, this thesis constitutes the first attempt to test explicitly whether government re-
pression is used as a pre-emptive strategy against specific domestic actors. Finally, the
thesis explores whether governments react to the threat of domestic groups’ inspiration
by foreign events with pre-emptive repression.
This thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter discusses the literature on the
causes of conflict in general and on conflict contagion as such a cause in particular as
well as research on the causes of repression. It situates the arguments made here within
existing knowledge about these phenomena and further unpacks the contribution of
the arguments made and tested in this thesis. Chapter three develops the argument
on conflict contagion and presents the empirical analysis of the contagion argument.
Chapter four develops an argument about government repression as a result of the threat
posed by specific domestic actors and tests it empirically. Chapter five develops the
argument that governments react with preventive repression to foreign events that may
cause conflict under the mechanisms introduced in chapter three and test this assertion.
The final chapter discusses the findings of this thesis as well as limitations and open
questions that provide opportunities for fruitful future research agendas.
Chapter 2
Literature review
Introduction
This thesis consists of three parts. The first part analyses the effect of information about
foreign conflicts on the likelihood of domestic conflict. Here, the argument is that in-
formation about foreign conflicts that is transmitted via mass media can inspire groups
with similar grievances like the foreign group in conflict to take up arms. The second
part analyses the concept of repression as a pre-emptive strategy. In this part I argue that
governments use group-specific repression to strike a perfect balance between domes-
tic groups’ costs and benefits for fighting in order to prevent them from taking up arms
in the most efficient way. The third part analyses government reactions to information
about foreign conflicts transmitted via mass media in order to prevent domestic unrest.
I argue here that governments are aware of the mechanism discussed in the first part and
use repression in order to prevent conflict contagion altogether. This chapter provides
an overview over scientific literature on armed conflict and government repression and
pinpoints the contribution that is offered by the three empirical studies that form this
thesis.
Conflict contagion literature
A large and long-standing body of scientific literature is devoted to uncovering the
causes of armed intrastate conflict and considerable progress has been made towards
understanding factors underlying the outbreak of armed conflict in a country. Firstly,
a number of structural factors are known to increase the likelihood of armed conflict
within states. Armed conflicts are routinely found to be more likely in states that are less
23
wealthy (for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Similarly,
states’ regime type has been found to be linked to armed conflict (for example Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). A second strand of conflict research
focuses on characteristics of specific actors within states, usually ethnic groups. It has
been found that relative disadvantages of groups, both with respect to state power and
economic wealth, increase the likelihood of armed conflict (for example Cederman
et al., 2010, 2011; Buhaug et al., 2014).
In recent years, conflict research has become increasingly interested in the effect
that events in other states can have on the likelihood of domestic actors engaging in
armed conflict. The phenomenon by which an armed civil conflict in one state can
spread to other states is sometimes described as conflict contagion (for example Braith-
waite, 2010). This concept likens armed civil conflict to a disease that can – once
broken out in a state – spread to subsequent states (Braithwaite, 2010). This thesis uses
the term contagion instead of the term diffusion which appears to be more common
in social science literature. Spatial diffusion is defined in Most and Starr (1990, 402)
as a phenomenon where “(...) events of a given type in a given polity are conditioned
by the occurrence of similar events in other polities at prior points in time.” A similar
understanding of diffusion has also been introduced by Lake and Rothchild (1998) in
the specific context of ethnic conflict. The term contagion is preferred here for this phe-
nomenon as it seems more appropriate in the context of the question why a particular
phenomenon in one unit should be contagious to a particular other unit. The term dif-
fusion on the other hand seems to imply the question how far a particular phenomenon
can spread through a system.
The first part of this thesis tests whether information flows via mass media can
serve as a transmission channel for non-geographic conflict contagion between dis-
criminated groups. The idea that information flows via mass media can trigger eth-
nic conflict contagion has been advanced by several scholars of conflict (for example
Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Kuran, 1998). In addition, the argument that information
transmitted by mass media plays a role in the contagion of collective behaviour is sup-
ported by empirical studies of protest (for example Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Hill et al.,
1998). With the exception of Weidmann (2015), the effect of information flows on the
contagion of armed intra-state conflict has not been tested empirically to date. Instead,
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quantitative studies of conflict contagion tend to focus on geographic proximity as the
transmission channel underlying the contagion of conflict.
Early studies on contagion phenomena were less committed to the necessity of
very close geographic proximity and also included information as a transmission chan-
nel. Hill and Rothchild (1986) argue that the contagion of what they call political
conflict depends on information flows. They argue that foreign protest can increase a
mistreated group’s sense of collective identity or provide instruction about strategies to
those that are disaffected and contemplate action. They test this argument operational-
ising potentially contagious protests to be in the same region because they assume those
to be more likely to be relevant and more likely to be reported about in the media (draw-
ing on others such as Katz and Wedell, 1977). They find that collective protest spreads
within geographic regions to countries with a large amount of radios and a previous
history of conflict. When restricting the sample to Africa only, on the other hand, ra-
dios decrease the likelihood of contagion in such situations. They argue that this is
because of government control of the media in many African countries. Similarly, and
using the Minorities at Risk data, Gurr (1993) finds evidence for conflict contagion
between similar groups in the same region but not for contagion between ethnic kin
around the world. Here, the author argues that a group’s collective action can be strate-
gically instructive to other groups that are similar because there are direct links between
disadvantaged groups.
In recent years, the interest in conflict contagion has been renewed and the focus
on close geographic proximity as the transmission channel underlying conflict conta-
gion has increased. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) and Gleditsch (2007) find armed
conflict to be contagious between close-by states. When Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008)
weight foreign conflicts by inverse distance as opposed to direct proximity, on the other
hand, they don’t find such an effect. They find contagion between neighhbours to be a
function of ethnic kinship ties across borders and of territorial conflicts. Salehyan and
Gleditsch (2006) argue and find refugee flows from direct neighbour states to increase
the likelihood of conflict. Refugee flows from further away countries on the other hand
do not have such an effect. Other studies explore contagion only in the context of neigh-
bour states. For example, Fox (2004) finds conflict contagion between groups with the
same religion in direct neighbour states. Forsberg (2008) finds such contagion between
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adjacent states in the presence of ethnic polarisation in the receiving country as well as
when there are kinship ties between one of the conflict groups and an ethnic group in
the neighbouring country.
As a result of the recent trajectory of conflict contagion research, considerable
knowledge has been accumulated about mechanisms underlying conflict contagion be-
tween neighbour states. The non-geographic contagion of conflict, on the other hand,
has barely been explored. The only exception is Weidmann (2015) who tests empiri-
cally whether ethnic conflicts spread between countries where populations communi-
cate directly with each other. The author uses data on phone connections and finds the
expectation to be supported.
The first part of this thesis constitutes the first attempt to empirically explore the
role of information flows via mass media in conflict contagion processes, a transmission
channel that has been suggested but not empirically tested by conflict scholars.
Aside from analysing contagion via mass media, the first part of this thesis also
aims at unpacking the causal mechanism behind information-based conflict contagion.
In order to identify conflict contagion, it is important to uncover specific mechanisms
underlying contagion processes. While the mechanisms underlying geographic conta-
gion are well understood, we know little about mechanisms underlying non-geographic,
information-based contagion. This thesis tests the argument that conflicts addressing
the grievance of ethnic discrimination are contagious to countries where parts of the
population are disadvantaged in similar ways because they raise awareness of system-
atic discrimination and the intent behind it.
Similar arguments about the role of similar grievances in conflict contagion mech-
anisms have been made before (for example Byman and Pollack, 2007), albeit to the
best of the author’s knowledge to date they have not been tested in a large-n study.
Following Kuran (1998), this thesis focuses on ethnic discrimination as the potential
grievance that can trigger conflict contagion because foreign conflicts can raise aware-
ness of the grievance itself and government intent. Ethnic discrimination has been
found to be closely associated with armed conflict in previous quantitative research
(Cederman et al., 2010). In addition, some have discussed the importance of actors’
awareness of grievances and government intent for collective action. Gurr (2000, 71)
argues that overt discrimination coupled with group disadvantage provides strong in-
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centives for action “(...) because the combination focuses (...) resentment on the agents
of discrimination.” Similarly, Buhaug et al. (2014) note the importance of groups’
awareness of the issue itself, its injustice and the responsibility of the government for
economic inequality to trigger conflict (also drawing on Gamson, 1992). They also note
that the political exclusion of groups leads to conflict via “a sense of moral outrage”
(Buhaug et al., 2014, 421).
Weidmann (2015) discusses a number of theoretical arguments that predict conflict
contagion via information flows, including the suggestion that ethnic groups may be-
come more aware of their own discrimination and its injustice as a result of information
about discriminated foreign groups in conflict. However, Weidmann’s research design
does not allow distinguishing this argument from other ones like for example the notion
of strategic learning that he also discusses. The author acknowledges that “[t]he strong
effect I find for international phone calls attests to the importance of communication as
a strong factor affecting the risk of violence. Arguably, the analysis provided can say
little as regards the precise mechanisms that account for this effect (...)” (Weidmann,
2015, 2).
In sum, it is not known empirically whether foreign events can indeed change
groups’ view of their own situation thereby adding to their sense of injustice and moral
outrage. The first part of this thesis helps unpacking the mechanism behind Weidmann
(2015)’s initial findings by operationalising and testing the grievance-based mechanism
more explicitly. Moreover, the first part of this thesis contributes to our understanding
of the role of groups’ perceptions and their stability on the likelihood of conflict more
generally.
Repression literature
A rich empirical literature on government repression has found that the use of repressive
measures is both explained by structural factors such as the regime type and by the
amount of domestic dissent governments face at specific points in time (for example
Regan and Henderson, 2002; Gartner and Regan, 1996) for overviews see (Davenport,
2007a; Hafner-Burton, 2013). Moreover, a number of studies has focused on legal
institutions (for a recent overview see Hill and Jones, 2014). This research agenda
has been enriched by a number of recent studies that focus explicitly on the strategic
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interaction between governments and the domestic opposition (for example Shellman,
2006; Carey, 2006; Pierskalla, 2010).
Repression as a targeted and pre-emptive measure
There are a number of studies that have found repression to be the result of some form
of materialised domestic opposition that threatens the regime (for example Regan and
Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 1995). The purpose of such reactive repression is “(...) to
neutralize political opponents and/or increase the costs of the behavior to such a large
extent that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy of protest” (Davenport, 1995,
685). Repression is expected to deter collective action and violence but governments
await the manifestation of dissent before they retaliate with repression.
Literature on the interaction between government and opposition portrays actors
as reactive to their opponent’s previous action as well. Carey (2006) argues that dissent
triggers government repression and government repression triggers dissent and finds
empirical support for this expectation. Shellman (2006) argues that government as well
as dissident leaders need to reduce audience costs as well as opponent costs and the
cost of their action itself in their interaction. Government and group move simultane-
ously and each actor attempts to match the other’s action with a cost-efficient response.
Actors use outcomes from the previous round to guide their actions. In that sense, a
government is not reactive as it moves at the same time as the opponent and not af-
terwards. However, it is reactive as it uses information about the opponent’s previous
action to decide on its current action. In addition, in this model the government tries to
match the opponent’s action but cannot prevent it.
Similarly, drawing on Lichbach (1987)1, Moore (2000) develops a model to ex-
plain governments’ reaction to dissent. The government chooses repression and accom-
modation in response to the cost that the dissident group has imposed on it. If the group
reacts to government repression with costly violence, the government switches its pol-
icy towards more accommodation and vice versa. The author finds empirical support
for this argument in an analysis of the cases of Sri Lanka and Peru. In this model, the
1Lichbach (1987) develops a substitution model of opposition tactics in order to explain dissident
reaction to government repression. He argues that the opposition is more inclined to use more effective
tactics and less inclined to use tactics that government repression is targeted at. If a government targets
the more effective tactic with repression, the group will substitute it with a larger amount of the less
repressed tactic. This argument is based on the assumption that opposition groups rationally maximise
the benefits of their rebellious action while minimising the costs.
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government exclusively reacts to the dissident group’s previous action as well and does
not take potential future actions of the group into account.
Finally, using a game-theoretic approach, Pierskalla (2010) assumes the govern-
ment to choose between repression and accommodation in reaction to an opponent’s
initial decision to protest. After the government’s action, the group decides on whether
or not to escalate the dispute by rebelling. While accommodation disincentivises the
opponent to rebel in response, repression has no impact on the opponent’s subsequent
decision on whether to fight the government. In the simplest version of the game, re-
pression does not only not have a deterring effect on rebellion but is in fact also not
necessary to deter protest2. Thus, here, repression is not a pre-emptive strategy that
influences subsequent events.
While in empirical repression studies government repression has almost exclu-
sively been explored as a reactive tool, literature on social movements and protest rou-
tinely suggests that government repression can increase the cost of action and in some
cases that governments use pre-emptive repression for this reason. Tilly (1978, 100)
defines repression as “[a]ny action by another group which raises the contender’s cost
of collective action.” He argues that repression is mainly a function of groups’ inter-
ests and the degree to which they diverge from the government’s interest. In addition,
he argues that repression is targeted at specific groups. Lohmann (2004) suggests that
governments react to past protest with repression because past protest offers incentives
for future protests and repression increases the cost of action. Karklins and Petersen
(1993) discuss governments’ use of pre-emptive repression (albeit in reaction to initial
levels of mobilisation) and the deterring effect of repression in case studies on collective
action in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Lawrence (2010, 102) argues that govern-
ments use repression against the leadership of nationalist movements “(...) precisely to
undermine the movement and destroy its ability to organize effectively.” She suggests
this was the case during the French empire. However, these actions were a response to
initial levels of mobilisation as opposed to purely pre-emptive. Finally, Earl (2006) dis-
cusses her earlier argument that instead of focusing on government repression, research
should be focusing on protest control in a wider sense. This widening of the research
agenda will shift focus towards the possibility that “[p]rotest control may be occurring
2This is because it is assumed that governments that are weak have a high cost of repression.
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long before insurgency is evident. In fact, protest control may play an important role as
a switchman, effectively preventing protest mobilization around some grievances and
ineffectively allowing some troubles to boil into protest. (...) Protest control occurs
at all points across a movement–it does not just affect in-progress protest; it affects
whether movements form, how they mobilize, and then the extent to which they mobi-
lize” (Earl, 2004, 77) cited in (Earl, 2006, 130).
In sum, in literature on collective protest, repression is seen to some degree as
a pre-emptive tool. However, while this literature discusses and identifies empirical
occurrences of various degrees of pre-emptive repression geared to deter subsequent
action, its aim is to analyse the occurrence of collective action and not when and to
what degree governments use repression pre-emptively. Therefore, albeit the notion
of pre-emptive repression is far from novel, to the author’s knowledge the pre-emptive
aspect of government repression has rarely been explicitly analysed empirically.
There are few empirical studies where repression has been analysed as an explic-
itly pre-emptive strategy. In a study on regime type and drawing on earlier case studies,
Ross (2001) suggests that resource rich states could be more likely to be repressive as
they have the capacity to repress in order to prevent demands. He finds some support
for this assertion in the case of oil rich states.
Danneman and Ritter (2014, 258) argue that governments use repression in order
to prevent the spillover of violent conflict from close-by states before domestic violence
has materialised because “[p]reemptive repression makes it more difficult for the group
to act and alters its expected utility calculations (...)”. They find empirical support
for this argument on the country-level. The finding that governments monitor foreign
events that increase the likelihood of domestic groups rebelling and react with pre-
emptive violence suggests that they should do the same with domestic threats.
Moreover, Herreros and Criado (2009) argue and find that during the Spanish Civil
War, the rebels were using targeted repression in the territories they controlled in order
to counter perceived threats and pre-empt rebellion against their rule. Similarly, Wood
et al. (2012) argues that governments use violence against groups because they perceive
them as a threat and that this violence increases as a result of foreign intervention in
genocides – at least in the short term – as they increase the perception of this threat.
They find support for this hypothesis.
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Finally, Nordas and Davenport (2013) argue explicitly that governments have in-
centives to use repression to prevent rebellion. According to them, the youth can be
identified by the government as a high threat group and therefore using repression
against them for pre-emptive purposes is cost-efficient. They test this assertion and
find that governments in states with youth bulges are more likely to use repression.
In sum, even though the idea that repression is used to pre-empt action is far from
new, to the best of the author’s knowledge the use of pre-emptive repression against
specific domestic ethnic groups with the goal to prevent them from engaging in violent
collective action has never been tested empirically. This thesis aims to fill this gap by
investigating whether governments use repression against domestic ethnic groups as a
result of these groups’ incentives for rebelling in the near future.
Repression and foreign events
A considerable body of literature analyses countries’ decisions to join international
human rights regimes and the effect of international treaties on human rights. For a
recent overview over this body of literature see Hafner-Burton (2012). A number of
studies have found that states are more likely to ratify certain types of human rights
treaties if close-by states do so (for example Simmons, 2009) but as Hafner-Burton
(2012, drawing on others) notes, there is no consensus about what types of rights this
behaviour exactly extends to. With respect to the effect of international human rights
treaties, a number of studies have found no effect on states’ human rights record while
others find some evidence of positive effects conditional on other factors and some even
find negative effects (for an overview see for example Hafner-Burton, 2012).
While a large body of literature analyses the effect of international regimes on re-
pression, the interest in the effect of events in foreign states that has emerged in conflict
research in recent years has not been paralleled in repression research. Instead, the
actions of governments in response to foreign events are widely ignored for explaining
repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). There are few exceptions that take the role of
governments in conflict contagion processes at least implicitly into account.
Braithwaite (2010) finds that states that are more capable can prevent conflict
breaking out as a result of conflict in a neighbour state. However, this paper does
not explicitly test whether state capacity has a deterring effect on conflict onset as it
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increases the expected cost of attempted rebellion or whether governments take active
measures to prevent contagion at which more capable governments are more success-
ful.
Hill and Rothchild (1986) find that in African countries the presence of radios
actually decreases the likelihood of the contagion of unrest from other countries. They
explain this finding by governments using the radio in order to prevent spill-overs of
conflict from other countries. Again, however, it is not entirely clear here whether
governments do indeed actively attempt to influence information to prevent spill-overs
or whether there is another reason for this observation.
Byman and Pollack (2007, 35) suggest explicitly that governments are aware of
external events: in the context of the suggested tendency for secessionism to be copied
elsewhere they state that “[r]epressive regimes make this claim frequently to justify
harsh actions against internal dissent (...)”.
Similarly, in the context of democratisation in post-soviet states, Beissinger (2007)
argues that elites learn from the example of successful rebellions in other states. He
finds evidence for elites both learning how to oppose rebellion more effectively and
officials becoming increasingly likely to defect in expectation of regime change, de-
pending on the timing of a particular rebellion in the overall wave of democratisation.
The finding that elites react explicitly to external events in the context of democratisa-
tion suggests that the same may hold with respect to other contexts as well.
Danneman and Ritter (2014) are the first to explicitly test whether governments
actively try to prevent spill-overs of civil conflicts from other countries to their territory
by way of repression. According to the authors, their study is the first attempt to ad-
dress this gap in two established bodies of literature: They provide insight into whether
repression is also influenced by external developments and they investigate the role
that governments could potentially play in processes of conflict contagion. They find
that governments repress their population as a result of armed civil conflict in close-by
countries. Cultural proximity to other states or similarities in regime type on the other
hand are not found to be drivers of such contagion processes. While providing valuable
insight into the role that direct geographic proximity of conflict plays in governments’
reasoning, this study does not consider arguments about inspiration processes between
groups. Are governments only worried about close-by states or do they also react to
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conflicts that might inspire domestic groups? Inspiration takes place on the group level
and thus some groups are more susceptible than others. Do governments target those
groups in particular? As Danneman and Ritter (2014)’s study is conducted on the coun-
try level, it does not provide insight into these questions. I aim to fill this gap by testing
the argument that governments pre-emptively repress groups they expect to become
inspired by foreign conflicts.
The question of whether governments react to conflicts in other countries is not
only important in order to find an additional determinant of government behaviour
towards the domestic population but also because the behaviour of the government
towards groups to which foreign conflicts might be contagious could play a role in de-
termining the outbreak of conflict itself. In that sense, government reactions to external
conflicts could give important insights into the process of conflict contagion as well,
an angle that has been largely ignored in contagion literature. To date, it has been es-
tablished that governments react with pre-emptive repression to close-by conflicts but
it is not clear whether they react to these conflicts because they fear particular mecha-
nisms by which specific domestic groups might become inspired or whether they react
to any form of unrest close-by with increases in repression against the entire domestic
population. I address this question here by suggesting two mechanisms of inspiration,
one based on similar grievance and one based on successful outcomes, to which gov-
ernments might react by targeting their repression at specific groups they expect to be
inspired.
Repression and discrimination
This thesis uses ethnic discrimination to explain government repression. Accordingly,
they are seen as conceptually distinct. I follow Cederman et al. (2010)’s definition
of ethnic discrimination. Here, an ethnic group is considered to be discriminated if
“[g]roup members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with
the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active dis-
crimination can be either formal or informal” (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). On the
other hand, “[b]y most accounts, repression involves the actual or threatened use of
physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring
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specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel,
practices or institutions” (Davenport (2007a, 2) drawing on Goldstein (1978, xxvii)).
Davenport (2007a, 2) suggests that repressive behaviour is not coercion to prevent
crime but rather “(...) applications of state power that violate First Amendment-type
rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity
or security.” This definition explicitly excludes unequal access to resources as a form
of repression (Davenport, 2007a). In addition, I explicitly exclude unequal access to
power from the definition.
Discrimination is a group’s exclusion from power. Discrimination can deprive a
group from resources that can be redistributed by the state to other groups (Cederman
et al. (2010) drawing on Wimmer (2002), Wimmer (2002)). In that sense, excluding
groups is an end that can be beneficial to governments in and of itself. Repression, on
the other hand, requires the state to use resources (see for example Davenport, 2007b).
Therefore, states should only have an incentive to use repression against a group if
repression contributes to a beneficial end from the point of view of a government such
as for example tranquility3 but not as an end in and of itself. In other words, repression
is conceptualised here as a means for a state to achieve wanted outcomes4.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the relationship between ethnic discrimina-
tion and government repression has not been investigated empirically in a large-n study
to date. However, using discrimination to approximate the likelihood for conflict, as
is done here, is in line with attempts in the repression literature to operationalise the
potential for dissent using measures such as population (for an overview see Ritter and
Conrad, forthcoming, 13).
Repression and conflict
This thesis studies repression as a tool to prevent conflict on the actor-level and thus
adds considerably to our understanding of the interdependence of the two phenomena
(on interdependence see Carey, 2006). To date, although it is widely assumed that the
two phenomena are closely linked, the actual links remain somewhat evasive.
It is fairly well-established in repression literature that high levels of dissent
3According to Davenport (2007b), order is the primary reason for states to use repression.
4See Davenport (2007b) for an overview over positions where repression is a means towards an end.
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(Carey, 2006) lead to government repression. Civil war is found to be the most impor-
tant predictor of government repression in an analysis comparing a number of explana-
tory factors for repression (Hill and Jones, 2014), for an overview see Hafner-Burton
(2013). However, as Hill and Jones (2014) note, there is some definitional overlap
between civil war and repression as non-combatant victims of the government are in-
cluded in repression measures.
On the other hand, the effect of government repression on subsequent violence is
much more controversial. Empirical studies have both found that repression encourages
dissent (Carey, 2006) and that high levels of repression deter violent dissent but only in
autocracies (Gupta et al., 1993). To the best of the author’s knowledge, conflict research
has not considered the actual effect of repression on armed conflict. The only exception
is Walter (2006) who finds that repression increases groups’ likelihood of forming an
armed self-determination movement.
One reason for why repression is not included in studies of armed conflict may
be the underlying endogeneity that results if indeed repression affects conflict and con-
flict affects repression. However, exploring the relationship is of utmost importance
to understand both phenomena better. This thesis contributes to knowledge about this
relationship. It argues that and tests whether repression is used to deter conflicts, that is
that a high threat of conflict can lead to high repression. The analyses introduced here
allow inference about states’ knowledge of causes of conflicts as well as their readiness
to counter these causes. If states have such knowledge and act to prevent conflict, stud-
ies finding a provoking effect of repression on subsequent violence may in fact reflect
a failed preventive rather than a provoking logic. Moreover, the effect of factors known
to cause conflict may in part reflect government actions to prevent conflict that are more
successful under some conditions than others. Thus, knowledge of whether and when
repression is used pre-emptively is of fundamental importance to further understand
the relationship between government repression and opposition violence.
Conclusion
This thesis aims to investigate whether armed conflict spreads between states as a result
of shared grievances and whether government repression is used to prevent armed eth-
nic conflict. Both phenomena have severe negative effects on civilians and knowledge
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about their causes is important in order to prevent them from occurring. In particular,
understanding whether repression is not only used as a reactive but also as a prospec-
tive tool that is targeted at specific domestic actors will add to our ability to explain
and predict governments’ use of repression. This knowledge allows the international
community to identify groups whose civilians are in danger of being targeted with gov-
ernment repression in order to be able to monitor and deter such actions.
Of course, if repression indeed deters rebellion – and as noted above, whether that
is the case is empirically far from clear – preventing government repression that is tar-
geted at preventing conflict may lead to the actual outbreak of armed conflict and thus
have an unexpected negative effect on civilian populations. Therefore, the question
on the effect of government repression on subsequent violence remains an important
field of investigation. After all, if repression increases the likelihood of violence, com-
municating this information to repressive states may decrease the use of repression
for preventive reasons. However, in order to know whether communicating this is a
strategy that will reduce repression, it is important to know whether governments use
repression for pre-emptive reasons. On the other hand, if repression indeed deters vio-
lence – or at least as long as governments believe so and use repression for that reason –
instead of exclusively focusing on deterring government repression it may be necessary
for the international community to offer governments alternative ways to prevent con-
flict. One such way could be decreasing the exclusion of ethnic groups from access to
resources. For this, the international community could consider providing governments
with resources that could be distributed to discriminated groups.
This chapter has reviewed relevant literature on both armed civil conflict and gov-
ernment repression and situated the contributions made by the arguments and empirical
analyses offered in this thesis in existing literature. The next three chapters of this the-
sis will introduce and empirically test the three arguments on conflict contagion and
pre-emptive government repression that are advanced in this thesis.
Chapter 3
Conflict contagion
Introduction
Recent global developments such as the wave of uprisings that spread through the Arab
world in the context of the Arab spring and the Occupy movement serve as forceful
reminders that collective action can be contagious across state borders. The conta-
gion of armed conflict between countries has increasingly become a subject of interest
for scholars of conflict. However, while considerable knowledge has been accumu-
lated about the tendency for armed conflict to spread to close-by states (for exam-
ple Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008), little is known about non-geographic transmission
channels of conflict contagion and about the mechanisms behind conflict contagion via
non-geographic channels. Understanding all mechanisms by which conflicts can be
transmitted to other countries is of fundamental importance in order to be able to either
prevent conflict contagion or to prepare and plan measures to alleviate the suffering of
civilian populations beforehand.
A recent study finds that ethnic conflict can be transmitted between countries
if populations communicate frequently via telephone (Weidmann, 2015). Weidmann
(2015) is the first study to explore the spread of armed conflict via information flows
and thus substantively widens current knowledge about conflict contagion. How-
ever, Weidmann (2015) does not explore the actual mechanism accounting for con-
flicts spreading as a result of communication. This chapter adds to our knowledge of
information-based conflict contagion by exploring the underlying mechanism by which
conflicts can spread through information networks. I argue that information about for-
eign conflicts involving groups that are ethnically discriminated increases the sense
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of grievance amongst groups that are are disadvantaged in similar ways. This argu-
ment builds upon Kuran (1998) and is also suggested as one potential mechanism for
information-based conflict contagion in Weidmann (2015). However, while Weidmann
does not test this argument, this chapter operationalises and tests the grievance-based
argument specifically. In addition, this chapter explores the role of information trans-
mitted via mass media as opposed to direct communication in conflict contagion pro-
cesses.
I find evidence supporting the argument on a contagious effect of armed conflict
on countries where groups have similar grievances like the challenger in the original
conflict. Thus, grievance-based inspiration seems to be one of the mechanisms under-
lying information-based contagion processes. The availability of media sources such as
radios is found to be important for this process to take place. Other factors that were ex-
pected to also play a role for information flows via mass media such as media freedom
are not found to be important for conflict contagion under the mechanism tested here.
Thus, the chapter finds some evidence that information via mass media contributes to
contagion processes.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the argument and
the third section discusses the data and methods used to test the argument empirically.
Section four presents empirical results and section five introduces a number of robust-
ness test before section six concludes.
The argument
Ethnic grievance and foreign inspiration
Previous research finds that ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of armed
conflict (for example Cederman et al., 2010). An ethnic group is discriminated if
“[g]roup members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with
the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active dis-
crimination can be either formal or informal” (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). I argue
that ethnic discrimination only provides a group with an incentive to rebel against the
government, if a group is collectively aware of its grievance (for example Buhaug et al.,
2014; Cederman et al., 2011) and recognises that the grievance is the result of inten-
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tional actions by the government1.
For discriminatory practices against an ethnic group to translate into a grievance
strong enough to trigger collective group action2, group members need to have a clear
picture of the actual severity of the disadvantages resulting from discriminatory poli-
cies3. In order to perceive a group-specific grievance, they also need to be aware of
the targeting of discriminatory policies at group members in particular (Klandermans
et al., 2001)4. If the grievance is not perceived as specific to the group, it is unlikely
that mobilisation will take place along ethnic lines5. For example, if group members
came to believe that the disadvantages members experience are a result of class dif-
ferences, mobilisation should take place along class lines. Even if group members are
collectively aware of their group-specific disadvantage, this may not be sufficient for
perceiving a grievance. It is also important that group members have a clear sense of
the unjust nature of this disadvantage (also see Buhaug et al., 2014; Cederman et al.,
2011). It is possible that groups are aware of disadvantages without being fully aware
of the injustice thereof if current circumstances are justified in a credible way. For ex-
ample, Wood (2003) finds that the conflict in El Salvador was the result of an increasing
awareness of the injustice of the labour system and a god given duty to resist that were
propagated by agents of the catholic church. Similarly, Gurr (1993, 164) notes that
for example “Afro-American minorities in Latin America seemingly accept dominant
groups’ myth that Luso-Hispanic societies are benignly color-blind.” Thus, in sum,
for an ethnic group to perceive a group-specific grievance that can result in collective
action, group members need to be collectively aware of the disadvantages they face, of
the ethnically specific nature of these disadvantages and of the injustice of the current
system.
However, even if an ethnic group perceives an ethnically specific grievance that
provides a strong incentive for collective action to improve the situation of group mem-
1Also see Gurr (2000) and Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of eco-
nomic inequality.
2See for example Gurr (1993) on the notion that objective disadvantage translates into grievance and
on the need of strong grievances for action.
3Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality.
4Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality;
Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988).
5Also see Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988); see Martin (1986) for an
overview over literature arguing that and investigating whether group grievance causes group action.
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bers, different courses of action are possible. For a group to choose action against the
government in an attempt to overcome their grievance, group members need to be aware
of the government’s culpability (Buhaug et al., 2014), drawing on (Gamson, 1992), in
the context of economic inequality; also see (Gurr, 2000)6. After all, if a group per-
ceives an ethnic grievance as not being caused by government actions, it might not
come to the conclusion that struggle against the government is necessary to overcome
the grievance. For example, if group members believe that their specific disadvantages
stem from the backwardness of the region the group resides in and that the government
is trying to solve these structural problems, they might come to the conclusion that
disadvantages will resolve over time. Similarly, if group members believe that foreign
actors are to be blamed for their situation, they might decide to take actions against
them.
How can groups’ awareness of their grievance and its causes change? Observing
foreign discriminated groups mobilise against the government to improve their posi-
tion can increase such awareness amongst domestic discriminated groups (Weidmann,
2015)7. Kuran (1998) argues that discourses about ethnic discrimination in other so-
cieties can lead to an increasing focus on the issue in a country. This can lead ethnic
groups to “(...) start blaming their own disappointments on other ethnic groups” (Kuran,
1998, 50) which can in turn result in ethnic conflict8. He also argues that information
flows transmitted by mass media play a role in this process.
Following Kuran (1998) and Weidmann (2015), I argue that information about
conflicts involving foreign ethnically discriminated groups increase awareness of tar-
geted discrimination, of the intent with which this policy is enforced among domestic
groups and of the injustice thereof. As a result, the perceived grievance of ethnic dis-
crimination and the expectation that violence against the government is necessary to
overcome the grievance increase. The theoretical argument is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
6Klandermans et al. (2001) find that trust in the government moderates the formation of grievances
in the context of South Africa.
7Also see McAdam and Rucht (1993) on the adoption of problem definitions and identities in the
context of diffusion from the US New Left to its German counterpart as well as for example Elkins and
Simmons (2005)’ argument that decision makers can learn from countries with similar visible character-
istics.
8Kuran (1998) does not explicitly argue that the grievance that will be perceived as ethnic by the
inspired population needs to be ethnic in the first place but I take his argument to imply that such demon-
stration is most likely if there exists ethnic discrimination among potentially inspired groups.
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Figure 3.1: The link between a foreign conflict over discrimination, a domestic group’s dis-
crimination and anti-government action.
Country A, Group A Country B, Group B
Discrimination
Grievance
Armed conflict
Aware of severity, targeting, injustice
Aware of government intent
Discrimination
Grievance
Armed conflict
Aware of severity, targeting, injustice
Aware of government intent
Information
Boldface implies the presence of a condition
The theoretical argument implies that, empirically, a larger number of conflicts
involving discriminated groups in other countries should increase the likelihood of
conflict in countries where groups are discriminated against as long as the domestic
population gains information about the foreign conflicts. The higher the number of
domestic discriminated groups, the higher the probability of at least one of them taking
action. Thus, we can derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should
increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more dis-
criminated groups there are in country i but only if the population in i gains information
about these conflicts.
I argue here that foreign discriminated groups’ violent action can be inspirational
to all other discriminated groups that become aware of it, irrespective of other fac-
tors such as geographic proximity or ethnic kinship. But is it realistic to expect that
discriminated groups would become aware of and identify with the struggles of other
groups with similar grievances in other parts of the world? An example can shed light
on this question.
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The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa formed an armed wing
in 1961 in order to oppose the Apartheid government. Initially using sabotage, the
organisation engaged in full-fledged armed conflict under UCDP criteria from 1981 to
1988, also due to an improved opportunity for violence as a result of the independence
of close-by states which offered support (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c). In
1971, Oliver Tambo, then President of the ANC (African National Congress), said in a
public statement on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the ANC’s armed wing:
“Now let us talk of Freedom,. [sic!] Everywhere in the world today, the oppressed
and exploited masses of people are up in arms. (...) They stand for peace and justice: they
clamour for an end to imperialist wars; they yearn for the birth of a new order. And to
uphold their convictions they are prepared to pay with their own lives. These men, women
and children whose lives are massacred in the struggle for liberation are in Vietnam,
in Laos, in Khmer, in Thailand; they are in Palestine, in the Sinai peninsula and other
Arab lands under Zionist occupation. There are fierce struggles being waged in Angola,
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau; there are battles in Zimbabwe and Namibia; in Comoro and
other islands in the Indian Ocean. Yes, there is a life and death struggle against United
States imperialism and its lackeys throughout the Latin American continent” (Tambo,
1971).
Here, identification with foreign struggles is driven by an awareness of a similar
grievance or goal, not by ethnic kinship, a common religion or even direct geographic
proximity between countries. Instead, it seems that discriminated groups frame their
struggle in the context of a wider struggle against oppression including other groups
perceived as similarly oppressed elsewhere.
Even though the argument here focuses on the effect of foreign conflicts, it does
not imply that domestic conflicts should not have an effect on other domestic groups’
conflict likelihood. One group fighting in a country should be particularly instructive
to other domestic groups because information about domestic conflicts is particularly
available. However, the study of domestic inspiration is complicated by rival causal
mechanisms such as groups learning about their government’s behaviour in particular
(Walter, 2006) and freeriding between domestic groups with similar goals (Metternich
et al., 2013). Which causal mechanism is prevalent in cases of domestic contagion is
an important question that would fruitfully be addressed in future research. However,
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this question is beyond the scope of this chapter.
In addition, non-violent struggles by ethnically discriminated groups in other
countries could increase awareness of ethnic discrimination in a society and thus trigger
demonstration effects as well. However, this chapter focuses exclusively on the effect of
violent conflict. Investigations into the inspirational effect of nonviolent protest about
ethnic discrimination would be a fruitful avenue for future research as well.
Information flows as transmission channel
The causal mechanism suggested here does not require geographic proximity between
conflicts and potentially infected countries (also see Weidmann, 2015). Instead, it re-
quires a sufficient number of people in a society to be aware of a particular discrimi-
nated group’s involvement in conflict elsewhere. Awareness can occur through direct
relations and through non-relational channels, for example the mass media9. Weidmann
(2015) finds initial evidence for the former channel playing a role in the contagion of
ethnic conflict. The focus here is on the latter channel.
The likelihood that the domestic population has gained awareness of foreign con-
flicts via mass media is difficult to determine. Several factors are expected to play a
role for information flows between two countries via mass media.
Firstly, the degree to which the population has access to media sources such as
radio, print media, TV or the Internet affects the likelihood that a sufficient share of
the population in the receiving country gains information about foreign events (also
see for example Hill and Rothchild, 1986). As the availability of media sources should
increase the likelihood of information about foreign events in a country, the proposi-
tion about the empirical implication of the contagion mechanism in the presence of
information can be reformulated as an empirically testable hypothesis in the context of
media availability.
Hypothesis 1: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J
should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the
more discriminated groups there are in country i and the more media sources are avail-
able to the population in country i.
9See Weidmann (2015) and McAdam and Rucht (1993), drawing on the work of others such as
Rogers and Eveland (1981), in the context of general diffusion phenomena.
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Secondly, state control of the media can prevent information about conflicts else-
where from reaching a country or allow the government to frame it in a way that is
beneficial for it (Hill and Rothchild, 1986). Therefore, a sufficient degree of openness
of the receiving country is expected to be necessary for citizens to gain unbiased infor-
mation about developments elsewhere through the media. This assertion is supported
by the empirical results in Hill and Rothchild (1986). Thus, the empirical proposition
derived from the theory can also be formulated as a hypothesis in the context of media
freedom as a factor necessary for information to reach a country.
Hypothesis 2: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J
should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the
more discriminated groups there are in country i but only if the media in country i are
free.
Thirdly, not all countries are equally likely to be covered by the media in different
countries. Kuran (1998) suggests that countries that are economically stronger exert a
stronger contagious effect on other countries than weaker ones do because they have
a greater impact on international information flows. Similarly, Elkins and Simmons
(2005) suggest that states are more likely to learn from more prominent countries.
Thus, the likelihood of hearing about events in economically stronger countries can be
expected to be higher10. Accordingly, the proposition can be formulated as a hypoth-
esis in the context of the prominence of the conflict country as a factor increasing the
likelihood of a conflict becoming known elsewhere.
Hypothesis 3: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J
should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the
more discriminated groups there are in country i and the higher the economic promi-
nence of the conflict countries J .
10This expectation is also in line with the notion about the impact of elite nations in Galtung and Ruge
(1965)’s prominent study on characteristics of events that increase the likelihood of media attention, even
though this article suspects that it may only be of importance in western states. Mowlana (1997, 44-47)
provides an overview over research finding that news tend to flow from richer to poorer countries.
44
Fourthly, there is a geographical element to media coverage: events in more prox-
imate countries are more likely to appear in the media (Hill and Rothchild, 1986),
drawing on others such as (Katz and Wedell, 1977); (Mowlana, 1997). However,
this factor is somewhat problematic as it is hard to disentangle whether the impact
of geographic proximity on conflict contagion is indeed explained by its implications
for media coverage, due to direct information-sharing opportunities between close
countries or as a result of physical spill-over processes of conflict. Nevertheless, the
empirical proposition can be reformulated in the context of capital distance.
Hypothesis 4: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J
should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the
more discriminated groups there are in country i and the closer country j is to country
i.
Ultimately, all of the factors introduced above are expected to play a role for infor-
mation flows between two countries via mass media. In particular, media freedom of
the receiving country is expected to be a necessary factor for such information flows
and as a result the other factors should not be able to exert their effect in the absence of
media freedom. High values on media source availability, prominence of the conflict
country and proximity between countries on the other hand may not be necessary for
information flows between two countries but increase the likelihood of such flows. The
main model attempts to test the empirical proposition introduced above in the context
of information transmitted by mass media by drawing on all information factors intro-
duced here. Thus, the main model tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J
should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the
more discriminated groups there are in country i and the higher the likelihood that the
population in country i gains information about such conflicts in countries J via mass
media.
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Data and methods
In this section, I introduce the research design used to test the argument that conflicts
involving ethnically discriminated groups in other countries can trigger ethnic conflict
in countries with discriminated groups if information about these foreign conflicts is
available. The units of analysis in this study are country-years. The dataset constructed
here covers years from 1949 to 2004.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable takes the value one when at least one ethnic conflict broke out
in a country in a given year and zero otherwise. I use data from the Growup database11.
“For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, armed organizations must both explicitly pur-
sue ethnonationalist aims and recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic
affiliations” (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). The EPR project requires at least two years
below the 25 battle deaths threshold for a year to be counted as a new onset (Hunziker,
2011). Years of ongoing conflict without onsets are assigned the value zero on the
dependent variable.
Independent variables
In order to construct measures for testing the hypotheses on the inspirational effect of
ongoing conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere, I start by counting the number of
discriminated groups represented in high intensity ethnic conflict by at least one armed
group in every country-year12. For this I draw on the Growup database. In addition, I
include all extrasystemic conflicts in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010
(Gleditsch et al., 2002) up until and including the year of independence (Gleditsch and
Ward, 2013). In the following I will refer to these conflicts as colonial conflicts for
simplicity. There is no data on colonial conflicts in EPR and it is thus not clear in
how far groups were discriminated and which ethnic groups were most involved in
the uprising against the colonial power. However, I assume that in colonial states the
11This database includes data from the Correlates of War State System Membership List v2008.1
(Correlates of War Project, 2008), the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version 2.0 (Cederman et al.,
2010), the GeoEPR-ETH Dataset 2.0 (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011), the Non-State Actor Dataset Version
3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the ACD2EPR Docking Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and the
UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
12An ethnic group can be represented in several conflicts (Hunziker, 2011) which will all be counted.
However, this is very rare.
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population in general is politically discriminated as the highest offices are unreachable
to them. I only consider conflict years of at least 1000 battle deaths (Harbom, 2010) as
inspirational as those are most likely to become known in other countries13.
In addition, the factors that have been argued to be relevant for information flows
between countries above need to be operationalised. The first factor that is expected
to enhance information about external events is the availability of media sources in a
country i. To operationalise media availability, the average per capita rate of TV and
radio is used14. Data on the number of radios per capita and the number of TVs per
capita is extracted from (Banks, 2011a). To the best of the author’s knowledge, the data
offered by Banks is the only available quantitative data source on the availability of
these media sources. Banks (2011a) combines information from a number of sources
such as for example the UN Statistical Yearbook (Banks, 2011b). In addition, some
missing data points are filled in by the database using estimates. As the data host
acknowledges, the reliability of the data can vary (Banks, 2011c)15. I use the natural
log of this variable as the average media source rate is skewed.
To operationalize whether the media of a country is free or not, Freedom House
Freedom of the Press historical data (Freedom House) is used. The threefold measure
of free, partly free and unfree is dichotomized here16. Unfree countries are assigned a
value of zero and free and partly free ones a value of one as they are expected to be
reached by at least some information about external events. The author’s own analysis
finds some cases of internal inconsistencies in the data. Such cases are excluded from
the analysis17. Better data on media freedom is not available and thus the author resorts
to using this data in order to be able to provide a first exploration of the role of media
freedom in conflict contagion processes.
The third factor that is expected to enhance the likelihood of information about
13See Mowlana (1997, 52) on earlier studies that find that news about developing countries focus on
violence.
14For additional information on the coding of this variable see Appendix A.
15The data also contains some working estimates that need to be seen with “extreme caution” (Banks,
2011c, 3). However, the predicted probabilities derived from model one on media availability are robust
to the exclusion of these estimates. In addition, the author’s own analysis shows that there are cases of
ten-fold increases or indeed decreases in the per capita rate of a media source in the radio and TV data.
However, such cases are rare – .01 per cent of non-missing observations from Banks – and therefore the
data is taken at face value without making speculative corrections.
16For additional information on the coding of this variable see appendix A.
17In addition, the yearly mean of media freedom drops in 1989 which is likely the result of a change
in measuring by the data source.
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events in a country is economic prominence. Economic prominence of a country j
is operationalised by its real GDP per capita (2000 prices) using data from Gleditsch
(2002). In the case of colonial conflicts and successes in colonial contexts, I use the
GDP of the colonial power.
I also expect that geographic proximity increases the likelihood of information
flows between two countries. I operationalise proximity by the inverse of the distance
between the capitals of two countries using data extracted from Cshapes (Weidmann
et al., 2010). It is expected that capital distance accounts best for the influence of
distance on information flows as many media sources and in particular news agencies
that redistribute information within countries are likely to be located in capitals and
consider events that are closest to them18.
Finally, and most importantly, an index combining all information-related factors
is introduced in an attempt to operationalise the overall likelihood of people in a country
i gaining awareness about developments in another country j via mass media. In order
to combine logged media availability, GDP of country j and inverse capital distance
in one measure they need to be translated to equal scales. For this, percentile scores
will be used to assign a score from one to 100 to the values of these variables in each
directed dyad19 and the sum of these scores is used below to weight relevant conflicts.
While media availability, proximity and economic strength are expected to increase
information and thus can to some degree substitute for each other, a minimum degree of
media freedom is considered necessary for information to reach a sufficient number of
citizens in a country. Thus, below an interaction between index-weighted high intensity
conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere and media freedom will be
introduced.
As inspirational effects of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups
are expected to be limited to domestic groups that also experience discrimination, I
introduce a variable on the number of domestic discriminated groups of at least five per
cent population share using data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman
et al., 2010). In the following I describe how the variable on domestic discriminated
18In the case of etrasystemic conflicts, values on capital distance are interpolated from the first year of
independence in pre-independence years.
19While percentile scores on media availability have been determined from the entire sample, per-
centile scores of GDP have been determined separately in each year and percentile scores of inverse
capital distance for every country i in each year.
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groups in each potentially receiving country, i, is combined with conflict involvements
of discriminated groups in other countries, referred to as countries J , and with the
information factor in each hypothesis. Table 3.1 gives an overview over the strategies
used to test each hypothesis.
To test hypothesis one on the impact of media availability, the number of high
intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in all countries other than a
country i are aggregated to a total yearly number. Subsequently, this sum for each
country i is interacted with the number of discriminated groups in country i as well as
with logged media availability in country i in a triple interaction effect to test the im-
pact of media availability. Similarly, to test hypothesis two on media freedom, a triple
interaction effect is introduced between the aggregate number of conflict involvements
of discriminated groups elsewhere, the number of discriminated groups in i and press
freedom in i.
To test hypothesis three on the impact of the GDP per capita of each country j,
I multiply the number of discriminated groups’ conflict involvements in each other
country j by j’s GDP per capita before summing the resulting values of all countries
other than i itself in each year. This measure is interacted with the variable on the
number of discriminated groups in each country i as well.
Hypothesis four is tested using the inverse capital distance between a country i and
a country j to weight conflict involvements in each country other than i before sum-
ming them as introduced in the literature on spatial lags (see for example Plu¨mper and
Neumayer, 2010). The resulting sum of weighted foreign conflict involvements of dis-
criminated groups for each country i is also interacted with the number of discriminated
groups in country i.
And finally, to test the effect of the combined measure operationalising informa-
tion flows via mass media, I weight conflict involvements of discriminated groups in
each country j other than i by the index built from media availability in i, GDP of
country j and capital distance between i and j. Subsequently, I interact this measure
with the number of discriminated groups in i and press freedom in country i.
The weighted measures20 are not row-standardised as the theory would expect that
20Weighted measures were constructed using the Stata package spmon (Neumayer and Plu¨mper,
2010).
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every additional discriminated group engaging in ethnic conflict elsewhere could have
an impact on a country as long as society gains information about it, irrespective of how
many other events people hear about. This is equivalent to assuming that discriminated
groups’ awareness of their situation can always become greater.
As endogeneity is a potential problem because influence can be exerted from coun-
try i to country j as well as from j to i (Franzese and Hays, 2007; Plu¨mper and Neu-
mayer, 2010) all measures on discriminated groups’ conflict involvements are time-
lagged by one year to alleviate the problem21. To match the variables on inspirational
potential, all additional constitutive terms of the interactions introduced above are time-
lagged by one year as well.
Table 3.1: Interactions in models 1–5.
Model Information factor Interaction terms
1 Media availability
High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J , t-1
* Media availability in i, t-1
* Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
2 Media freedom
High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J , t-1
* Media freedom in i, t-1
* Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
3 GDP j
High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J
multiplied by GDP of each country j, t-1
* Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
4 Capital distance
High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J
weighted by inverse capital distance between i and j, t-1
* Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
5
Info index
and media freedom
High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J
weighted by the information index, t-1
* Media freedom in i, t-1
* Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
Control variables
Below I discuss control variables that are introduced to prevent confounding (Ray,
2003). Firstly, other close-by conflicts could have an effect on the occurrence of con-
flicts involving discriminated groups as well as on conflict onset in the country in ques-
tion. It is important to control for the presence of any close-by conflicts that are not
included in the variable on conflicts of discriminated groups. Therefore, I control for
whether there was at least one intra-state or colonial conflict in a direct neighbour that
does not fulfill the criteria for inclusion in this independent variable of interest. For this
I draw on data from the Growup database as well. Whether a country is a direct neigh-
bour is determined using Cshapes (Weidmann et al., 2010) and defining adjacency as a
21See Franzese and Hays (2007) for a discussion of shortcomings of this solution and alternatives.
The discussion also draws on Beck et al. (2006).
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minimum distance of less than ten kilometres between two states22.
In addition, the regime type could be a confounding factor as it might be causal
to variables of interest such as media freedom or political discrimination as well as the
likelihood of conflict onset. I use the xpolity measure (Vreeland, 2008) drawing on
Polity 4 data (Gurr et al., 1989).
I also control for the natural log of the real GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002)
as this variable might have an impact on the availability of media sources as well as
conflict onset. Finally, I control for a country’s total population in millions using data
from Gleditsch (2002) as more populous countries might have a higher chance of dis-
criminated groups as well as conflict onset.
I also include the year of observation as it might be that the increase in media
sources and information flows over time is confounded with other developments over
time and as the number of conflicts might follow a time trend as well.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.
Estimation and analysis
Only about 1.9 per cent of the country-years between 1950 and 2004 saw the onset of
an ethnic conflict. When the event under scrutiny is rare, coefficients estimated using
standard logit models are biased and probability calculations following the usual logit
formula are problematic (King and Zeng, 2001). I use a rare events logistic regression
model to correct for biased coefficients as suggested by King and Zeng (2001) with
country-clustered standard errors. In addition, I follow King and Zeng (2001)’s sug-
gestion to simulate probabilities as described for example in King et al. (2000). For
this, I use the Stata package developed by Tomz et al. (2003).
It can be expected that the likelihood of ethnic conflict in a given year depends
partly on whether there was an ethnic conflict in a country in the year before. Past
domestic conflict can also influence additional conflicts elsewhere and might thus be
a confounding variable. This time dependency is corrected for by including the num-
ber of years since the last ethnic conflict in a country alongside a squared and cubed
term (Carter and Signorino, 2010). For this measure, again, I draw on data from the
Growup database. In addition, I include a lagged dependent variable as a test sug-
22In the case of colonial conflicts in years before independence, again, values on distances are inter-
polated from the year of independence.
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Table 3.2: Variable summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups, t-1 2.11 1.43 0 6
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by GDP, t-1 5555.67 6478.05 0 26351.95
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by capital distance, t-1 .0006 .0029 0 .1182
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by info index, t-1 303.11 225.87 0 1160
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 -2.15 1.23 -7.24 1.27
Number of discriminated groups, t-1 .26 .57 0 4
Press freedom dummy, t-1 .60 .49 0 1
Natural log of GDP per capita 8.13 1.11 5.14 11.08
Population (1000000s) 33.45 108.86 .23 1294.85
Xpolity .73 4.95 -6 7
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 .42 .49 0 1
Peace years 18.81 15.63 0 55
Year 1979.28 15.56 1949 2004
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 .02 .14 0 1
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gested in Wooldridge (2002)23 indicates that the peace year terms do not eliminate time
dependency in all models.
Table 3.5 gives an overview over the sign and statistical significance of interac-
tion effects introduced in models one through five. To determine significance, I use
simulation techniques from King et al. (2000)24. I start by simulating the difference
in the outcome probability between a scenario with the highest and the lowest occur-
rence of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups at different values of
additional interaction variables. I refer to this difference as the inspirational effect of
foreign conflict in table 3.5. To evaluate whether the number of discriminated groups
has a significant effect on this inspirational effect of foreign conflict, as the theory sug-
gests, I simulate the difference in the strength of this inspirational effect in a scenario
with three discriminated groups and a scenario with no such groups. I refer to this
difference in table 3.5 as the moderating effect of discriminated groups. In models
three and four, conflict involvements are already weighted by the respective informa-
tion factor and we are only interested in the moderating effect of discrimination on the
effect of these weighted conflict involvements. In models one, two, and five, where
the respective information factor enters as a third interaction term, we are also inter-
ested in whether the interaction between foreign conflicts and domestic discrimination
is different in high and low information scenarios. To determine this, I also simulate the
difference between the moderating effect of discrimination on the effect of foreign con-
flict involvements in the respective high and low information scenario. This third layer
is referred to as the effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and
inspiration in table 3.52526.
Results
In the following I discuss results from models one through five in tables 3.3 and 3.4.
23Note that here probabilities were not simulated but calculated using the logit formula.
24Unlike suggested in King et al. (2000), I use the median as the point prediction to make results
comparable with the Stata package relogitq (Tomz et al., 2003) that is used for predicted probabilities
shown below.
25Simulations of differences as well as the graphical presentation of results draw on material from
Brambor et al. (2006).
26In all simulations, I set the control variable on regime type, logged GDP per capita and population
size to their respective means. The lagged dependent variable and the variable on conflict in neighbour
states are set to zero, the year variable is set to 1990 and the variables on peace years are set to the mean
as well as the squared and cubed terms of this value respectively. The models on media availability and
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Table 3.3: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information
factors: media availability and media freedom.
(1) (2)
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf) -0.0467 0.00794
(0.211) (0.151)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.347+
(0.190)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) -0.0578 -0.0120
(0.579) (0.521)
(Disc)*(Media) -0.108
(0.150)
(Conf)*(Disc) 0.426∗ 0.0181
(0.198) (0.127)
(Conf)*(Media) 0.00277
(0.0692)
(Disc)*(Conf)*(Media) 0.157∗
(0.0696)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.206
(0.611)
(Disc)*(Freed) -0.0527
(0.763)
(Conf)*(Freed) -0.0630
(0.172)
(Disc)*(Conf)*(Freed) 0.0897
(0.229)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.222 -0.415∗
(0.175) (0.162)
Population (1000000s) 0.00193∗∗ 0.00195∗∗∗
(0.000659) (0.000562)
Xpolity 0.00902 0.0356
(0.0339) (0.0290)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.107 0.107
(0.227) (0.271)
Peaceyears -0.0939 -0.104
(0.0692) (0.0726)
Peaceyears2 0.00249 0.00165
(0.00383) (0.00367)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000285 -0.00000546
(0.0000553) (0.0000494)
Year 0.0507∗∗∗ -0.00505
(0.0105) (0.0161)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.899∗ 0.627
(0.358) (0.465)
Constant -102.8∗∗∗ 10.53
(21.47) (32.28)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 3.4: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information
factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.
(3) (4) (5)
GDP Distance Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPconf) 0.00000203
(0.0000164)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.321 0.264 -0.248
(0.196) (0.202) (0.584)
(Disc)*(GDPconf) -0.0000324+
(0.0000186)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by capital distance, t-1 (Distconf) 33.27∗
(13.10)
(Disc)*(Distconf) -95.45
(143.0)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by index, t-1 (Indconf) -0.000259
(0.00124)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.540
(0.672)
(Freed)*(IndConf) -0.000469
(0.00148)
(Disc)*(IndConf) 0.000498
(0.000969)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.0351
(0.790)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndConf) 0.000815
(0.00157)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.471∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗ -0.380∗
(0.152) (0.147) (0.189)
Population (1000000s) 0.00185∗∗ 0.00191∗∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗
(0.000584) (0.000542) (0.000632)
Xpolity 0.0285 0.0252 0.0458
(0.0293) (0.0280) (0.0340)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.312 0.305 -0.126
(0.226) (0.214) (0.282)
Peaceyears -0.121+ -0.132+ -0.125
(0.0685) (0.0676) (0.0886)
Peaceyears2 0.00372 0.00424 0.00216
(0.00358) (0.00353) (0.00468)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000418 -0.0000477 -0.00000794
(0.0000492) (0.0000490) (0.0000659)
Year 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ -0.00192
(0.00625) (0.00603) (0.0177)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.601∗ 0.546+ 0.715
(0.294) (0.292) (0.454)
Constant -61.01∗∗∗ -60.29∗∗∗ 4.618
(12.77) (12.27) (35.19)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 3.5: Significance of interactions in models 1 – 5.
Model Interaction effect Sign
Significant
(5%)
1. Media availability Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media low) (1) - No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media high) (2) + Yes
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + Yes
2. Media freedom Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1) + No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2) + No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
3. GDP Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict - No
4. Capital distance Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict - No
5.
Info index
and media freedom Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1) + No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2) + No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
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Model one tests hypothesis one suggesting that armed conflicts of ethnically dis-
criminated groups in other countries increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset
within a country more, the more discriminated groups there are and the more media
sources are available to the population. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of ethnic
conflict onset27 predicted from model one where information is operationalised as the
natural log of the average availability of TVs and radios in a country. The figure shows
scenarios with low availability of radios and TV in the panel on the left hand side and
scenarios with a high availability of radio and TV in the panel on the right hand side. In
both panels, the x-axis indicates different numbers of discriminated groups in a state.
Finally, the point prediction in grey illustrates a scenario where the number of conflict
involvements of discriminated groups in all other countries is very low and the point
prediction in black a scenario where this number is very high. Thus, the difference be-
tween the black and the grey prediction can be understood as the effect of an increase in
the number of foreign discriminated groups rebelling against their governments. Un-
der hypothesis one we would expect that this difference increases as the number of
discriminated groups in a country increases as only those groups should be inspired.
However they can only be inspired if they gain information about foreign events. Thus,
we expect the difference between the black and the grey prediction to be larger the more
discriminated groups there are in a country and the more media sources are available.
The expected trend is found in Figure 3.2: The effect of foreign conflict involvements
of discriminated groups increases as the number of discriminated groups increases but
only in the panel on the right hand side where the number of radios and TVs available
is high.
As can be seen in table 3.5, the moderating effect of an increase in the number
of discriminated groups on the effect of increases in foreign conflict involvements of
discriminated groups is significantly positive, but only in the scenario where media
availability is held at the 90th percentile. When media availability is held at the 10th
percentile, the moderating effect of domestic discrimination on the effect of those for-
eign conflict involvements is negative and not significant. Thus, the effect of foreign
discriminated groups rebelling is significantly increased by higher numbers of discrim-
capital distance cover the period from 1950 to 2004, models that include GDP weighted measures cover
1951 to 2004 and models on media freedom and the overall information index cover 1981 to 2004.
27All predicted probabilities are simulated using the Stata package relogitq (Tomz et al., 2003).
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Figure 3.2: The predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset simulated from model 1 on media
availability and foreign high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated
groups.
inated groups in a country but only if radios and TVs are readily available. In addition,
and as can be seen in table 3.5, the effect of a change in media source availability from
the 10th to the 90th percentile on the interaction between domestic discrimination and
conflict involvements of foreign discriminated groups is significantly positive as well.
Thus, the moderating effect of discrimination on the effect of conflict involvements
of foreign discriminated groups is significantly higher in high media scenarios than in
low media scenarios. Overall, hypothesis one is supported by the evidence from model
one. The availability of media sources such as TV and radio as well as a discrimi-
nated domestic population is necessary for an increased likelihood of domestic conflict
breaking out as a result of foreign conflicts over ethnic discrimination. This finding
also suggests that the expectation that media freedom is necessary for inspiration be-
tween similarly discriminated groups via mass media is not supported as we see such
inspiration without taking the presence of media freedom into account.
Figure 3.2 shows that the substantive effect of the mechanism in hypothesis one
is large. In the scenario on the very left, where the availability of radios and TVs is
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low and there are no discriminated groups in a country, the predicted probabilities of
ethnic conflict onset are almost identical, irrespective of whether the number of conflict
involvements of discriminated groups abroad is low (3.1 per cent [1.7; 5.7]) or high
(2.2 per cent [.8; 6.1]). This is considerably different in the scenario on the very right,
where the availability of media sources is high and three groups are discriminated in
a country. Here, the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset at a low number of
foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups is very low with 1 [.1; 9.3] per
cent. On the other hand, when the number of discriminated groups fighting in armed
conflicts elsewhere is high, the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset rises to
77.2 [16.1; 98.3] per cent.
These scenarios are by no means unrealistic. The 90th percentile of logged media
availability corresponds to an average per capita number of TVs and radios of about
.57, similar to a number of cases in the data, for example Canada in the late 70s or
the Lebanon in the late 80s. Six foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups
were experienced by all but the conflict countries in 1982. In 13 countries in the data
two groups are discriminated at some point in their history, in four countries there are
three such groups and in one country there are four.
Model two explores the role of media freedom in the inspiration process un-
der scrutiny. Hypothesis two expects that armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated
groups in other countries can only inspire domestic discriminated groups if domestic
media are free. The results from model two suggest that media freedom by itself is not
only not necessary but also not sufficient as a transmission channel for foreign conflict
involvements of discriminated groups. The predicted onset probabilities in scenarios
with both high and low numbers of conflict involvements of discriminated groups in
other countries are very small and fairly similar irrespective of the number of discrim-
inated groups and the amount of media freedom in a country, albeit here the effect is
slightly larger at higher numbers of discriminated groups in the high freedom scenario.
The simulated interactions in table 3.5 are substantively as expected but very small and
statistically not significant. It needs to be noted that because of a smaller range of years
covered in the variable on media freedom, the sample used here is much smaller than
in models not including the media freedom measure. If tested in this smaller sample,
the hypothesis on media availability is not supported by the evidence either. Therefore,
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the results of all models including media freedom need to be seen with some caution.
In models three and four, where conflict involvements of discriminated groups are
weighted by GDP of country j and distance between i and j respectively, increases
in weighted conflict involvements only have a positive effect on conflict onset when
there are no discriminated groups in a country. While in the case of GDP weighted
conflicts this positive effect is small, in the case of distance weighted conflicts it is
considerable with a 12 per cent increase in onset probability. In addition, and as table
3.5 shows, the simulated interaction with domestic discriminated groups is negative
and not significant in both models. This suggests that neither the prominence nor the
distance of a conflict country by themselves play a role for the inspiration mechanism
introduced here. However, the result on capital distance might suggest that distance
plays a role in a different mechanism where low numbers of discriminated groups are
favourable conditions. It could, for example, be the case that conflicts are contagious to
close-by countries when there is no discriminated population as these governments are
not prepared to deal with domestic unrest by aggrieved groups; a threat that might occur
as soon as refugees reach a country as suggested by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006).
Finally, model five explores the effect of the index on information flows where
foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups are weighted by
media availability, distance and economic prominence of the conflict country and in-
teracted with media freedom which was expected to be necessary for transmission. As
table 3.5 shows, the interactions are as expected in hypothesis five: Domestic discrimi-
nation has a positive effect on the effect of increases in index-weighted foreign conflict
involvements of discriminated groups. This interaction is stronger in the presence of
media freedom than in its absence. However, all these interactions are statistically in-
significant. In addition, substantive effects are smaller than in the model on media
availability only. As model five is performed on a smaller sample because of the in-
clusion of the variable on media freedom, the results on the information index need to
be interpreted with caution. Additional data on media freedom would be required in
order to draw a better comparison between the measure on media availability and the
full specification of information flows introduced here.
In sum, the involvement of foreign discriminated groups in high intensity ethnic
conflicts abroad increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset in countries with dis-
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criminated groups. This effect has been found to depend crucially on the presence of
media sources in a country. On the other hand, this effect is barely present in any of
the models excluding media sources. Thus, the results suggest that a large availability
of media sources may be sufficient as a transmission channel for demonstration effects
between discriminated groups. In fact, high media availability may even be necessary
for transmission via the mass media channel. The results with respect to media free-
dom and the overall information index are unexpected. Media freedom was expected
to be necessary for the transmission of foreign information via mass media but this has
not been found to be the case. The results on the information index suggest that the
overall specification may capture information flows worse than media availability only.
However, additional data on media freedom would be needed for a full assessment of
the transmission channel for inspiration between similarly discriminated populations.
Additional tests of the causal mechanism and robustness
The effect of success as an alternative explanation
Some scholars have argued that successful outcomes of conflict can trigger conflict
contagion (for example Gurr, 2000, in the context of groups in similar circumstances
that are linked by networks of communication). It has been argued that success – even
relatively minor – as a result of a struggle might inspire groups with the same goals
and identities (Byman and Pollack, 2007, in the context of secessionist groups). Suc-
cesses are expected to be inspirational because they increase groups’ optimism about
the likelihood of success for themselves (for example Lake and Rothchild, 1998). In
the context of discriminated groups, these arguments suggest that if a group’s discrim-
ination ends as the result of a violent struggle, other discriminated groups conclude
that violence might be a worthwhile strategy for achieving that goal as well. Under
this mechanism it can be expected that an improvement in an ethnically discriminated
group’s situation as a result of violent rebellion should increase the likelihood of dis-
criminated groups in other countries rebelling as well if they gain information about
it.
In order to rule out that results are driven by the success-based mechanism, the
implications of this mechanism have been tested as well. For this, the measure on
the number of conflict involvements of discriminated groups in all original models has
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been replaced by the number of successes of discriminated groups in all other coun-
tries. Successes are determined as cases where an ethnically discriminated group was
involved in a conflict in a given year and saw an improvement to her situation in the
consecutive year. The Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman et al., 2010) classes
politically relevant ethnic groups’ domestic status into nine categories: monopoly, dom-
inant, senior partner, junior partner, regional autonomy, separatist autonomy, powerless,
discriminated, and state collapse. For a discriminated group, all categories other than
state collapse, separatist autonomy and powerlessness are coded as an improvement
of her situation28. In addition, cases of colonial independence constitute relevant suc-
cesses here. As it is not clear which ethnic groups led the struggle for independence,
I include all cases of independence (Gleditsch and Ward, 2013) that occur in the same
or a subsequent year of an extrasystemic conflict (UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Ver-
sion 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002)) where the majority of the population is no longer
discriminated in the first year of the newly independent state according to the Ethnic
Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman et al., 2010). Here, the threshold for success is
lower than in non-colonial cases as colonial independence is considered to be the main
success. Regression results are shown in tables 3.6 and 3.7.
The model on foreign successes of discriminated groups and media availability
does not show the trend expected under the success-based mechanism. Instead, an
increase in foreign successes of discriminated groups from minimum to maximum has a
positive effect on the probability of ethnic conflict onset, but only in scenarios with low
media availability. In all scenarios with high media availability, on the other hand, such
increases in successes have a negative effect. The effect of an increase in the number of
discriminated groups on the effect of success is positive and statistically significant as
expected, but only in the low media scenario. In the high media scenario this interaction
is negative and not significant. Finally, the effect of media availability on the interaction
effect between discrimination and inspiration is negative and insignificant.
These results offer partial support for the hypothesis. Foreign successes of dis-
criminated groups have a positive effect on ethnic conflict onset that significantly in-
creases with the number of discriminated groups. However, this is only the case in
scenarios with low availability of media sources. Thus, here the availability of media
28More information on the coding of successes can be found in Appendix A.
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sources does not seem to be important. It may be the case that successes of similarly
discriminated groups are so rare and relevant that they become known to discriminated
groups in all countries. But even then some characteristic of low media countries not
included in the model may increase the likelihood of contagion between discriminated
groups.
Figure 3.3: The predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset simulated from model 7 on media
freedom and foreign successes of discriminated groups.
Figure 3.3 shows results from the model on media freedom and foreign successes
of discriminated groups29. The effect of increases in successes of foreign discriminated
groups on the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset is found to increase as the
number of discriminated groups increases in a country. This is the case irrespective of
whether the domestic media is free or not. In fact, the moderating effect of the number
of discriminated groups on the inspirational effect of foreign successes of discriminated
groups is significantly positive in the scenario with no media freedom. The moderating
effect of discrimination is also positive in the scenario with media freedom but not
significantly so. Media freedom does not exert a significant effect on the interaction
29Again, results on media freedom and the information index need to be interpreted with some caution
as they draw on a much smaller sample.
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Table 3.6: Ethnic conflict onset depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere,
information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and
media freedom.
(6) (7)
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Success) -0.527 -0.635
(0.785) (0.418)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.247
(0.167)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 1.008+ -0.118
(0.561) (0.324)
(Disc)*(Media) 0.308+
(0.166)
(Disc)*(Success) -0.373 0.706
(0.880) (0.440)
(Success)*(Media) -0.154
(0.240)
(Disc)*(Success)*(Media) -0.222
(0.218)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.655
(0.406)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.259
(0.421)
(Success) * (Freed) 1.152∗
(0.481)
(Disc)*(Success)*(Freed) -0.465
(0.545)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.243 -0.390∗
(0.171) (0.157)
Population (1000000s) 0.00182∗∗ 0.00191∗∗∗
(0.000667) (0.000579)
Xpolity 0.0117 0.0341
(0.0335) (0.0293)
Conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.0515 0.233
(0.221) (0.295)
Peaceyears -0.0945 -0.109
(0.0652) (0.0760)
Peaceyears2 0.00244 0.00180
(0.00355) (0.00380)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000271 -0.00000687
(0.0000511) (0.0000507)
Year 0.0441∗∗∗ -0.0101
(0.0105) (0.0171)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.870∗ 0.652
(0.370) (0.497)
Constant -89.52∗∗∗ 20.43
(21.64) (34.09)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 3.7: Ethnic conflict onset depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere,
information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance
and the information index.
(8) (9) (10)
GDP Distance Index and Press freedom
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPsuc) 0.0000148
(0.0000309)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.142 0.149 -0.238
(0.186) (0.191) (0.369)
(GDPsuc)*(Disc) 0.0000252
(0.0000221)
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by capital distance, t-1 (Distsuc) -52.13
(306.1)
(Distsuc)*(Disc) 182.8
(194.6)
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by index, t-1 (Indsuc) -0.00470
(0.00416)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.913∗
(0.406)
(Indsuc)*(Disc) 0.00637
(0.00410)
(Indsuc)*(Disc) 0.00870
(0.00530)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.497
(0.433)
(Indsuc)*(Disc)*(Freed) -0.00511
(0.00474)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.452∗∗ -0.479∗∗ -0.373∗
(0.152) (0.149) (0.182)
Population (1000000s) 0.00179∗∗ 0.00186∗∗∗ 0.00205∗∗
(0.000569) (0.000536) (0.000654)
Xpolity 0.0281 0.0269 0.0421
(0.0291) (0.0278) (0.0334)
Conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.481∗ 0.421+ 0.0220
(0.220) (0.215) (0.309)
Peaceyears -0.128+ -0.130+ -0.136
(0.0684) (0.0670) (0.0922)
Peaceyears2 0.00419 0.00419 0.00281
(0.00362) (0.00350) (0.00483)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000486 -0.0000474 -0.0000171
(0.0000503) (0.0000486) (0.0000674)
Year 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗ -0.00475
(0.00588) (0.00589) (0.0157)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.565∗ 0.545+ 0.762
(0.277) (0.301) (0.472)
Constant -65.64∗∗∗ -58.40∗∗∗ 10.10
(11.82) (11.94) (31.16)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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between inspiration and discrimination in this model. Thus, these results also lend
support to the expectation that successes of discriminated groups have an inspirational
effect that is associated with discriminated groups elsewhere. However, media freedom
plays no role here and is by no means necessary for this process to take place.
In model eight, increases in GDP-weighted successes of foreign discriminated
groups have a positive effect on the probability of ethnic conflict onset that increases
with the number of discriminated groups. Thus, the interaction is as expected, albeit
not statistically significant.
In model nine on distance weighted successes, the effect of increases in foreign
discriminated groups’ successes weighted by capital distance increases considerably
with the number of discriminated groups but this interaction is also not significant.
While the effects at positive group numbers are the largest out of all success models,
the uncertainty is also considerable in this model. This might suggest that the actual
specification of the impact of distance is not correct. In fact, when an alternative specifi-
cation on minimum distance is used, the interaction is significantly positive. Alongside
with results from models on media availability and freedom, this result could suggest
that instead of information transmitted by mass media, physical proximity as such is
important under the success mechanism.
Finally, in model ten on the information index none of the interactions in question
is significant. Substantively, as expected, the effect of index weighted foreign successes
of discriminated groups increases as the number of discriminated groups in a country
increases. This interaction is stronger if there is no media freedom. The effect of index-
weighted successes at high numbers of discriminated groups is not as large as the effect
of distance weighted successes.
In sum, the results on success suggest that there might be a success-based inspi-
ration process between similarly aggrieved groups in different countries. However,
information transmitted by mass media does not appear to act as a transmission chan-
nel for this mechanism. Instead, success-based inspiration seems to be transmitted by
geographic proximity. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the results on the effect of
media sources above are the result of a mis-specification where instead of the presence
of conflict generally successful outcomes drive the results. The findings suggest that
exploring the role of foreign successes of groups with similar grievance and the under-
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lying transmission channels would be a fruitful endeavour, especially as to the author’s
knowledge to date successes have exclusively been operationalised in the context of
territorial concessions (Forsberg, 2013, for example).
Placebo test
In order to test whether supportive evidence found in the original models is indeed a
result of the causal mechanism suggested here or of other effects of foreign conflicts,
a placebo test has been conducted. For this, the variables on conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere have been replaced with a variable on high intensity
foreign conflict involvements of ethnic groups that are not discriminated against. The
control variables on additional conflicts in neighbours have been adjusted accordingly.
If the mechanism suggested above held, these events should not have an inspirational
effect on discriminated groups in particular as they should not raise their awareness for
this specific grievance. Thus, the effect of increases in foreign conflicts should not de-
pend on the number of discriminated groups in a country. Predicted probabilities from
these models have been simulated using the same substantive values like in the original
models to allow for direct comparison. The samples in the models on non-discriminated
groups are identical to each respective original model so direct comparison is possible.
Regression results can be found in tables 3.8 and 3.9.
With regards to media availability, the positive effect of increases in relevant for-
eign conflict involvements that was found in high media and high discrimination sce-
narios in the original model is much smaller here. This suggests that in the context of
media availability inspiration is indeed driven by a similarity in grievance.
The placebo test on foreign non-discriminated groups’ conflict involvements in
relation with GDP per capita of the conflict country produces predicted probabilities
fairly similar to the original model suggesting that this factor does not only not play
a role for grievance-based inspiration effects of ongoing conflict but also not for other
contagion mechanisms involving ongoing ethnic conflict. As opposed to the original
models on media freedom and on the information index, the placebo tests do not show
any sign of inspiration.
When high intensity conflict involvements of non-discriminated ethnic groups are
weighted by inverse capital distance, on the other hand, the effect is similar to the orig-
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Table 3.8: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
non-discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Infor-
mation factors: media availability and media freedom.
(11) (12)
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of non-discriminated groups, t-1 (ConfNodisc) 0.0643 0.0851
(0.0646) (0.0612)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.442∗
(0.197)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.887 0.150
(1.129) (0.542)
(ConfNodisc)*(Media) 0.0184
(0.0218)
(ConfNodisc)*(Disc) 0.00914
(0.127)
(Disc)*(Media) 0.130
(0.348)
(Disc)*(Media)*(ConfNodisc) 0.0178
(0.0425)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) 0.673
(0.716)
(ConfNoDisc)*(Freed) -0.114
(0.0858)
(ConfNoDisc)*(Disc) -0.0117
(0.0498)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.257
(0.730)
(Disc)*(ConfNoDisc)*(Freed) -0.0105
(0.0739)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.246 -0.412∗∗
(0.162) (0.158)
Population (1000000s) 0.00180∗∗ 0.00192∗∗∗
(0.000652) (0.000565)
Xpolity 0.0103 0.0383
(0.0330) (0.0266)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.00999 0.237
(0.216) (0.298)
Peaceyears -0.106 -0.0927
(0.0653) (0.0746)
Peaceyears2 0.00322 0.000997
(0.00361) (0.00378)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000395 0.00000338
(0.0000531) (0.0000510)
Year 0.0434∗∗∗ -0.0129
(0.0131) (0.0224)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.933∗∗ 0.587
(0.357) (0.460)
Constant -88.74∗∗∗ 25.36
(26.42) (44.28)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 3.9: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
non-discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Infor-
mation factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.
(13) (14) (15)
Ethnic conflict onset Ethnic conflict onset Ethnic conflict onset
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups -0.00000734
weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPConfNoDisc) (0.0000203)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.275 0.281 -0.127
(0.193) (0.190) (0.732)
(Disc)*(GDPConfNoDisc) -0.00000591
(0.0000139)
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups 44.86∗∗∗
weighted by capital distance, t-1 (DistConfNoDisc) (13.13)
(Disc)*(DistConfNoDisc) -36.11
(27.45)
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups 0.000594
weighted by index, t-1 (IndConfNoDisc) (0.000427)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) 0.297
(0.583)
(Freed)*(IndConfNoDisc) -0.000861
(0.000570)
(Disc)*(IndConfNoDisc) 0.0000271
(0.000487)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.407
(0.888)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndConfNoDisc) -0.0000488
(0.000664)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.478∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.409∗
(0.154) (0.152) (0.189)
Population (1000000s) 0.00185∗∗ 0.00194∗∗∗ 0.00194∗∗
(0.000576) (0.000539) (0.000641)
Xpolity 0.0266 0.0245 0.0556+
(0.0288) (0.0277) (0.0313)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.293 0.250 0.0397
(0.230) (0.224) (0.316)
Peaceyears -0.127+ -0.135∗ -0.115
(0.0668) (0.0677) (0.0937)
Peaceyears2 0.00403 0.00437 0.00161
(0.00352) (0.00354) (0.00487)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000457 -0.0000491 -0.000000287
(0.0000487) (0.0000492) (0.0000676)
Year 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ -0.0170
(0.0102) (0.00583) (0.0257)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.588∗ 0.540+ 0.676
(0.288) (0.289) (0.461)
Constant -70.31∗∗∗ -56.51∗∗∗ 34.04
(20.35) (11.75) (51.20)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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inal model: Increases in such conflict involvements have a strong positive effect in a
scenario with no discriminated groups in a country i. The difference in the predicted
probability point estimates is even stronger than in the model on conflict involvements
of discriminated groups in other countries. Thus, all ethnic conflicts exert an effect
when weighted by distance and this effect is most pronounced when there are no dis-
criminated groups in a country. This finding supports the assertion that the result found
in relation with distance is not a result of inspiration but rather an alternative mecha-
nism based on the presence of armed conflict close-by more generally.
Alternative specifications
In addition, a number of alternative specifications of the measures and operationali-
sations in the models have been tested. Regression tables can be found in Appendix
A.
I measure the variable on high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated
groups in other states in two alternative ways. Firstly, I also test a specification that in-
cludes involvements of discriminated groups in all ethnic conflict years above 25 yearly
battle deaths as opposed to only years of high intensity. Secondly, I test a specification
that includes discriminated groups’ year of entering a conflict alongside involvements
in conflict years of high intensity. Regression results are shown in tables A.1 through
A.4. While results on predicted probabilities are fairly robust to the inclusion of low
intensity involvements, they are in parts less robust to the inclusion of onsets alongside
high intensity years of conflict. The latter was expected to be the most plausible op-
erationalisation as onset years were expected to be similarly likely to become known
elsewhere as high intensity years. However, it may be the case that the year where a
group enters a conflict is different from the beginning of a conflict in the perception of
the media because of specific coding rules for onset years and groups entering.
Moreover, when the measure on media is not logged (see table A.5), the trend
observed in the original model is reflected but no interactions are significant in the
regression. However, this is mostly caused by the case of Russia, which has a ten-fold
increase in the availability of radio in four years in the data before values drop again by
more than a ten-fold proportion30. This is likely an error in the data, albeit the project
30If only those cases are excluded, the three-way interaction in the regression reaches p=.13.
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representative when prompted noted that this pattern is reflected in the original data.
When Internet is also included in the index (using data from the World Bank
(World Bank, 2011b) on Internet access), the results reflect the trend found in the origi-
nal model but interactions are no longer significant in the regression as well. However,
as the sample has shrunk considerably because of the coverage of the measure on In-
ternet availability, this is not particularly surprising. These results can be seen in table
A.5.
When the minimum distance is included as opposed to the capital distance (again,
see table A.5), increases in weighted conflicts barely have any effect at all, irrespective
of the number of discriminated groups in a country.
When colonial conflicts are not included, as is shown in A.6 and A.7, all predicted
probabilities are robust.
Finally, I also rerun the original models controlling for government repression in
the previous year using data from Cingranelli and Richards (Cingranelli et al., 2014).
The measure is lagged in time as it is known that civil conflict explains government
repression very well (Hill and Jones, 2014). Regression results can also be found in
tables A.8 and A.9. When repression is controlled for, the results on the effect of me-
dia is no longer robust. Other results are fairly similar and the finding on distance is
even more pronounced. The measure on lagged repression is only available from 1982
onwards and thus the sample size is considerably smaller. Thus, it is not clear whether
the lack of robustness in the model on media availability is due to the smaller sample
or the effect of repression as such. In the latter case, it is possible that foreign con-
flicts increase repression which in turn increases the likelihood of conflict. If that was
the case, the variables on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in interaction with
media availability would not be required in the model as repression correctly captures
their effect. However, if the original model on media availability is rerun without the
variable on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups and without all interaction terms,
the variable on repression carries a negative sign as would be expected but is statisti-
cally not significant. Moreover, when the media model is tested on the sample in the
repression model but without lagged repression as a control variable, the results are vir-
tually identical suggesting that the hypothesis is not supported in the subsample under
scrutiny but not that what we observe in the full sample is a case of omitted variable
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bias.
Conclusion
This chapter tests in a large-n study whether information about conflicts involving
groups with similar grievances can trigger conflict contagion. It also explores the role
of information transmitted via mass media in contagion processes of armed conflict.
The chapter finds support for the suggested mechanism in the context of the availabil-
ity of media sources. Other factors that were expected to play a role for information
flows transmitted via mass media such as for example media freedom were not found
to be important. In addition, the mechanism was not found to depend on geographi-
cal proximity. Two potential alternative mechanisms, one based on successes and one
based on the role of repression, can be ruled out. However, the main finding is not
robust to the use of a smaller sample that includes years after 1980. It may be the case
that this reflects changes in the availability and use of media sources of different types.
After all, when media sources include the Internet, the sample is limited to years above
1990 and here the trend in the main model is well observable.
Chapter 4
Pre-emptive Repression
Introduction
Do governments repress domestic groups pre-emptively in order to prevent them from
rebelling? With rare exceptions, empirical repression literature does not consider re-
pression as a pre-emptive strategy (also see Nordas and Davenport, 2013). Instead,
repression is usually analysed as the result of structural factors (Nordas and Daven-
port, 2013) or as a reaction to some form of domestic dissent (for an overview see
Davenport, 2007a). Little is known about whether governments use repression also as
a pre-emptive strategy – that is before collective action has materialised. In addition,
empirical analyses of repression are usually conducted on the state-level (Davenport,
2007a). Therefore, we know little about whether government repression is tailored to-
wards specific actors and if so, who the most likely targets are. This chapter aims to fill
these gaps in current knowledge by exploring whether governments use repression as a
targeted strategy to prevent domestic ethnic groups from rebelling against the govern-
ment. Understanding all facets of governments’ incentives for the use of repression is
important for the international community in order to be able to prevent and deter the
use of repressive measures such as torture and disappearances. In addition, being able
to identify groups most at risk of such repression beforehand is particularly important
in order to protect civilians.
Governments can use repression to prevent domestic groups from engaging in
collective violence (Danneman and Ritter, 2014; Nordas and Davenport, 2013). Re-
pressing groups in order to prevent them from rebelling should be a more cost efficient
strategy than increasing repression once opposition has materialised (Nordas and Dav-
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enport, 2013). After all, once group leaders have mobilised members to some form of
collective action, they have an incentive to keep fighting and deliver a positive outcome
for the group in order not to lose legitimacy and credibility. As a result, a larger amount
of repression or some form of material concession is necessary to quell dissent after it
has materialised. Thus, I argue here that governments determine the level of repression
they use against specific domestic groups not only by each group’s current level of dis-
sent but also by the likelihood with which they expect this group to rebel in the near
future.
This chapter tests the argument on group-specific pre-emptive repression using
comprehensive data on government repression of specific ethnic groups all around the
world from the Minorities at Risk project. It is thus able to provide important insight
into the targeted, strategic and pre-emptive use of repressive measures by the govern-
ment. The chapter finds evidence that governments determine the level of repression
to be used against a group from factors that influence the group’s expected utility for
fighting. However, this is only the case when the state’s repressive capacity is large in
relation to the group’s size, likely because in such cases governments can use even high
levels of repression against a group without overstretching resources. Thus, the chapter
finds that repression is used as a pre-emptive tool but only against the relatively weak.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section develops a theoretical model
and derives testable empirical implications. Section three introduces the data and meth-
ods used to empirically test these implications. Section four discusses empirical results
and section five offers and empirically tests refinements to the theoretical and empirical
model before the final section concludes.
The argument
In this section I introduce a simple model to develop the argument that governments
have an incentive to use repression to prevent domestic ethnic groups from fighting.
The interaction between a government and a domestic ethnic group can be formulated
as a simple game where the government, G, chooses the level of repression to use
against the group, D, from a continuous range and the group decides whether or not to
rebel against the government. This is a bargaining situation similar to the one described
in Rubinstein (1982) as the government ‘offers’ a specific amount of repression and the
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group decides on whether to reject the offer by fighting. The game is structurally sim-
ilar to Fearon (1995)’s bargaining model of inter-state war but differs in substantive
terms. While in Fearon (1995) adversaries bargain over a share of a good in question,
for example territory, I assume here that governments are not ready to make any conces-
sions and thus do not bargain over the issues underlying the potential conflict. Instead,
they try to prevent conflict by increasing their adversary’s cost of fighting. Thus, while
in Fearon (1995) the cost of fighting is fixed, here the challenger’s cost for fighting is
variable as the government can influence it by its use of repression.
The game is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The government moves first and decides on
the overall level of physical repression to apply against the group in a given round t
by changing the initial level of repression, rt−1 ≥ 0, by a certain amount ∆rt. Subse-
quently, the group D decides whether to fight against the government or not.
Figure 4.1: The game in period t.
G
D
∆rt
Ft ¬Ft
UGt(∆rt, Ft) = p(−bt)− cGt − β1∆rt
UDt(∆rt, Ft) = pbt − cDt − rt−1 −∆rt,
UGt(∆rt,¬Ft) = −β1∆rt
UDt(∆rt,¬Ft) = 0,
Payoffs
In the following I discuss the players’ payoffs arising from different outcomes in Figure
4.1. The payoff structure draws on Fearon (1995)1 but is extended by the effect of
repression levels for the challenger and the effect of the manipulation of repression for
the government.
If the ethnic group D challenges the government, it gains benefit bt ≥ 0 with
probability p ∈ (0, 1) but has to endure a cost cDt > 0. The benefit bt ≥ 0 that D
1Fearon in turn draws on earlier work such as Bueno de Mesquita (1981).
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expects upon winning is derived from its position in society which is proportional to
the severity of the discrimination the government subjects it to. After all, if D wins, its
discrimination ends and its position improves by the current level of discrimination, bt.
D loses with probability 1 − p in which case the status quo, valued at 0, prevails but
it still has to endure the cost of the fight. Accordingly, if D does not fight, it gains 0.
Thus, a group’s expected benefit of fighting is pbt2.
The most important assumptions for deriving predictions about the government’s
incentives to repress the group, however, are about how repression influences the group.
Firstly, if the government increases the level of repression, the group’s situation is wors-
ened in proportion to ∆rt, independent of which action it actually takes, as it can be
assumed that government repression affects group members independently of whether
they support a struggle or not. This impact is not included here as it is a constant that
won’t have an impact on the group’s decision.
Secondly, and most importantly, the group’s cost of fighting should be affected
by the current overall level of physical repression ∆rt + rt−1. This follows directly
from Tilly (1978)’s definition of repression and is also argued for example in (Muller
and Weede, 1990; Hasenclever and Rittberger, 1999). Repression affects the cost of
fighting because in a more repressive environment it should be harder to mobilise for
and organise rebellion (for example Tilly, 1978, in a more general context) and some of
the people who try and do so will get caught and punished harshly (also see Hasenclever
and Rittberger, 1999). In addition, in a more repressive environment it is harder for
rebels to extract resources from group civilians who are under more state scrutiny than
in less repressive environments3. This effect of repression on groups that decide to
fight distinguishes the model developed here from previous theoretical models such as
Pierskalla (2010) as it allows the government to use repression to prevent rebellion.
Thus, in sum, a group’s cost for fighting is cDt + rt−1 + ∆r.
Similarly, payoffs arising from all final outcomes can also be formulated for the
government. The payoff for the government G if there is no fight can be quantified by
the value 0 as its position does not change.
2See Buhaug et al. (2009) for the argument that powerful disadvantaged groups are particularly likely
to rebel and to be repressed by the government. Operationalising power by group size, they find empirical
support for an increased conflict likelihood of these groups.
3For an overview over earlier work discussing the effect of repression on the mobilisation of resources
for collective action see for example Rasler (1996).
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If there is a fight, the government G has to incur a cost of fighting, cGt > 0,
as well. Additionally, the government loses with probability p in which case it can
expect to be degraded to position −bt. I assume here that upon winning D degrades
the government to its own current position in society. After all, the group may reason
that its discrimination was due to the state’s resource poverty at a given point in time as
discussed in Wimmer (2002) and that such discrimination is the easiest way to organise
society from the point of view of any government. Additionally, the government wins
with probability 1−p in which case it gains nothing but still incurs the cost of the fight.
Moreover, and following Pierskalla (2010) and others in the assumption that re-
pression is costly, I assume that a cost is associated with increasing repression. The cost
of an increase in repression is proportional to the magnitude of the increase because the
more state forces are occupied with repressing D, the higher the opportunity cost. De-
creases in repression on the other hand carry a benefit proportional to the decrease as
resources are freed up. I add coefficient β1 > 0 to any changes in repression to express
this cost and reward logic of making changes in repression. β1 can be understood as
the government’s loss resulting from occupying troops with a specific task.
I assume that cGt > β1rt for all r ≥ 0. Thus, I assume that fighting in a military
conflict against D is in any case more costly than repressing the civilian population of
D. This seems sensible as even if repression and conflict incurred similar opportunity
costs, in an armed conflictD inflicts additional costs on the government while in the re-
pression case it is passive. In addition, and as argued above, the government can expect
the opportunity cost of conflict to be higher than the opportunity cost of pre-emptive
repression as group leaders have little incentive to stop fighting before achieving some
concessions once they have mobilised members. The same assumption is also made in
Pierskalla (2010).
The government might also expect that after winning the challenging group de-
grades the government group to the level of physical repression it has experienced
itself. A cautious government should expect that. However, this is irrelevant for the
equilibrium strategy of the government here and is thus omitted from the government’s
payoff.
77
Equilibrium strategies
In the following I present each player’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy using
simple backwards induction.
The domestic group D’s equilibrium strategy F ∗t : ∆rt ∈ [−rt−1,∞) 7→
{Ft,¬Ft}, is
F ∗t =
 Ft if pbt − cDt − rt−1 −∆rt > 0¬Ft otherwise (4.1)
Intuitively, the challenging group fights whenever her expected benefit of fighting
outweighs the cost of doing so.
The government, on the other hand, strictly prefers peace over war in any case,
irrespective of the change in repression that might be required to achieve that. After
all, changing repression is always less costly than fighting. The government observes
the magnitude of all factors feeding into D’s utility for different final histories and thus
knows whether D would choose to fight at the initial level of repression, rt−1, that is
when ∆r = 0. If
pbt − cDt − rt−1 ≤ 0 (4.2)
that is ifD does not fight at the current level of repression, the government has no incen-
tive to increase the level of repression and thereby decrease D’s incentive to fight only
further. After all, any increase in repression decreases the government’s peace time
utility as it has to carry the cost of the increase without gaining anything. The govern-
ment may, however, have an incentive to decrease repression because it is rewarded for
freeing up resources. There is only one ideal amount of decrease in that situation: the
amount of decrease that putsD’s fighting utility on a level with its peacetime utility. By
decreasing repression to this amount, G maximises the reward for freeing up resources
without facing rebellion.
Thus, in any case where the government knows that D has no incentive to fight at
the current level, it has an incentive to decrease repression by
∆rt = pbt − cDt − rt−1 (4.3)
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However, as negative repression is not possible, the government can at most de-
crease repression such that rt = 0. Thus, it decreases repression by the ideal amount
in equation (3) when the current repression level allows for such a large decrease and
otherwise decreases the repression level to the value 0.
On the other hand, if the government observes that the group has an incentive to
fight under current circumstances, it has an incentive to increase repression by the ideal
amount in equation (3) in order to prevent D from fighting. As the cost increases with
the magnitude of the change, the government has no incentive to make a change that is
larger than necessary as its peacetime utility decreases with the cost of the change.
In sum, the government’s equilibrium strategy is to choose
∆rt
∗ =
 pbt − cDt − rt−1, if this term is ≥ −rt−1−rt−1, otherwise (4.4)
Thus, there is an underlying ideal level of change in repression,
∆rt
∗∗ = pbt − cDt − rt−1 (4.5)
that translates into the government’s strategy ∆r∗ as follows
∆rt
∗ =
 ∆r∗∗t , if ∆r∗∗t ≥ −rt−1−rt−1, otherwise (4.6)
Figure 4.2 illustrates these connections. If a group’s benefit of fighting outweighs
the cost, that is if pbt − cDt − rt−1 > 0, the government’s ideal change in repression
is an increase which translates directly into its action. Similarly, if this difference is
negative, the ideal action is to decrease repression. However, if the negative difference
is smaller than a decrease to the minimum level of repression r = 0, the actual decrease
is necessarily smaller than the ideal decrease. It is easy to see from Figure 4.2 that if
there was no repression in the previous time period, that is if rt−1 = 0, the government
can only increase repression or hold it constant.
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Figure 4.2: The relationship between a group’s cost benefit calculation
and the government’s change in repression. r∗t is the government’s strategy and r∗∗t
is the underlying ideal change.
pbt − cDt − rt−1
∆r
−rt−1 ∆r∗t
∆r∗∗t
The results from the simple game introduced here allow deriving the following
propositions:
Proposition 1: If a domestic group’s expected cost benefit balance pbt − cDt − rt−1
is positive, the government increases repression by the positive difference between
expected benefit and cost, pbt − cDt − rt−1.
Proposition 2: If a domestic group’s expected cost benefit balance pbt − cDt − rt−1
is negative, the government decreases repression by the negative difference between
expected benefit and cost, pbt − cDt − rt−1, as long as pbt − cDt − rt−1 ≥ −rt−1. If
pbt − cDt − rt−1 < −rt−1, the government decreases repression by −rt−1. If there is
no repression present, that is if −rt−1 = 0, repression cannot be decreased.
Hypotheses
The following empirical expectations can be derived from the theoretical considera-
tions introduced here:
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Hypothesis 1: The larger the discrimination of an ethnic group, the higher the likeli-
hood of an increase in repression against the group. This effect increases as the group’s
probability of winning increases.
and accordingly
Hypothesis 2: The larger the discrimination of an ethnic group, the lower the like-
lihood of a decrease in repression against the group. This effect decreases as the
group’s probability of winning increases.
Hypothesis 3: The larger the cost of fighting for an ethnic group, the higher the
likelihood of a decrease in repression against the group.
and accordingly
Hypothesis 4: The smaller the cost of fighting for an ethnic group, the higher the
likelihood of an increase in repression against the group.
Data and methods
This section introduces the data and methods used to test the argument on governments
using pre-emptive repression to balance groups’ expected utility for fighting and peace.
The unit of analysis in the empirical analysis is the group-year. The sample of ethnic
groups is taken from the Minorities at Risk data (subsequently referred to as MAR data)
Phases III and IV (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). This version of MAR contains an
ethnic group if it “(...) collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discrimina-
tory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and/or (...) collectively mobilizes in
defense or promotion of its self-defined interests” (Minorities at Risk Project, 5).
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is a three-category ordered measure on whether the govern-
ment increases, holds constant or decreases the level of repression it applies against the
civilian population of an ethnic group in a given year. The dependent variable is coded
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using MAR data on a number of repressive measures. I code an increase in govern-
ment repression whenever the total number of measures used against group civilians
increases and a decrease accordingly. I model the direction as opposed to the actual
magnitude of change because of the censored nature of the dependent variable with
respect to decreases. In addition, some measures are more severe than others and thus
the number of measures that have changed may not be an ideal proxy for the actual
intended magnitude of change in repression.
Specifically, the measures of repression that are used here to determine the over-
all level of repression against civilians from the MAR data are “[f]ew group mem-
bers arrested”, “[m]any group members arrested”, “[l]eaders arrested, disappeared, or
detained”, “[s]how trials of group members or leaders”, “[t]orture used to intimidate
or interrogate”, “[m]embers executed by authorities”, “[l]eaders executed by authori-
ties”, “[s]ystematic killings by paramilitaries”, “[p]roperty confiscated or destroyed”,
“[r]estrictions on movement”, “[f]orced resettlement”, “[i]nterdiction of food sup-
plies”, “[e]thnic cleansing”, “[s]ystematic domestic spying”, “[s]tates of emergency”,
and “[s]aturation of police and military” (Minorities at Risk Project, 91–96).
The variables on repression in MAR contain four categories, where repression can
either 1) not be used at all, 2) be used against group members carrying out collective
action, 3) be used both against members that do and members that do not engage in
collective action or in circumstances where it is not clear whether action is present or
4) be used against group members not carrying out collective action (Minorities at Risk
Project). Here, for each measure only cases of the latter category are coded as value one
while the former two categories are coded as zero before summing them. Unclear cases
and cases containing both categories have to be dropped which leads to a missing value
on the overall repression measure. Collective action can refer here both to peaceful and
violent action (Minorities at Risk Project).
This coding of changes in repression based on the number of measures used is
somewhat problematic as it cannot capture a change in the degree to which each mea-
sure is used. Unfortunately, no group-level data on repression is available that would
also allow evaluating the intensity of the use of different measures.
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Independent variables
A group’s status in society, the benefit of winning b in the theory developed here, is
operationalised using the level of political discrimination against a group from MAR.
This variable contains five categories where zero stands for no discrimination and four
for targeted restriction of political participation by public policy. The variable measures
whether groups are excluded from political activity in a state and in how far the state is
making attempts to remedy a group’s under representation or enforces it by its actions.
Only in the severest category of discrimination does the government actually take action
to enforce a group’s exclusion (Minorities at Risk Project, 36-37).
Ideally, the probability of a group winning p would be predicted in an auxiliary
model but this is not possible here as no data is available on the actual outcomes of
rebellions. Instead, I use the ratio of group members to non-group members as a proxy
for a group’s probability of winning. As the variable on group population in MAR
contains gaps, I linearly interpolate a group’s total number4.
This operationalisation is based on the assumption that the government and the
group have a similar ability to draft and extract resources amongst relevant populations
for a potentially existential fight. In that case, the government can increase the army
if necessary as the group’s members and resources are mobilised. Assuming that the
government can draw from all non-group members might be overly optimistic as other
groups in the state might not cooperate with the government. However, it is assumed
that the government can offer material benefits to supporters in an existential fight that
provides incentives to the general population, not only to the government’s direct con-
stituency. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be relaxed as the dataset does not
contain all groups in government and therefore their size is not known.
In order to express a group’s expected benefit of fighting pb, I introduce an inter-
action term between the status variable b and the variable on group proportion that is
used as a proxy for a group’s probability of winning p.
The cost of fighting needs to capture the negative externalities that a group can
expect from fighting the government until it is either defeated or wins (also see Fearon,
4In MAR Phases 3 and 4, data on a group’s size is derived from an estimate on the group’s proportion.
This proportion is used to derive the total number of group members using data on the total population
from the US Census Bureau in 1995 and 1998 and from the CIA World Factbook in 2004. The number
of group non-members is determined using data on a country’s population size from Gleditsch (2002)
(extracted from QoG (Teorell et al., 2013)) in all years.
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1995). This will depend on the government’s capacity to induce fatalities on fighters as
well as potentially civilians. This measure should also depend on the potential strength
of the government’s army in a fight in relation to the group’s strength. Therefore,
the cost of fighting should be captured in the ratio of group non-members to group
members, the inverse of the variable that is used to operationalise a group’s probability
of winning.
In addition, as the goal here is to model the balance between costs and benefits,
the previous repression level needs to be included. Even though the number of mea-
sures used is not an ideal operationalisation of the magnitude of repression, there is no
alternative measure available. Because of this concern, below the robustness of results
will be evaluated in cases with no previous repression.
Thus, a government’s incentive to change the repression level against a specific
group is modeled as
∆r∗∗t = β1
members
non-members
× disc
+ β2
members
non-members
+ β3disc
+ β4
non-members
members
+ β5rt−1 (4.7)
It is expected that coefficient β1 is positive, β2 and β3 are close to 0 and β4 and β5
are negative.
The relationship between the variables on repression and discrimi-
nation
The relationship between the variables on discrimination and repression still needs to be
addressed. Conceptually, the two are distinct. A group’s level of discrimination reflects
group members’ situation vis-a-vis the rest of the society, that is their access to power
in a state (Cederman et al., 2010). Similarly, in MAR, a group is discriminated at the
highest level if “[p]ublic policies substantially restrict the group’s political participation
by comparison with other groups” (Minorities at Risk Project, 37). A group can be
denied access to power without being actively repressed. Repression on the other hand
is “(...) any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective
action” (Tilly, 1978, 100). Such actions do not necessarily change a group’s access to
84
power. For example, according to MAR the Amhara in Ethiopia did not experience any
discrimination in 1999 and according to the EPR data (Cederman et al., 2010) the group
was a junior partner to the government. Nevertheless, group civilians were subjected to
torture, show trials and arrests according to MAR.
The MAR data provides insight into the types of rights and participatory activities
that can be limited for a group. Those are freedom of expression, freedom of move-
ment, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on organising, restrictions on voting
rights, police/military recruitment, civil service access, access to higher office and an
other category (Minorities at Risk Project, 37-38)5. However, a group may also be
discriminated at the highest level without any of these explicit political restrictions
holding.
Some of the political rights associated with discrimination are violated by the use
of certain repressive measures contained in the overall repression variable. Therefore,
the possibility that the variables on discrimination and repression overlap by definition
needs to be considered6.
Specifically, it appears that a group’s freedom of movement is violated if the re-
pressive measures restrictions on movement or forced resettlement are used. However,
the relationship between the right and the repressive measures in question in the data
is not deterministic. It is possible to see each of these repressive measures in question
being used against civilians without the general right being considered restricted. It is
even possible to see the use of both measures against civilians without the right being
considered restricted. Similarly, it is possible for the right to be considered restricted
without seeing any of the potentially related repressive measures being used against
civilians.
In addition, it appears that rights in judicial proceedings are violated if any of
the following repressive measures are used: few group members arrested, many group
members arrested, leaders arrested, disappeared, or detained, show trials of group mem-
bers or leaders, members executed by authorities, and leaders executed by authorities.
Here, again, it is possible for the right in question not to be considered restricted even
5Cases of discriminated groups that only face restrictions in the other category are excluded as it is
unclear which rights are infringed here.
6A project representative noted in an email exchange that to the responsible Research Director’s
recollection, there is no definitional overlap between the variable on repression and discrimination in the
Phase 4 data.
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though the group experiences one of the related repressive measures being used against
civilians7 and it is also possible to be considered to be denied the right without experi-
encing any of the potentially related repressive measures being used against civilians.
Thus, there does not seem to be deterministic definitional overlap between specific
rights and related repressive measures in the data. Nevertheless, it might be that the use
of a repressive measure against civilians is causally related to an infringement of the
potentially related rights. In order to determine whether that is the case, temporal pat-
terns can be exploited: The relationship would be problematic if the use of a repressive
measure in a year would result in the violation of the right in the same year without
the violation having been present before. While such cases occur in the data, in the
sample under scrutiny they are actually rare. There are three cases where an increase
in a repressive measure corresponds with a decrease in the potentially associated right.
However, this change in rights does not translate into a change in the discrimination
level used in the analysis here in any of these cases even though in two of the cases no
other rights change.
Similarly, there are two cases where a decrease in the use of a repressive measure
against civilians is associated with an increase in the potentially corresponding right.
Here the discrimination level does also not change even though all other rights remain
the same.
Thus, in sum, while there may be a link between repression and discrimination,
this relationship does not seem problematic in the sample under scrutiny and given the
level of aggregation.
Control variables
I control for whether a group is a dominant minority according to MAR as the govern-
ment should not repress such groups and repression against them is unlikely to change
as a result. In addition, dominance should be correlated with a group’s size. These
groups are not excluded as there are cases in the data where these groups are repressed
and/or in conflict with the government.
I control for the regime type of a country as measured by the Vanhanen index
of democratisation (Vanhanen, 2011) (from QoG) as democracies may be more con-
7There is no case in the data where all these measures occur simultaneously.
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strained to use repression and higher levels of democracy might prevent political dis-
crimination of specific groups (also see Fearon and Laitin, 2003). I use the Vanhanen
measure in order to prevent a more direct definitional overlap between the measures on
repression and group discrimination and other accounts of the regime type of a state
such as Polity IV (Gurr et al., 1989).
I also control for a country’s GDP per capita from (Gleditsch, 2002) – again ex-
tracted from GoG – as richer states may be less fearful of groups rebelling as group
members may have fairly big opportunity costs for violence (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004). As Wimmer (2002) argues that ethnic discrimination should be particularly
likely when public goods are scarce, this variable could also have an effect on the like-
lihood of discrimination.
It is important to control for changes in the group’s level of protest and rebellion
in any year as the government is likely to react to group actions with increases in re-
pression. In testing the theory introduced here it is vital not to mistake reactions of
the government for pre-emptive action, particularly as group rebellion or protest might
result in discrimination or a decimation of a group’s size. Therefore, I include variables
on changes in a group’s level of violent rebellion and protest from the previous year
respectively. Finally, I include a dummy variable on whether a group engaged in rebel-
lion at the minimum level of local rebellion in the previous year. In MAR (Minorities
at Risk Project, 90), a local rebellion requires “[a]rmed attempts to seize power in a lo-
cale”. Previous rebellion might also lead to changes in group size and status alongside
an increased likelihood to increase repression and is thus a possible confounding factor.
All these control measures are coded from MAR data.
I also include a three category variable on whether there was an increase or a
decrease in the total number of local rebellions fought by other groups in the same
country. I add the same measure on changes in other groups’ protest. This is important
as domestic unrest may lead to general pre-emptive repression as well as have an effect
on groups’ status if resources are redistributed to groups that protest or rebel. I construct
these variables from MAR data and add additional violent conflicts that are considered
as non-ethnic from EPR to the conflict variable using the Growup dataset.
87
Estimation
In the following, I derive the relationship between the ordered dependent variable with
three categories and the independent variables. For this I draw on the relationship
between a group’s cost benefit calculation and the continuous ideal change in repression
∆rt
∗∗ derived from the original game.
Like in a standard ordered logit or probit model, the goal of the estimation is
to find two cutoff points on an underlying latent variable in order to determine how
values on the independent variables correspond to the three outcome categories. The
latent variable is the continuous ideal level of change in repression ∆r∗∗ that translates
into the government’s strategy ∆r∗ depending on rt−1 in the theoretical model. In the
empirical model ∆r∗∗ needs to be translated into the three categories of the dependent
variable.
In cases where the ideal change in repression ∆r∗∗ is a decrease of a certain mag-
nitude but a decrease of that magnitude is not possible, the government’s action under
the equilibrium strategy ∆r∗ is a decrease to the minimum level of repression, 0. As
long as some decrease is possible, however, this is not problematic for the estimation as
the dependent variable only considers whether a decrease took place or not. Therefore,
the latent ideal change translates into the correct empirical outcome category.
If the government has not repressed previously, on the other hand, a decrease
in repression is impossible. Here, cases where the latent variable would correspond
to a decrease are associated with the empirical outcome of no change. This form of
censoring needs to be taken into account by the model in order to avoid the effect of
negative cost benefit assessments on the likelihood of a decrease in repression being
underestimated.
Because of these complications, I use a variation of a standard ordered probit
model that takes this form of censoring into account8. I assume that the effect of the in-
dependent variables and a stochastic term  ∼ N(0, σ2) on the underlying latent level of
8This estimation strategy is also discussed in Zhao and Glewwe (2010) in the context of explaining
educational attainment where some subjects are still in school. Thus, the educational attainment of some
subjects is fully known while for others it is only known that the final outcome is larger or equal to a
certain value. For the individuals in the latter category, the observed outcome translates to a larger range
on the latent variable than is associated with the observed outcome. This is taken into account when
formulating the probability of being in the observed category for these individuals exactly like is done
here.
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ideal change in repression ∆r∗∗ is linear. However, the difference between an ordinary
ordered probit model and the model developed here is that the link function between
the latent variable in the empirical model ∆r∗∗ and the outcomes accommodates the
selective censoring. Thus, the latent variable ∆r∗∗ translates to empirical outcomes as
follows
y =

1, if ∆r∗∗ +  > τ2
0, if (0 < ∆r∗∗ +  < τ2) ∪ (rt−1 = 0 ∩∆r∗∗ +  < 0)
−1, if rt−1 > 0 ∩∆r∗∗ +  < 0
(4.8)
where τ1 = 0 and τ2 are cut-off points of the ordered model.
In other words, for cases where no repression is present at the beginning of the
time period under scrutiny, there are two reasons why no change in repression occurs:
Either because the best option of the government was to do nothing or because the best
option was to decrease repression but such a decrease is empirically impossible. In
addition, there is only a positive probability of a case showing a decrease in repression
if the group was repressed in the previous year.
To account for the fact that the probabilities of being in the no change and the
decrease category depend on whether there was previous repression in a MLE context,
a dummy δ that takes the value one if there was previous repression will be included
directly into the likelihood function. ωj is a dummy on whether a case is in category j.
The likelihood function is then
L =
n∏
i=1
( Φ (−∆r∗∗)ωjδ(Φ(τ2 −∆r∗∗)− Φ(−∆r∗∗) + Φ(−∆r∗∗)(1− δ))ωj
( Φ (∆r∗∗ − τ2))ωj) (4.9)
Results
Table 4.1 shows regression results from the model introduced above. Here, the inter-
action between a group’s discrimination and size appears negative and statistically not
significant. Thus, hypotheses one and two are not supported by the evidence. The cost
term, on the other hand, carries a negative sign and is statistically significant on the ten
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per cent level. Thus, there is some support for hypotheses three and four.
Table 4.1: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.17 0.05 0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 0.17 0.18 0.36
(Disc)*(Size) -0.06 0.07 0.42
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.00 0.08
Repression, t-1 -0.01 0.08 0.94
Dominant group dummy 0.25 0.33 0.45
Vanhanen index -0.01 0.01 0.07
GDP (100000s) 0.55 1.38 0.69
Change in group protest 0.12 0.05 0.02
Change in group rebellion 0.13 0.07 0.08
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.31 0.23 0.19
Change in others’ protest -0.04 0.12 0.76
Change in others’ rebellion -0.38 0.16 0.02
Cut 0.55 0.11 0.00
Constant 0.08 0.26 0.76
N 745
Log-likelihood -215.893
Figure 4.3 illustrates these findings. It shows the predicted probability of an in-
crease in repression at different values of group discrimination, the proxy for b, across
the range of the variable on the member to non-member ratio (minimum to about 95th
percentile), the proxy for p. Predictions shown correspond to the median value of 1000
simulations and 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles9.
At low values of the member to non-member ratio p, the predicted probability of an
increase in repression increases sharply with increasing levels of p, both at the highest
and lowest levels of discrimination. This sharp increase is a function of the negative
effect of the inverse member to non-member ratio that was used to operationalise costs.
When groups are small compared to the rest of the population, their cost of fighting is
largest. At small proportional group sizes, small increases in group size have a large
effect on a decrease in the cost of fighting. As the cost of fighting has a negative
effect on repression, decreases in the cost of fighting translate into a sharply increased
probability of repression. The incline is steeper at higher levels of discrimination which
9In all figures shown the Vanhanen index and the GDP measure were set to their mean while all other
variables were set to 0.
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leads to an initial increase in the effect of discrimination as p increases.
However, as p increases further, the effect of discrimination on the probability of
an increase in repression slightly decreases. This negative interaction between discrim-
ination and the probability of winning is at odds with the theory introduced here where
it was expected that the effect of discrimination on repression increases with group size.
Thus, the empirical findings from model one are not fully supportive of the theory
developed here. In order to understand the results better, the sample is split between
cases with p, a group’s member to non-member ratio, below and above the median.
Regression results for these models can be found in Appendix B in tables B.1 and B.2.
In the sample with low member to non-member ratio p, the interaction between
discrimination and a group’s proportional size is positive and significant at the ten per
cent level. The cost term carries a negative sign and closely misses significance at
the ten per cent level. Figure 4.4 illustrates these relations. Here, the effect of dis-
crimination increases considerably as p increases. This is radically different from the
decreasing effect of b as p increases in the full sample. Instead, the positive interac-
tion between b and p is consistent with the expectation that the government assesses a
group’s expected benefit of fighting via pb.
In the sample of groups with large values of p, on the other hand, the interaction
between group size and discrimination is negative and insignificant while the cost term
is again negative and significant on the five cent level. Thus, in the sample of large
groups, the theory is not fully supported by the evidence.
Overall, the empirical results offer support for hypotheses three and four on gov-
ernments adjusting repression levels to groups’ costs for fighting. With regards to hy-
potheses one and two on the effect of the expected benefit of fighting, the evidence is
less clear. While in the sample of smaller groups the evidence weakly suggests that
governments may consider incentives in terms of expected benefits, when groups are
large the evidence is directly contrary to this expectation. These findings could suggest
that there are different underlying processes at work but it is by no means clear what
those are. Therefore, in an attempt to understand these findings further, I offer and test
several potential explanations for the inconclusive evidence.
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Figure 4.3: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimina-
tion and group proportion predicted from Table 4.1.
Refining the model
There are three potential explanations for the inconclusive results found in the original
model. Firstly, it could be the case that governments take a more complex effect of
repression on groups’ expected utility calculations into account. Secondly, it is possible
that governments use more complex considerations than the original model assumes.
Thirdly, the cost of repression may depend on groups’ relative size. Below, each of
these possibilities is tested.
Adverse effects of repression
The theory introduced above assumes that repression exerts its effect on domestic
groups only by increasing the cost of fighting. In fact, however, the relationship be-
tween repression and collective action is far from clear. Some find that repression en-
courages dissent (for example Carey, 2006), others find a u-shaped effect of repression
on political violence (for example Muller and Weede, 1990) and Gupta et al. (1993)
find that high levels of repression deter violent dissent but only in autocracies.
Thus, it is possible that the model should also take repression as a potential incen-
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Figure 4.4: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimina-
tion and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with small member-
to non-member ratios.
tive for action into account. After all, the level of repression of a group constitutes a
grievance that a group can end by defeating the government10. As a result, the benefit
of winning in a conflict may not only be constituted by b but rather by b+ rt. If that is
the case, a group’s expected utility of fighting becomes:
UDt(∆rt, Ft) = p(bt + rt−1 + ∆rt)− cDt − rt−1 −∆rt (4.10)
In other words, repression deters rebellion but at the same time also provokes
rebellion by offering groups an additional incentive for fighting. If that is the case, the
government’s ideal change in repression becomes
∆r∗∗t =
pbt + prt−1 − cDt − rt−1
1− p (4.11)
Thus, the effect of all variables on the latent change in repression becomes rela-
10Lawrence (2010) offers the grievance-based argument as one potential explanation for repression
triggering violence.
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tively stronger as a group’s probability of winning, p, increases and repression becomes
a less potent tool to prevent rebellion. This is because as p increases the benefit of win-
ning becomes relatively more important and the effect of repression is increasingly
exerted through the expected benefit alongside the cost term.
To test this more complicated version of the model, p needs to be standardised to
p∗ ∈ [0, 1]. This is achieved by using
p∗ =
member to non-member ratio
max member to non-member ratio
(4.12)
Then, including constitutive terms, we can operationalise the latent change in re-
pression to be
∆r∗∗t =
p∗bt
1− p∗ +
p∗
1− p∗ +
bt
1− p∗ +
p∗rt−1
1− p∗ +
rt−1
1− p∗ +
cDt
1− p∗ (4.13)
Table 4.2: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group. Specification with more com-
plex effect of repression.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.17 0.05 0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 5.10 7.33 0.49
(Disc)*(Size) -2.06 2.74 0.45
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.00 0.09
Repression, t-1 (Rep) -0.03 0.09 0.79
(Rep)*(Size) 2.00 4.52 0.66
Dominant group dummy 0.26 0.33 0.43
Vanhanen index -0.01 0.01 0.07
GDP (100000s) 0.55 1.38 0.69
Change in group protest 0.13 0.05 0.01
Change in group rebellion 0.13 0.07 0.08
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.31 0.23 0.19
Change in others’ protest -0.04 0.12 0.75
Change in others’ rebellion -0.37 0.16 0.02
Cut 0.55 0.11 0.00
Constant 0.09 0.26 0.73
N 745
Log-likelihood -215.8391
The regression for this model can be found in table 4.2. The log-likelihood of
this model is almost identical to the log-likelihood of the original version of the model.
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Thus, it appears that the more complex version of the theory is not substantially better
equipped to explain the data. In addition, the interaction term between the scaled ver-
sions of p and b is still negative. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the poor performance
of the theory can be explained by the failure to take a more complex effect of repression
on domestic groups into account.
Governments making more complex assessments
Another explanation for the poor performance of the theory introduced here could be
that governments observe groups’ expected utility for conflict or even their conflict
likelihood directly and therefore do not need to estimate expected utility as a result of
observed values of few variables. To test whether that is the case, I use an auxiliary logit
regression to predict group rebellion in a given year11. In this auxiliary model shown
in table B.3 in Appendix B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable on whether an
ethnic group engages in rebellion at the minimum level of a local rebellion from MAR
(Minorities at Risk Project, 2009) in a given year. I use all independent variables from
the original model that are expected to be associated with a group’s expected utility for
rebellion: a group’s member to non-member ratio in interaction with its discrimination
level as well as the interaction terms, the non-member to member ratio to gauge the
costs of fighting and the repression level in the previous year. In addition, I include
variables on whether a group is dominant, GDP, the Vanhanen index, and whether a
group has a defined regional base in the state, whether a group has kin in a neighbour
state, whether a group has engaged in conflict in the previous year and the number
of years since a group’s last rebellion at the same minimum level from MAR. In the
auxiliary model, previous rebellion, peace years and democracy (ten per cent level)
have the expected effects on rebellion and are statistically significant. Moreover, kin in
a direct neighbour state decreases the likelihood of rebellion significantly at the ten per
cent level. None of the other variables are statistically significant and the variables of
interest do not have the expected effects.
Nevertheless, the auxiliary model is used in three ways to arrive at auxiliary pre-
dictions of a group’s likelihood of fighting in a given year. Regression results from
these models can be found in tables 4.3 through 4.5.
11The auxiliary approach is similar to the one introduced in Kathman (2010) to explain interventions
in neighbouring civil wars by the threat of the neighbouring war being contagious.
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Table 4.3: The effect of a linear auxiliary prediction on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Linear auxiliary prediction 0.17 0.15 0.27
Linear auxiliary prediction squared 0.01 0.02 0.56
Dominant group dummy -0.08 0.33 0.82
Vanhanen index -0.02 0.01 0.02
GDP (100000s) 1.61 1.61 0.32
Rebellion dummy, t-1 -0.58 0.67 0.39
Change in group protest 0.14 0.05 0.01
Change in group rebellion 0.14 0.08 0.09
Change in others’ rebellion -0.33 0.16 0.03
Change in others’ protest -0.03 0.12 0.79
Cut 0.58 0.09 0.00
Constant 1.01 0.42 0.02
N 734
Log-Likelihood -220.204
Table 4.4: The effect of an auxiliary predicted probability on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Auxiliary predicted probability 3.57 2.26 0.11
Auxiliary predicted probability squared -0.96 2.06 0.64
Dominant group dummy -0.03 0.32 0.92
Vanhanen index -0.02 0.01 0.02
GDP (100000s) 1.24 1.31 0.34
Rebellion dummy, t-1 -1.88 1.13 0.10
Change in group protest 0.14 0.05 0.01
Change in group rebellion 0.14 0.08 0.08
Change in others’ rebellion -0.33 0.16 0.03
Change in others’ protest -0.04 0.12 0.77
Cut 0.58 0.09 0.00
Constant 0.37 0.19 0.06
N 734
Log-Likelihood -219.549
Firstly, I use the linear prediction from the auxiliary model as an input variable
to predict government change in repression in a model that includes only the control
variables from the original model. As above results suggest that the likelihood of in-
creases in repression might decrease again when a group’s propensity to fight is high, I
also include a squared term. In this model, shown in table table 4.3, both the auxiliary
prediction and the squared term carry a positive sign and are statistically not significant.
Secondly, the predicted probability from the auxiliary model and its squared term
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Table 4.5: The effect of a linear prediction based on factors expected to influence expected
utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Linear auxiliary prediction (EU vars) -1.09 1.05 0.30
Linear auxiliary prediction (EU vars) squared -1.50 0.72 0.04
Dominant group dummy 0.17 0.32 0.59
Vanhanen index -0.02 0.01 0.01
GDP (100000s) 0.99 1.36 0.47
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.47 0.23 0.04
Change in group protest 0.12 0.05 0.02
Change in group rebellion 0.16 0.08 0.04
Change in others’ rebellion -0.34 0.16 0.04
Change in others’ protest -0.01 0.12 0.90
Cut 0.59 0.09 0.00
Constant 0.60 0.43 0.16
N 734
Log-Likelihood -212.144
are included in the control model. Here, the squared term turns negative but again, both
terms are not significant.
Thirdly, I calculate a group’s latent propensity for fighting from the auxiliary
model only using the variables expected to affect a group’s expected utility, p, b, pb,
c, and rt−1 while the control variables in the auxiliary model are set to 0. When this
form of auxiliary prediction and a squared term are included in the control model, the
squared term is negative and statistically significant on a five per cent level and the log
likelihood is highest of all three models on auxiliary predictions. This suggests that
governments may use the variables argued to be associated with expected utility as the
most important sources of information when estimating the threat that a group poses.
However, as the variables do not have the expected effect in the auxiliary model, this
is only limited support for the theory introduced here. As Figure 4.5 shows, the rela-
tionship between the linear prediction and the government’s probability of increasing
repression is positive for the vast majority of cases. Thus, governments may use ex-
pected utility predictions as suggested here but make different calculations when they
expect a group’s expected utility for fighting to be very high.
Repression being costly at high expected utility values
Another potential explanation for the inconclusive results from the original model could
be that not all governments are willing or able to balance very high expected utilities
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Figure 4.5: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of the auxiliary
prediction using groups’ expected utility variables.
with repression. Repression should become more costly the higher the opportunity cost
resulting from it, that is the larger the group compared to a government’s repressive
capacity. As the group becomes relatively larger, it becomes more difficult for the
government to repress the group without becoming vulnerable to other adversaries.
Thus, if a large amount of repression is required in order to prevent a group from
fighting and if using such a large amount of repression would be particularly costly to
a government, the government might be more likely to resort to measures other than
repression in order to prevent the group from fighting or might even take the risk of
rebellion12. Governments that can easily afford to repress a group even if high levels
of repression are required, on the other hand, should react as predicted by the expected
utility argument introduced above13.
12In Pierskalla (2010), the government’s willingness to repress depends among other things on the
comparison between the cost of repression and the cost for accommodation. In addition, here, weak
governments are assumed to have a high cost of repressing.
13Davenport (1995, drawing on earlier work) offers an overview over two potential alternative expla-
nations for the use of repression by governments with large repressive capacity. Firstly, repression is a
cheap measure for governments with large repressive capacities which allows for controlling large parts
of the population at the same time. This explanation is closely linked to the argument made here albeit it
does not consider opportunity costs also with respect to potential external threats. Secondly, repressive
98
For testing this, I split the data at the median of a variable on a country’s military
personnel (World Bank, 2011a) per group members. In the sample where this ratio is
high, governments should not incur a large amount of opportunity costs even if they
use large amounts of repression against a group. Therefore, in this sample, the theory
introduced here should still hold. In the sample where the military to group ratio is
low, on the other hand, governments incur considerable opportunity costs when using a
large amount of repression against the group in question and therefore, here the theory
may not hold.
Table 4.6: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with
low military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups only.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.19 0.08 0.03
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 0.83 0.51 0.10
(Disc)*(Size) -0.29 0.17 0.10
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.01 0.87
Repression, t-1 0.03 0.11 0.80
Vanhanen index -0.03 0.01 0.01
GDP (100000s) 2.59 1.81 0.15
Change in group protest 0.30 0.08 0.00
Change in group rebellion 0.14 0.09 0.12
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.17 0.34 0.61
Change in others’ protest -0.26 0.18 0.14
Change in others’ rebellion -0.60 0.24 0.01
Cut 0.38 0.20 0.06
Constant -0.18 0.39 0.64
N 370
Log-likelihood -114.8625
In these models the variable on groups’ dominant status cannot be included as
there are only two cases of dominant groups in the sample with large military which
both see no change in repression. Instead of just excluding the variable, results below
are shown on the subset of cases where groups are not dominant. There are only 27
cases of dominance in the sample with low military to group ratio as well and thus not
many cases are lost compared to the models shown above14.
In the model on the sample of small militaries in relation to the group in question
administrations have an incentive to promote the use of repression.
14Tables B.5 and B.4 show results from the split samples below excluding the variable on dominance
altogether. Here, regression results are mostly robust in sign but not in significance.
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from table 4.6, the interaction between discrimination and group size is negative and
significant on the 10 per cent level. In addition, here the cost term is positive and no
longer statistically significant either.
Figure 4.6 illustrates these findings. The interaction between discrimination and
size increases initially but decreases towards larger group sizes as in the original model.
Thus, as expected, when the military is relatively weak, the implications derived from
the theory do not hold. Here, governments do not seem to adjust repression to a group’s
expected benefit or cost of fighting.
Figure 4.6: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimina-
tion and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with low military to
group ratio.
Table 4.7 shows regression results from the sample on cases where the military to
group ratio is larger than the median. Figure 4.7 plots the predicted probability of an
increase in repression from this model. The results from this sample are very much in
line with the expectations from the expected utility hypotheses. The interaction term
between discrimination and group size appears significantly positive. The cost factor
appears negative with p = .09. Figure 4.7 illustrates that the effect of discrimination
on the probability of an increase in repression is significantly positive at all other than
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very low levels of p and increases as p increases. Thus, these results lend considerable
support for the expected utility hypotheses introduced above.
In sum, the expected utility argument that is driven by an expected benefit term pb
and a cost term c gains considerable support in the sample on cases where governments
have large repressive capacity compared to the group they are facing. These findings
suggest that governments consider groups’ expected utility considerations in order to
determine the threat level posed by specific domestic groups. However, they only seem
to act upon these considerations with repression if they can afford to do so without
incurring large opportunity costs. Thus, repression appears to be used as a pre-emptive
tool but only by governments with relatively large repressive capabilities compared to
the targets of repression.
Table 4.7: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with
high military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups only.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) -0.12 0.16 0.45
Member to non-member ratio (Size) -45.16 20.26 0.03
(Disc)*(Size) 15.45 6.72 0.02
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.00 0.09
Repression, t-1 -0.05 0.14 0.71
Vanhanen index -0.01 0.01 0.73
GDP (100000s) -1.66 2.60 0.52
Change in group protest -0.04 0.09 0.66
Change in group rebellion 0.20 0.19 0.30
Rebellion, t-1 0.45 0.40 0.27
Change in others’ protest 0.10 0.21 0.62
Change in others’ rebellion -0.26 0.26 0.32
Cut 0.71 0.15 0.00
Constant 1.18 0.64 0.07
N 338
Log-likelihood -72.1172
Robustness
As noted above, the measure on repression only captures changes in the amount of
different repressive measures used but not the degree to which the measures are used.
This imprecision can lead to an underestimation of the number of changes in repression.
However, as long as all governments have the same tendency to diversify the measures
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Figure 4.7: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimina-
tion and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with high military to
group ratio.
they use to increase repression and accordingly use fewer measures to decrease it, this
should lead to an underestimation of the effect of all variables and in that sense make
for a particularly conservative test of pre-emptive repression without inducing bias.
In addition, the concern is alleviated as in 83 per cent of cases repression was absent
in the previous year. Nevertheless, the robustness of the supportive results from the
sample with high military to group ratio is tested in the subset of cases with no previous
repression. As in those cases only increases in repression are possible, I run a logistic
regression model.
Regression results on the model with high military to group ratio are shown in
table B.6. Here, the interaction term is positive with p = .058 and the cost term carries
a negative sign but is no longer significant.
Conclusion
This chapter tests whether governments adapt the level of repression they use against
specific domestic groups to their expectation about these groups’ incentives for re-
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belling in order to prevent them from taking up arms. It finds evidence that govern-
ments react to group-specific characteristics that increase groups’ expected utility for
rebellion with repression. However, contrary to the assumption introduced here, not
all governments do so but rather only governments that are relatively strong compared
to the potential target of repression. This is probably because such governments can
afford to use even large amounts of repression without becoming vulnerable to other
threats. Thus, the findings suggest that repression is a pre-emptive tool for governments
that are strong relative to domestic groups.
Chapter 5
Repression to Pre-empt Contagion
Introduction
Do governments react pre-emptively in order to prevent the spill-over of conflicts from
other countries? And, if so, when do they expect a foreign conflict to be contagious and
what actions do they consider in order to prevent spill-overs? Apart from one exception
(Danneman and Ritter, 2014), these questions have not been considered to date. This is
surprising given that scholars widely agree that conflicts can spread between countries
and that it seems highly unlikely that governments would either not be aware of that
possibility or not be willing to try and prevent such a threat from materialising. Part of
the hesitation to address these questions may be due to the remaining uncertainty about
the transmission channels of conflict contagion. As we do not know with certainty
which conflicts are contagious – and must be even more uncertain about which ones
governments might think to be contagious – it is difficult to identify relevant foreign
conflicts that may trigger pre-emptive government action.
Recent literature finds that governments react to ongoing armed conflict in close
geographic proximity with repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). Here, repression
is measured on the country level and it is thus not clear who is targeted by this re-
pression. Many open questions remain about governments’ reactions to the threat of
foreign conflicts spilling over to their country. Firstly, if governments expect foreign
conflicts to be contagious, do they target the population uniformly with domestic re-
pression or do they target groups they expect to be particularly likely to react to foreign
events with rebellion? The latter seems likely but what groups do governments expect
to be most likely to be susceptible to conflict contagion? To answer this question, it
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is important to know what mechanisms governments expect to trigger the spillover of
foreign conflicts. Do they exclusively consider close-by conflicts as threats or conflicts
elsewhere more broadly? And are there specific characteristics of foreign conflicts that
governments fear to trigger spillovers in particular? These questions are of fundamen-
tal importance to understand what triggers governments to react to foreign events with
pre-emptive repression and which parts of the population are most likely to suffer from
these measures. Moreover, answers to these questions will provide further insight into
governments’ knowledge of processes triggering armed conflict more generally and
into their strategies to prevent such conflict.
Many scholars have argued that inspiration processes between groups have an ef-
fect on conflict contagion. The first part of this thesis finds that one of the mechanisms
behind conflict spill-overs may be information flows between groups in different coun-
tries that share similar grievances. Many others have argued that successful outcomes
of the struggles of foreign groups can inspire groups with similar goals elsewhere. This
is discussed for example in Horowitz (1985) in the context of secessionist groups and in
Gurr (2000) in the context of groups that face circumstances in their home country sim-
ilar to those of a group in conflict elsewhere. This chapter tests whether governments
react to either one of these mechanisms with pre-emptive repression. Under both mech-
anisms, groups that gain information about these foreign events and that have similar
grievances like the foreign group have the highest incentive to be inspired by these
events. This chapter tests whether governments target those groups in particular with
pre-emptive repression.
In order to test whether governments fear contagion as a result of potentially in-
spirational information about events in other countries, this chapter conducts a large-n
study on the analytic level of the government-ethnic group dyad. Drawing on chapter
three, again, I introduce a number of measures for the likelihood of events elsewhere
becoming known in a country such as the degree to which the population has access
to mass media, the media freedom of a country and geographic proximity between two
countries.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the argument about
governments reacting to the threat of foreign events potentially inspiring domestic
groups. The third section introduces the data and methods used in the empirical test
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of the argument in the fourth section. The subsequent two sections test alternative
specifications before the final section concludes.
The argument
For making predictions about government repression aimed at preventing conflict con-
tagion, it is of fundamental importance how governments expect foreign events to affect
domestic groups. In the following I reiterate two alternative arguments about inspira-
tion processes between groups that were first introduced in chapter three: the mecha-
nism based on foreign ongoing conflict and similarity in grievance and the mechanism
based on foreign success and similarity in grievance. I derive empirical implications
for the behaviour of a government that expects contagion to take place according to
either mechanisms in turn and test them against each other.
Grievance based mobilisation
The first mechanism by which governments may expect foreign conflicts to be inspi-
rational to domestic groups follows the argument discussed in chapter three on the
inspirational effect of the mobilisation of discriminated groups on other discriminated
groups.
Chapter three argues that four conditions must be met for a groups to have an
incentive to engage in ethnic violence targeted at the government: Groups must be
aware of the severity, targeted nature and injustice of their disadvantages and they
must be aware of government intent in causing them. A group’s collective aware-
ness of the severity of the disadvantages its members experience is necessary in order
for group members to perceive a grievance large enough to trigger action1. Moreover,
groups need to be aware of the targeted nature of discrimination in order to perceive
the grievance as ethnic (Klandermans et al., 2001)2 and as a result in order to mobilise
ethnically3. In addition, group members need to arrive at the conclusion that their treat-
ment is unjust (also see Buhaug et al., 2014; Cederman et al., 2011). These factors
1Again, see for example Gurr (1993) on the notion that objective disadvantage translates into
grievance and on the need of strong grievances for action. Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing
on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality.
2Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality;
Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988).
3Also see Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988); see Martin (1986) for an
overview over literature arguing that and investigating whether group grievance causes group action.
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will cause groups to perceive a group-specific grievance that they have an incentive to
address via collective ethnic action.
However, for this action to be targeted at the government, groups also need to gain
awareness of the government’s responsibility for their circumstances (Buhaug et al.,
2014), drawing on (Gamson, 1992), in the context of economic inequality, also see
(Gurr, 2000)4.
The struggles of foreign groups in similar circumstances can increase groups’
awareness of all these factors5. However, for domestic groups to become inspired by
ongoing foreign conflicts of discriminated groups under this mechanism, information
about these conflicts and their causes is necessary. Following Kuran (1998) and Wei-
dmann (2015), chapter three argues that information about conflicts involving foreign
ethnically discriminated groups increases domestic discriminated groups’ awareness of
targeted discrimination, of the intent with which this policy is enforced and of the injus-
tice thereof. As a result of this process, the mobilisation of foreign discriminated groups
against the government can trigger rebellion among domestic discriminated groups.
If governments are aware of this process, they have an incentive to prevent it from
taking place. Thus, they should target domestic discriminated groups with pre-emptive
action if foreign discriminated groups rebel against their government. However, as this
mechanism only applies to cases where domestic groups become aware of the struggles
of foreign groups as well as of the similarity of these foreign groups’ situation to their
own experience, governments should only react to struggles of foreign discriminated
groups if they expect a domestic discriminated group to have gained information about
these events. This chapter focuses on the role of mass media in this process. The effect
of direct communication between groups – for example as a result of ethnic kinship or
cultural similarity – is beyond the scope of this chapter but would be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
4Klandermans et al. (2001) find that trust in the government moderates the formation of grievances
in the context of South Africa.
5Also see Weidmann (2015), Kuran (1998) and also McAdam and Rucht (1993) on the adoption
of problem definitions and identities in the context of diffusion from the US New Left to its German
counterpart as well as for example Elkins and Simmons (2005)’ argument that decision makers can learn
from countries with similar visible characteristics.
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Grievance based success
Moreover, and as introduced as an alternative argument in chapter three, a number of
scholars have argued that a group achieving her goal in a conflict can be inspirational
to other groups by showing them that such success is possible (for example Horowitz,
1985, in the context of successful mobilisation for secessionism). Gurr (2000) makes
that argument in the context of groups that face circumstances in their home country
similar to those of a group in conflict elsewhere. Byman and Pollack (2007) suggest
that successful secessionist groups can inspire groups in similar situations in the same
or neighbouring countries. Under this line of reasoning, successes of groups elsewhere
suggest to domestic ethnic groups with a similar goal that they might be equally suc-
cessful.
Groups’ actual goals and as a result the question of what constitutes a success
and which other groups might be inspired by these successes is difficult to measure.
Empirical literature on success arguments usually considers successes in the context
of secessionist groups winning concessions (see for example Walter, 2006; Forsberg,
2013), most likely as they are the most straightforward types of goals and outcomes to
observe and measure6.
However, the general argument about groups gaining confidence in their goal by
observing successes of groups with similar goals should apply to similar goals and suc-
cesses more broadly. For this reason, I consider groups that face political discrimination
and assume that their goal is to improve their status in society. As a result, identify-
ing successes is straightforward: a discriminated group is successful in a fight if her
status improves and her discrimination ends as a result of the fight. Accordingly, if a
politically discriminated group observes the status of a discriminated group in another
country improve as a result of a violent struggle, it may come to the conclusion that its
own chance of improving its situation with violence is higher than previously expected.
This increase in the perceived probability of success increases groups’ incentive for
fighting and may trigger some groups to take up arms against the government.
Again, under this argument information about the foreign group’s political sta-
tus and the outcome of the conflict for the group needs to be available to domestic
6Data on secessionist demands and concessions is not available in the Minorities at Risk framework
that is used here.
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groups in order to inspire them to action. And again, mass media is the transmission
channel for information under scrutiny here. Other forms of information transmission
may play a role as well but are beyond the scope of this thesis. In sum, under this
argument discriminated groups that gain information about foreign groups with similar
grievances fighting and reaching a successful outcome should consider fighting more
likely to result in success and thus have an increased likelihood of rebelling against the
government.
Additional mechanisms
Here, as in chapter three, shared grievance is expected to be the mechanism under which
groups identify with and are inspired by the mobilisation for or successful outcome of
ethnic violence. Shared grievance offers a clear mechanism by which inspiration is
expected to take place. The addressing of the grievance elsewhere raises awareness of
the grievance among domestic actors and successes in alleviating the grievance raises
the expectation of similar successes with respect to the same goal and method.
Other factors could be expected to link groups with foreign groups in conflict that
may also lead to inspiration, either independently or as an amplifier for the mechanisms
suggested here. For example, it may be argued that groups in different countries that
share the same ethnicity inspire each other to rebellion. Previous research has found
evidence for this in the context of close-by conflicts (Forsberg, 2008; Buhaug and Gled-
itsch, 2008). However, these tests have not been conducted on the group-level and the
mechanism underlying this process is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, it is possible
that governments expect contagion under this mechanism and react to it. Danneman
and Ritter (2014) test cultural similarity between societies – as opposed to groups as
such – as a potential transmission channel for conflict contagion that governments may
react to with repression but do not find governments reacting to this. Moreover, other
types of shared grievances relying on different group definitions may trigger conflict
contagion and/or may be expected by governments to do so and may thus trigger re-
pression. Such considerations provide interesting questions for future research – both
on conflict contagion and government pre-emptive reaction – but are beyond the scope
of this thesis.
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Government pre-emptive repression
Following chapter four, I argue that governments use repressive measures in order to
prevent domestic unrest and violence. Repression deters rebellion because it is more
costly for a group to organise rebellion in a repressive environment (for example Tilly,
1978). For governments, it is most cost-efficient to use pre-emptive repression to bal-
ance groups’ utility for war with repression (also see Nordas and Davenport, 2013).
A number of assumptions were introduced in chapter four in order to derive this
argument. Firstly, drawing on previous research, repression is assumed to be costly
to the government as resources used for repression cannot be used for other purposes.
As a result, governments have an incentive to use the amount of repression they be-
lieve necessary in order to prevent a group from fighting but not more in order to avoid
wasting resources. Secondly, it is assumed that fighting in a military conflict against a
domestic group is in any case more costly to the government than repressing the civilian
population of said group. Therefore, the government is using repression as a strategy to
prevent conflict in all cases. The repression level the government uses against a domes-
tic group should thus always match the group’s current expected utility for fighting.
The previous chapter tests this notion in the context of domestic factors expected to
influence groups’ utilities for war and peace. The previous chapter explicitly models
changes from the repression level in the previous year in response to imbalances in a
group’s expected utility. This test was geared at exploring whether governments react
to the overall balance of costs and benefits in order to establish whether repression is
used in an explicitly pre-emptive way. In this chapter, we are interested in whether the
government considers foreign events to be part of the factors that affect a group’s ex-
pected utility and thus balance the level of foreign inspiration with repression as well.
Therefore, here the more straightforward – yet equivalent – formulation of the theory
is used where the total repression level matches right hand side variables affecting a
group’s utility for fighting. Thus, when domestic groups’ incentives for rebellion are
high as a result of information about foreign events, government repression should be
high in order to counterweight these incentives.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the overall argument graphically. The left hand side panel
illustrates a situation where governments expect conflict spillovers under the mecha-
nism based on foreign mobilisation and similar grievances. Here, foreign discriminated
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groups’ conflicts can inspire domestic groups to rebellion by raising awareness of their
incentives for violence. Knowing this, upon observing the foreign conflict and if it can
be expected that information about this conflict will reach a domestic group and thus in-
spire its members, a government has an incentive for repression against the group in or-
der to prevent the group from rebelling. If governments expect the grievance based mo-
bilisation mechanism to hold, repression against domestic discriminated groups should
be high when the number of discriminated groups fighting elsewhere is high. The right
hand panel illustrates the success based mechanism. Here, governments expect foreign
successes of discriminated groups to inspire domestic discriminated groups. As a re-
sult, governments react with repression when they expect information about a foreign
conflict of a discriminated group to reach a domestic discriminated group in order to
prevent rebellion. Thus, if governments expect the grievance based success mechanism
to hold, repression against discriminated groups should be high when the number of
successes of discriminated groups elsewhere is high.
Hypotheses
These considerations allow deriving the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: A high number of discriminated groups fighting the government in
other countries should lead to higher levels of repression of domestic discriminated
groups. This should only be the case if a government has reason to expect that the
group has gained information about these conflicts.
Hypothesis 2: A high number of successes by discriminated groups in other coun-
tries should lead to higher levels of repression of domestic discriminated groups. This
should only be the case if a government has reason to expect that the group has gained
information about these successes.
Data and methods
This section introduces the data and methods used to test the arguments on government
repression as a reaction to the threat of a domestic group’s inspiration, either by foreign
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Figure 5.1: The link between foreign events involving discriminated groups, a domestic
group’s discrimination and government repression.
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Government
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Conflict ∧ Success
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discriminated groups’ struggles or successes. The unit of analysis here is the group-year
and the sample of ethnic groups is taken from the Minorities at Risk data (subsequently
referred to as MAR data) Phases III and IV (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). As there
is data on the government’s treatment of each of these groups, the data can also be
interpreted as group-government dyad years.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of interest here is the level of repression that a government uses
against a specific ethnic group. As in the previous chapter, this variable is coded using
MAR data on a number of repressive measures against an ethnic group’s civilian pop-
ulation that does not engage in collective action7. Here, I use the sum of all measures
of government repression that are being used against group civilians.
As noted in the previous chapter, this coding is somewhat problematic as it cannot
capture an increase in the degree to which different measures are used but no alternative
is available.
7For an overview over specific measures see the previous chapter.
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Independent variables
For operationalising the mobilisation and the success based mechanisms of inspiration,
an important question is which foreign events that are inspirational under either mech-
anism should the government expect to actually become known by an ethnic group. In
the following I discuss the operationalisation of inspirational events under both mech-
anisms before turning to this question.
Inspirational events
The mobilisation mechanism introduced in hypothesis one is operationalised as fol-
lows. Each discriminated MAR group involved in armed conflict with the government
in another state can be inspirational to a domestic ethnic group. Therefore, I code a
variable on the total number of these conflicts active in a given year. Here there is
less of a concern of simultaneity than in the analysis in the first part of this thesis and
therefore this variable is not lagged in time.
Armed conflict is defined as anti-government rebellion at the scale of large-scale
guerrilla activity as it is again expected that high intensity conflicts are most likely to
become known (Minorities at Risk Project, 90). Foreign groups involved in such con-
flict are considered discriminated if they are politically discriminated by government
policy or social practice according to MAR (Minorities at Risk Project). An alternative
measure where conflicts are included from the level of local rebellion (Minorities at
Risk Project) onward is also discussed below.
As it is important for the inspirational potential variable to be as complete as pos-
sible and as it is not entirely clear in how far MAR data is exhaustive, ethnic conflict
involvements of discriminated groups in states that are not included in the MAR data
are added to the measure using data from the ETH Growup database used in the analysis
in Chapter three.
For operationalising the success based mechanism, I code a variable on the num-
ber of successes of discriminated groups that fight the government in other states using
MAR data as well. I code a success whenever a discriminated group that is involved in
rebellion in a given year at the minimum level of local rebellion achieves an improve-
ment in its status, that is a decrease of its political discrimination, in the next year. I
augment this variable with Growup cases for countries that are not in the MAR dataset
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as well.
As under both mechanisms only groups that are discriminated are expected to
be inspired and thus the government should only take action against them, I interact
the variables on inspirational foreign events under both mechanisms with a domestic
group’s level of discrimination from MAR. As noted in the previous chapter, here,
the level of discrimination is a five category ordered measure where zero stands for
no discrimination and four for targeted restriction of political participation by public
policy.
Information about inspirational events
According to the theory, governments should only react to violent action or successes
of similarly aggrieved groups if they have reason to believe that a group has actually
gained awareness of these inspiring events. In this chapter, and based on the findings
from chapter three that found some measures to be far from relevant, I introduce four
ways of operationalising information flows.
Firstly, again, I use the measure on the average number of radios and TVs per
capita using data from (Banks, 2011a). I interact the measure on media availability
with the measure on discrimination and the number of inspiring events elsewhere –
discriminated groups’ successes or conflicts – under each mechanism respectively in a
triple interaction.
Secondly, the media freedom measure from Chapter three is used here as well. As
before, I interact the dummy on media freedom with the measure on a group’s discrim-
ination and inspiring events under each mechanism respectively in a triple interaction.
Thirdly, it might be the case that people are aware of events close-by, for exam-
ple because they have direct contact to the population there or because media are most
likely to report events close-by as discussed before. I thus only consider inspirational
events under both mechanisms that take place in direct neighbour states. In a fifth and
sixth model, only inspirational events under both mechanisms that take place in neigh-
bour states (defined using a minimum distance of 10 km from Cshapes (Weidmann
et al., 2010)) are interacted with the measure on group discrimination.
Finally, I also test the overall index of information flows as introduced in chap-
ter three. This index combines a country i’s media availability, a country j’s GDP
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per capita, and the capital distance between i and j in an additive index based on per-
centile scores. This dyadic index is used to weight foreign conflicts and successes of
discriminated groups. The weighted conflict measure is subsequently interacted with
the variable on media freedom in country i and a group’s level of discrimination.
The following table summarises the measures that are tested in models one through
eight.
Table 5.1: Interactions in models 1–8.
Model Contagion argument Information factor Interaction terms
1 Mobilisation Media availability
Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere
* Media
* Group status
2 Success Media availability
Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere
* Media
* Group status
3 Mobilisation Media freedom
Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere
* Media freedom
* Group status
4 Success Media freedom
Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere
* Media freedom
* Group status
5 Mobilisation Proximity
Conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours
* Group status
6 Success Proximity
Successes of discriminated groups in neighbours
* Group status
7 Mobilisation Media freedom
Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere weighted by information index
* Media freedom
* Group status
8 Success Media freedom
Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere weighted by information index
* Media freedom
* Group status
Control variables
Firstly, under the theory introduced in the previous chapter, the government balances
groups’ overall expected utility and therefore completeness of the model is nevertheless
desirable in order to understand the contribution of each variable. For this reason, here
the cost factor from the previous chapter, the inverse of the member to non-member
ratio, is included as well.
Moreover, a number of control variables are included to avoid confounding of the
variables of interest.
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I control for whether a group is a dominant minority here as well. These groups
are included in the analysis as it is not impossible for a group to be dominant and
nevertheless experience repression and/or discrimination.
I control for the regime type as measured by the Vanhanen index of democratisa-
tion (Vanhanen, 2011) (as before from QoG) as democracies may be more constrained
to use repression as well as to discriminate against domestic groups.
I also control for a country’s GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002) in 100.000s
from QoG. As noted previously, richer states may expect large opportunity costs for
violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and may be less likely to discriminate (also see
Wimmer, 2002).
Again, I control for a group’s own level of protest and rebellion in a year from
MAR in order to isolate pre-emptive repression.
Moreover, I also include a variable on the total number of armed conflicts fought
by other groups in the same country as well as for an identical measure on other groups’
protest. Again, I construct these variables from MAR data and add additional violent
conflicts that are considered as non-ethnic from EPR to the conflict variable8 using
Growup data.
Finally, I include a variable on the number of conflicts in direct neighbour states
that are not included in the respective measure of inspirational potential using data from
Growup, MAR and Cshapes. Controlling for those conflicts is important as they might
also lead to repression as well as cause conflicts in neighbours that are considered in-
spirational here. Thus, if those conflicts that are not relevant under the mechanisms
introduced here were omitted, the effect of the mechanism tested might be overesti-
mated.
Estimation
I use an ordered logit regression as the dependent variable on the number of measures
used can be understood as an ordered measure of the level of repression. I include
the level of repression in the previous year here as well as this variable is highly sig-
nificant in all main models. In this chapter, this is not done as we are interested in
8This might lead to overcounting but this is accepted in order to be conservative. In addition, the
definitions of ethnic conflicts and groups are fairly compatible between both projects and therefore the
concern is minor.
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modelling changes but rather to deal with time dependency in the model that could bias
results. After all, it is likely that even if governments have an incentive to balance a
group’s expected utility, part of the repression level is nevertheless explained by the
previous repression level, for example because the administration moves slowly or be-
cause changes of large magnitude cannot easily be implemented. In that case, including
the lagged measure that explains the part of the overall repression level that is not ex-
plained by current expectations but by path dependency should improve our ability to
find the relationship between the variables of interest. To interpret results, I present
first differences in predicted probabilities of being in the lowest category, that is of not
seeing any repression. This category is shown as it is the most likely category in the
data9. Moreover, like in chapter three, table 5.2 gives an overview over the simulated
interactions and their significance.
Results
First, models testing hypothesis one on the effect of foreign conflicts of discriminated
groups are investigated. These models are shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4.
In model one in table 5.3, information flows are operationalised by the availabil-
ity of radios and TVs in a country. Here, governments are expected to be more likely
to repress domestic groups that are ethnically discriminated when the number of con-
flicts fought by discriminated groups in other countries is high. This should not be the
case for domestic groups that are not discriminated, on the other hand. The effect on
a group’s likelihood of seeing no repression that results from an increase in foreign
conflicts of discriminated groups from minimum to maximum has been simulated in
scenarios with the lowest and the highest level of group discrimination, both when the
availability of media sources is held at the 10th and at the 90th percentile. Results of
these simulations are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The scenario with low media availability
is shown on the left hand side and the scenario with high media availability is shown on
the right side. Within these scenarios, the case of a non-discriminated group is shown
with a filled triangle and the case of a discriminated group is shown with a hollow
9Variables of interest are moved from minimum to maximum. The only exception is the media
availability measure which is again moved from the 10th to the 90th percentile. Again, control variables
on democracy and GDP are set to their means while all other control variables are set to 0. Every
simulation shows the median as well as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of 100000 simulations.
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Table 5.2: Significance of interactions in models 1 – 8.
Model Interaction effect Sign
Significant
(5%)
1. Media availability and conflict Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media low) (1) - Yes
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media high) (2) + No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
2. Media freedom and conflict Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1) - No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2) - No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
3. Conflicts in neighbours Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict + No
4. Index and conflict Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1) - No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2) + No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
5. Media availability and success Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media low) (1) + No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media high) (2) - No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) - No
6. Media freedom and success Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (No media freedom) (1) + No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media freedom) (2) - No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) - No
7. Successes in neighbours Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success + No
8. Index and success Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (No media freedom) (1) - No
Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media freedom) (2) + No
Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1) + No
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triangle. As can be seen, increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups only
exert a statistically significant effect in the case of a discriminated group in a country
with low media availability. This effect is negative. Thus, for discriminated groups the
likelihood of some repression significantly increases when media availability is low.
For non-discriminated groups, on the other hand, there is barely any effect in the low
media scenario. The simulated interaction between discrimination and the effect of
these foreign conflicts is significantly negative in the low media scenario. In the high
media scenario on the right hand side, on the other hand, this interaction is positive but
insignificant and there is barely any effect of increases in foreign conflicts of discrim-
inated groups on the likelihood of no repression for both types of groups. The effect
of media availability on the effect of discrimination is positive but insignificant. Thus,
governments are significantly more likely to repress discriminated groups than non-
discriminated groups when foreign conflicts of discriminated groups are numerous but
only in the scenario where the availability of media sources is low10. This suggests that
– under some circumstances – governments take action against discriminated groups
when they observe foreign conflicts of discriminated groups. However, hypothesis one
expected such action when there is a high level of media sources. Instead, evidence for
such action is found in the scenario with low media availability. Thus, hypothesis one
is not supported.
Next, hypothesis one is tested with media freedom in a country i being the variable
assumed to moderate information flows from a country j to i. Regression results can be
found in model two in table 5.3. Here, the simulated findings are somewhat similar to
model one. In the scenario with no media freedom, an increase in foreign conflicts of
discriminated groups is significantly negative, increasing a discriminated group’s like-
lihood of repression. However, the effect is weaker than in the low media availability
scenario in the model above. In the presence of media freedom, discriminated groups
10When conflicts of low intensity are included in the variable on foreign inspirational conflicts along-
side high intensity conflicts from the main specification, the trend, especially in the low media scenario,
is similar. In these models, again, the control variable on additional conflicts in a direct neighbour state
is adjusted accordingly. In the high media scenario discriminated groups are more likely to see no re-
pression here. However, no effect is significant in this model. When media availability is not logged,
results from the low media scenario in the original model are robust while high media scenarios also
show a positive but insignificant effect for discriminated groups. The same is the case when Internet is
included in the overall index of media availability. Regression results from these additional tests can be
found in table C.1 in Appendix C.
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are also more likely to see repression, but here the negative effect is weaker than in the
absence of media freedom and no longer significant. For groups that are not discrim-
inated, foreign conflicts of discriminated groups have no effect, irrespective of media
freedom in a country. In this model, none of the interactions is statistically significant
as can be seen in table 5.211.
Figure 5.2: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases
in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, media availability and group discrim-
ination.
11When low intensity conflicts are included alongside high intensity conflicts, discriminated groups
see a similarly small increase in the likelihood of repression in the high and low freedom scenario while
non-discriminated groups see no effect. No effect is significant. Results from this model can be found in
table C.2.
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Model three in table 5.4 tests the relationship when only high intensity conflict
involvements of discriminated groups in neighbour states are included. Here, increases
in such foreign conflicts of discriminated groups have no significant effect on any type
of group and the simulated effects are very small. Moreover, the simulated interaction
between discrimination and these conflicts is positive which is opposite to the expecta-
tion but very small and insignificant12. Thus, it appears that conflicts of discriminated
groups in neighbour states are not of particular concern to governments.
The final model – model four in table 5.4 – on foreign conflicts of discriminated
groups tests the effect of information as a combined index moderated by media free-
dom. Here, the results are substantively similar to the results in the models on media
freedom and media availability: Discriminated groups are more likely to be repressed
as a result of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in the absence of
media freedom. This effect reaches statistical significance here. In the high freedom
scenario, changes in foreign conflicts slightly increase discriminated groups’ likelihood
of no repression. On non-discriminated groups, on the other hand, increases in foreign
conflicts barely have any effect. No other effect or interaction is significant here13.
12When low intensity conflicts are included as well, the trend is similar and the positive effect on non-
discriminated groups is significant. However, here the effect is small as well. Results from this model
can be found in table C.2.
13Again, results are fairly similar when low intensity conflicts are included too but here the effect
of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in the absence of media freedom is far from
significant and there is a larger positive effect on discriminated groups in the presence of media freedom.
Results from this model can be found in table C.2.
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Table 5.3: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discrimi-
nated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based
on media and freedom.
(1) (2)
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf) 0.0580 -0.00498
(0.275) (0.130)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.922 -1.053
(1.069) (0.643)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media) -0.438
(1.544)
Media x Disc 0.740
(0.515)
Conf x Media 0.0126
(0.142)
Conf x Disc -0.0409 0.0937+
(0.0973) (0.0517)
Conf x Disc x Media -0.0583
(0.0476)
Press freedom (Freed) -1.603
(2.279)
Freed x Disc 1.479
(0.904)
Conf x Freed 0.0460
(0.186)
Conf x Freed x Disc -0.0850
(0.0743)
GDP per capita 2.491 -0.497
(3.395) (2.837)
Vanhanen index -0.0286 -0.0442∗
(0.0186) (0.0203)
Group rebellion 0.240∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.0716)
Group protest 0.294∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.0934)
Dominant group 0.959 0.676
(0.727) (0.612)
Other domestic protests 0.0298 -0.0148
(0.136) (0.141)
Other domestic rebellions 0.0371 -0.0898
(0.198) (0.121)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.548 -0.639∗
(0.343) (0.304)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000771 -0.000708
(0.000768) (0.000768)
Repression, t-1 1.733∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.191)
cut1
Constant 4.221 2.080
(3.023) (1.682)
cut2
Constant 5.505+ 3.473∗
(3.027) (1.691)
cut3
Constant 6.574∗ 4.710∗∗
(3.042) (1.670)
cut4
Constant 9.400∗∗ 7.009∗∗∗
(3.205) (1.776)
cut5
Constant 10.92∗∗ 9.202∗∗∗
(3.694) (2.164)
cut6
Constant 11.59∗∗∗
(2.123)
Observations 577 761
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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So far, the results suggest that governments react to foreign conflicts of discrimi-
nated groups by repressing domestic discriminated groups in scenarios with low media
availability and freedom respectively. This is contrary to the theoretical expectation
that governments only react if they can expect information about foreign conflicts to be
transmitted via mass media. In addition, as the moderating effect of the media factors
is not significant in any model, the role of information is not clear. In sum, hypothesis
one is not supported.
Next, the analysis turns to testing hypothesis two on the effect of successes of dis-
criminated groups elsewhere. These models are shown in tables 5.5 and 5.6. Model
five in table 5.5 measures information as a function of media source availability. Here,
the simulated effect of foreign successes of discriminated groups increasing from mini-
mum to maximum on the likelihood of a group seeing no repression is shown. The only
scenario where increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups have a negative
effect and thus lead to an increase in the probability of repression is the scenario where
an ethnic group is discriminated and media sources are available. This is as expected
under the theory, however, this effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, foreign
successes have no significant effect in any of the other scenarios and all interactions are
insignificant14.
The next model operationalises information as media freedom and is shown as
model six in table 5.5. In this model, the simulated results are somewhat similar to
the findings from the model on media availability but the negative effect of increases
in foreign successes of discriminated groups in the press freedom and discrimination
scenario is barely discernible. Here, again, no effect or interaction is significant.
14Results are similar when media availability is not logged. When the Internet is included in the index
as well, the negative effect of increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups in the high media
and discrimination scenario is much weaker. Regression results from these model can be found in table
C.3 in Appendix C.
123
Table 5.4: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discrimi-
nated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based
on proximity and index.
(3) (4)
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbConf) -0.205
(0.172)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.264∗∗ -0.535
(0.0924) (0.507)
NbConf x Disc 0.0318
(0.0514)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndConf) 0.000164
(0.00106)
Press freedom (Freed) -2.484
(2.154)
Freed x Disc 1.455+
(0.786)
IndConf x Freed 0.000360
(0.00139)
IndConf x Disc 0.000356
(0.000368)
IndConf x Freed x Disc -0.000556
(0.000518)
GDP per capita 1.084 -0.284
(2.298) (3.737)
Vanhanen index -0.0457∗∗ -0.0204
(0.0175) (0.0214)
Group rebellion 0.195∗∗ 0.267∗∗
(0.0626) (0.0941)
Group protest 0.346∗∗∗ 0.335∗
(0.0923) (0.133)
Dominant group 0.660 0.774
(0.597) (0.669)
Other domestic protests 0.0323 0.144
(0.140) (0.181)
Other domestic rebellions -0.106 -0.0416
(0.129) (0.206)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.475 -0.613+
(0.290) (0.349)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00138 -0.000194
(0.00107) (0.000725)
Repression, t-1 1.779∗∗∗ 1.618∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.217)
cut1
Constant 2.543∗∗∗ 2.395
(0.433) (1.620)
cut2
Constant 3.966∗∗∗ 3.637∗
(0.520) (1.607)
cut3
Constant 5.290∗∗∗ 4.688∗∗
(0.604) (1.570)
cut4
Constant 7.670∗∗∗ 7.603∗∗∗
(0.798) (1.714)
cut5
Constant 9.857∗∗∗ 9.097∗∗∗
(1.284) (2.294)
cut6
Constant 12.28∗∗∗
(1.333)
Observations 769 571
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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The next model only considers successes of discriminated groups in direct neigh-
bour states. Regression results are shown as model seven in table 5.6. In this model,
effects are small and as before not as expected under the hypothesis. Moreover, again,
no effect reaches statistical significance here.
The final model, model eight in table 5.6, operationalises information by the full
information index in interaction with media freedom. Here we find that increases in
foreign successes of discriminated groups – weighted by information – have a small
positive effect on the probability of no repression when groups are ethnically discrim-
inated, almost irrespective of whether media are free or not. The effect on groups that
are not discriminated, on the other hand, is positive in the absence of media freedom
and slightly negative in the presence of media freedom. Thus, the hypothesis is not
supported here substantially. Moreover, none of the effects or interactions is significant
here either.
Overall, these results suggest that foreign successes have no effect on govern-
ments’ treatment of domestic discriminated groups. On the other hand, there is some
evidence suggesting that foreign conflicts of discriminated groups increase repression
of discriminated groups when media availability is low. Thus, none of the hypotheses
above is supported by the evidence here.
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Table 5.5: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information
and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom.
(5) (6)
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ) -0.0424 -0.103
(0.262) (0.194)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.462+ 0.0680
(0.252) (0.133)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media) -0.551
(0.380)
Media x Disc 0.121
(0.120)
Succ x Media 0.0445
(0.138)
Succ x Disc 0.0382 -0.00352
(0.0819) (0.0695)
Succ x Disc x Media 0.00883
(0.0440)
Press freedom (Freed) -1.290∗
(0.646)
Freed x Disc 0.409∗
(0.199)
Freed x Succ 0.0385
(0.253)
Succ x Freed x Disc 0.0215
(0.0862)
GDP per capita 2.220 -0.806
(3.221) (2.518)
Vanhanen index -0.0311 -0.0417∗
(0.0199) (0.0212)
Group rebellion 0.233∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.0960) (0.0593)
Group protest 0.270∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.0957)
Dominant group 0.955 0.718
(0.767) (0.652)
Other domestic protests 0.0576 0.0519
(0.140) (0.137)
Other domestic rebellions -0.00594 -0.128
(0.193) (0.118)
Conflict in neighbour dummy -0.912∗ -0.830∗∗
(0.357) (0.321)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000958 -0.000976
(0.000769) (0.000804)
Repression, t-1 1.733∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.193)
cut1
Constant 3.479∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗
(0.902) (0.459)
cut2
Constant 4.752∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗
(0.931) (0.503)
cut3
Constant 5.831∗∗∗ 4.418∗∗∗
(1.007) (0.592)
cut4
Constant 8.800∗∗∗ 6.754∗∗∗
(1.348) (0.751)
cut5
Constant 10.28∗∗∗ 8.878∗∗∗
(2.081) (1.176)
cut6
Constant 11.35∗∗∗
(1.266)
Observations 577 761
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Taking capability into account
As it was found in chapter four that only governments with strong militaries relative
to groups may use repression as a balancing strategy, the main models have also been
retested in a sub-sample of cases where the military to group ratio is above the median.
These models can be found in tables C.4 through C.7.
In the model on media availability, the trend is similar to before but much more
pronounced. In the high media scenario, there is a small positive effect on discriminated
groups while there is barely any effect on non-discriminated groups. Neither the effects
nor the interaction in the high media scenario is significant. In the low media scenario,
on the other hand, the negative effect of foreign conflicts on discriminated groups’ like-
lihood of no repression is even stronger than before and significant as well. Moreover,
there is a strong and significant positive effect on non-discriminated groups here in the
low media scenario. The interaction between discrimination and foreign conflicts in
the low media scenario is again significantly negative. Thus, discriminated groups are
significantly more likely to see repression here. Moreover, the moderating effect of me-
dia on the interactions between conflict and discrimination is now significantly positive
as well. These findings lend further support to the previous finding that governments
react to foreign conflicts with pre-emptive repression against discriminated groups in
low media scenarios. It even appears that they may offer reliefs – potentially as conces-
sions – to non-discriminated groups. This finding also lends credibility to the previous
finding that pre-emptive repression is mainly a strategy for strong governments.
In the media freedom model we see a slight negative effect in the low freedom
model when groups are discriminated as well but no effect or interaction is significant
here. The same is the case in the model on neighbours where results are similar to
previously. In the sample on media freedom and the information index, again we see
somewhat similar effects like in the original model that are far from significant. More-
over, in the success models effects are either very small or insignificant in all models.
Thus, there is no sign of government reaction to foreign successes here.
In sum, so far this chapter finds some evidence for governments repressing dis-
criminated groups as a reaction to foreign conflicts of discriminated groups. However,
as opposed to the theoretical expectation, such evidence is found in scenarios where
media availability is low. This effect is stronger when governments are strong. Other
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Table 5.6: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information
and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index.
(7) (8)
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbSucc) -0.464
(0.928)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.285∗∗∗ -0.0810
(0.0797) (0.184)
NbSucc x Disc 0.0398
(0.299)
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndSucc) -0.00238
(0.00173)
Press freedom (Freed) -2.555∗∗
(0.866)
Freed x Disc 0.693∗∗
(0.259)
IndSucc x Freed 0.00276
(0.00208)
IndSucc x Disc 0.000462
(0.000591)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc -0.000584
(0.000679)
GDP per capita 0.0569 -0.0731
(2.208) (3.026)
Vanhanen index -0.0385∗ -0.0270
(0.0165) (0.0241)
Group rebellion 0.216∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0935)
Group protest 0.359∗∗∗ 0.327∗
(0.0899) (0.129)
Dominant group 0.721 0.905
(0.664) (0.715)
Other domestic protests 0.00645 0.179
(0.128) (0.162)
Other domestic rebellions -0.0910 -0.102
(0.125) (0.208)
Conflict in neighbour dummy -0.602+ -1.097∗∗
(0.313) (0.343)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00178 -0.000456
(0.00113) (0.000743)
Repression, t-1 1.773∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.230)
cut1
Constant 2.635∗∗∗ 1.299∗
(0.396) (0.509)
cut2
Constant 4.055∗∗∗ 2.543∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.555)
cut3
Constant 5.397∗∗∗ 3.598∗∗∗
(0.601) (0.623)
cut4
Constant 7.807∗∗∗ 6.551∗∗∗
(0.774) (1.017)
cut5
Constant 10.02∗∗∗ 7.971∗∗∗
(1.262) (1.730)
cut6
Constant 12.41∗∗∗
(1.326)
Observations 769 571
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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information factors or successes do not seem to play an important role.
Results for time lag
In addition to the results shown above, variables of interest were also lagged in time
by one year15. Results from these regressions are shown in tables 5.7 through 5.11.
Interestingly, in those models, a different picture appears than in the models assuming
a simultaneous relationship.
Again, in model one information flows are operationalised by the availability of
radios and TVs in a country. Results from this model can be found in table 5.7. As
above, effects of increases in conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere on the like-
lihood of no repression are simulated in different scenarios. In a scenario with low
availability of media sources, discriminated groups are more likely to see repression as
a result of increases in foreign conflicts while non-discriminated groups are more likely
to see no repression as a result. However, these effects are small. In the high media
scenario, the negative effect on discriminated groups’ likelihood of no repression is
stronger while the effect on this likelihood for non-discriminated groups is similar to
the low media scenario. These results are substantively as expected but neither effects
of foreign conflicts nor interactions are significant in any scenario. When foreign rebel-
lions of discriminated groups of a lower intensity are included alongside high intensity
conflicts of such groups elsewhere, the trend appears as well and reaches statistical
significance. These results are shown in table 5.8 and are illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3 shows the difference in the probability of no repression against a group
when the number of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups is increased from min-
imum to maximum. Again, the two estimates on the left hand side are simulated for
scenarios where the logged measure on radio and TV availability is held at the 10th
percentile. On the right hand side, two scenarios are shown where the media availabil-
ity measure is held at the 90th percentile. In both cases, the filled triangle represents a
scenario where the domestic group under scrutiny is not discriminated while the hollow
triangle represents a case where the domestic group is discriminated at the highest pos-
sible level. As can be seen on the left hand side, when the availability of media sources
15Here, all control variables other than democracy, GDP and a group’s cost of fighting are also lagged
in time to be better able to control for confounding.
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Figure 5.3: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases
in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups of all intensities, media availability and
group discrimination with a one-year time lag.
is low, increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups barely have any effect on
a group’s likelihood of not being repressed, irrespectively of a group’s level of discrim-
ination. On the other hand, and as can be seen on the right hand side, when there is
a high availability of media sources, increases in these foreign conflicts have a differ-
ent effect on domestic groups that are discriminated than on non-discriminated groups.
When a group is not discriminated against, its probability of not being repressed in-
creases when the number of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups increases. On the
other hand, when a group is discriminated against, her probability of being repressed
increases significantly as a result of an increase in the number of foreign conflicts of
discriminated groups from minimum to maximum. The interaction between discrimi-
nation and the effect of foreign conflict is significantly negative when media availability
is high while it is positive and insignificant when media is low. The effect of media on
this interaction is negative as expected but not significant16.
16Results from both specifications are not robust to tests with an unlogged media measure and the low
media specification is not robust to the inclusion of Internet in the media measure. Regression results
can be found in table 5.8 and C.8.
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Thus, when time-lagged, results offer some support for hypothesis one. They sug-
gest that governments react to foreign conflicts of discriminated groups with repression
against domestic groups that are discriminated as well if a substantial number of media
sources is available to the domestic population. However, as the moderating effect of
media source availability is not significant here either, the role of media is uncertain.
Nevertheless, the substantive finding is in line with the finding on media availability in
chapter three. It thus seems not only that discriminated groups are inspired to conflict
by information about foreign conflicts of discriminated groups but also that govern-
ments are aware of that and make attempts to counterbalance this effect with targeted
repression against these groups. However, it is not clear why we observe a seemingly
media related government reaction to discriminated groups only with a time lag while
instantaneously we find governments to react to discriminated groups in low media
scenarios.
Next, hypothesis one is tested with media freedom in a country i being the variable
assumed to moderate information flows from a country j to i. In this case, governments
with no media freedom are the ones that repress against discriminated groups when the
number of foreign high intensity conflicts increases. When media freedom is high,
on the other hand, foreign conflicts of discriminated groups barely have any effect.
This is similar to the instantaneous results but effects are much stronger here and reach
statistical significance.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Here, the scenario on the left hand side illus-
trates cases with no media freedom and the scenario on the right hand side illustrates
cases with media freedom. When there is no media freedom, the likelihood of not be-
ing repressed at all increases for groups that are not discriminated when the number
of foreign discriminated groups rebelling increases. This effect narrowly misses statis-
tical significance. Discriminated groups’ likelihood of seeing some repression on the
other hand increases significantly as a result of these changes in the absence of media
freedom. As the estimates on the right hand side show, however, foreign conflicts of
discriminated groups have barely any effect in the presence of media freedom, irre-
spective of the status of a domestic group. The simulated interaction effect between
discrimination and foreign conflicts of discriminated groups is significantly negative in
the scenario with no media freedom while it is negative and insignificant in the sce-
131
nario with media freedom. Moreover, when simulated, the interaction between media
freedom and the interaction between discrimination and foreign conflicts is positive but
misses statistical significance. These findings could suggest that governments that re-
strict media freedom are also using repression to react to foreign threats. This is not
surprising if one assumes that governments that adhere to human rights do so because
they are under domestic pressure and that they then cannot easily selectively violate
other rights. It also shows that governments that restrict media freedom are not content
that information about foreign events will not be received as a result of the restriction.
Moreover, it may be the case that these governments simultaneously offer concessions
to groups in better positions17. However, as the moderating effect of media freedom is
not significant, the role of media freedom remains uncertain.
Figure 5.4: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases
in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, media freedom and group discrimina-
tion with a one-year time lag.
In the model on conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours, there is a positive
17When these results are retested in a model on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups of all in-
tensities, the trend is similar but effects are no longer significant. Moreover, here the positive effect on
non-discriminated groups in the no freedom scenario is more pronounced while the negative effect on
discriminated groups is less pronounced. This model is shown in table C.9.
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but insignificant effect of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups on the
likelihood of not being repressed that is similar for discriminated and non-discriminated
groups here. The interaction is negative as expected but insignificant18. Thus, again,
foreign conflicts in neighbours do not seem to be of particular concern to governments
under the mechanism tested here.
The final model on conflicts tests the effect of information as a combined index
moderated by media freedom. Here, the results are substantively similar to the results
in the model on media freedom as such. The negative effect of increases in conflicts on
discriminated groups’ probability of seeing no repression when there is no media free-
dom is statistically significant. The moderating effect of discrimination in the low free-
dom scenario is negative and significant. Thus, discriminated groups are more likely
to see an increase in repression in the low freedom scenario. Other effects and inter-
actions are not significant. Here, the negative effect on discriminated groups is more
pronounced while the positive effect on non-discriminated groups is less pronounced
than in the media freedom only model19.
In sum, these results suggest that governments target discriminated groups with
repression as a result of foreign conflicts in high media scenarios with a one year lag.
In low media scenarios, on the other hand, discriminated groups are targeted more in-
stantaneously. It is not clear why this is the case. A possible explanation could be
that discriminated groups in low media scenarios have mobilised before as a result of
structural grievances and therefore governments may react quicker to the possibility of
them gaining information about foreign events, for example as a result of direct com-
munication. Moreover, the results from the lagged models on media freedom suggest
that there may be a type of generally repressive governments that both restrict media
freedom and react to foreign events with targeted repression. However, the moderating
effects of both information factors do not reach statistical significance and thus these
conclusions contain a considerable amount of uncertainty.
Next, the lagged effect of successes of discriminated groups elsewhere are con-
sidered in table 5.10. In model one, we see no significant effects or interactions in
18When low intensity conflicts are included there is a positive interaction but again nothing is signifi-
cant (see table C.9).
19When conflicts of all intensities are included, effects are similar but weaker and nothing reaches
significance. Again, these results can be found in table C.9.
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the simulations20. When media availability is not logged (see table C.10), however,
we see a significantly positive effect on discriminated groups’ likelihood of not being
repressed in the low media scenario while we see a negative but insignificant effect on
this likelihood for non-discriminated groups. This interaction is significant. In the high
media scenario there is barely any effect for both groups. The moderating effect of
media is insignificant here.
When media freedom is included in the model instead of media availability, we see
a similar effect like in the unlogged media model. When there is no media freedom,
increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups lead to a significant increase in
discriminated groups’ likelihood of no repression while groups that are not discrimi-
nated see an insignificant decrease as a result. The interaction is significantly positive
here. In the media freedom scenario, on the other hand, changes in foreign successes
have only small and insignificant effects. Again, the moderating effect of media is
insignificant here.
In the model on neighbour states, there are neither discernible effects nor an inter-
action.
Finally, in the model on the index and media freedom, discriminated groups are
significantly more likely to see no repression as a result of foreign successes of dis-
criminated groups in the absence of media freedom while non-discriminated groups
see an increase in the likelihood of some repression that is not significant. The interac-
tion between discrimination and successes in the low freedom scenario is significantly
positive. In the presence of media freedom, again, there is barely any effect of foreign
successes of discriminated groups and the moderating effect of media freedom is not
significant.
In sum, some models find a lagged effect of successes on discriminated groups’
treatment. However, governments’ reaction here is a decrease in repression which may
suggest that they offer concessions to these groups as they expect them to be more in-
spired when observing successes. However, it is not clear why this is the case only
in the low media and no media freedom scenarios. The moderating effect of media
sources is not significant in any model here either, thus leaving considerable uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, these findings are interesting as they again closely mirror findings
20The same is the case when the Internet is included (see table C.10).
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from chapter three on the actual likelihood of conflict where successes also played a
particular role for discriminated groups in low media and low freedom scenarios. Thus,
these findings may indeed suggest that governments have knowledge of the processes
underlying conflict contagion and act to deter them.
Conclusion
This chapter tests an argument suggesting that foreign conflicts and successes are par-
ticularly likely to inspire domestic discriminated groups and as a result governments
should be more likely to repress discriminated groups in the light of such foreign events
when they can expect domestic groups to have gained information about these events.
It was found that governments indeed increase repression against discriminated
groups as a result of foreign conflicts by similar groups when the availability of media
sources is high but only with a one year time lag. When media availability is low,
governments were found to repress discriminated groups immediately.
Moreover, governments that censor media are found to react to those conflicts
with the repression of domestic discriminated groups, likely because they are generally
more likely to use repression and do not trust their ability to prevent information from
entering.
Finally, governments were found to offer concessions to discriminated groups in
low media source and freedom scenarios as a result of foreign successes with a one-year
time lag.
The results on low media scenarios are surprising. There seems to be something
about low media availability/ freedom scenarios that triggers a quicker reaction against
discriminated groups and that leads governments to react to successes as well, a reac-
tion they barely show in high media scenarios. It may be the case that in such countries
there are other infrastructural or civil rights deficiencies that lead groups to have gener-
ally higher grievances that may coincide with higher levels of initial mobilisation which
require quicker and more comprehensive action by the government.
The role of information flows in this chapter has not fully become clear. It may
be the case that governments are less concerned about information flows than expected
and that variables used here to measure information capture other aspects of the pro-
cess. One such aspect could be the level of initial grievance and/or mobilisation of a
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group that affects the speed and comprehensiveness of government reaction. It would
be fruitful to explore this aspect in more detail in future research, for example by con-
sidering how government reaction towards discriminated groups differs as a result of
their level of political mobilisation or their history of collective action.
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Table 5.7: Models 1 and 2 with time lag.
(9) (10)
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf) -0.0416 -0.215+
(0.187) (0.110)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) -0.387 -1.284∗∗
(0.753) (0.421)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media) -0.161
(0.838)
Media x Disc 0.0154
(0.384)
Conf x Media 0.0254
(0.0881)
Conf x Disc 0.0716 0.128∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0396)
Conf x Disc x Media 0.00493
(0.0384)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed) -4.908∗∗
(1.807)
Freed x Disc 2.059∗∗
(0.750)
Conf x Freed 0.375∗
(0.171)
Conf x Freed x Disc -0.160∗
(0.0707)
GDP per capita 0.101 0.860
(2.767) (2.680)
Vanhanen index -0.0301+ -0.0372+
(0.0169) (0.0205)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0936 0.124
(0.0807) (0.0754)
Group protest, t-1 0.0841 0.0877
(0.0953) (0.0951)
Dominant group 0.385 -0.344
(0.746) (0.759)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0103 0.0705
(0.112) (0.134)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.120 0.0358
(0.110) (0.103)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 0.0957 -0.158
(0.301) (0.327)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00275+ -0.00134
(0.00141) (0.000918)
Repression, t-1 1.805∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.197)
cut1
Constant 2.073 -0.217
(1.895) (1.185)
cut2
Constant 3.488+ 1.151
(1.893) (1.213)
cut3
Constant 4.758∗ 2.357+
(1.925) (1.228)
cut4
Constant 7.077∗∗∗ 4.662∗∗∗
(1.995) (1.396)
cut5
Constant 8.999∗∗∗ 6.462∗∗∗
(2.122) (1.662)
cut6
Constant 11.84∗∗∗ 9.027∗∗∗
(2.317) (1.784)
Observations 745 730
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 5.8: Robustness tests for model 1 with time lag.
(11) (12) (13)
Repression Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint) -0.268 -0.0580
(0.402) (0.228)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) -5.029 -0.607 -0.476
(3.195) (0.501) (1.978)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media) 2.559
(3.297)
Media x Disc -1.974
(1.296)
ConfAllint x Media -0.113
(0.153)
ConfAllint x Disc 0.245+ 0.0314
(0.144) (0.0908)
ConfAllint x Disc x Media 0.0929
(0.0600)
Conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf) -0.0777
(0.116)
Radio and TV measure, t-1 (MediaNolog) -0.571 -1.811
(2.747) (13.29)
MediaNolog x Disc 0.782 -3.825
(1.239) (5.466)
Conf x MediaNolog 0.0142
(0.260)
Conf x Disc 0.0764
(0.0468)
Conf x Disc x MediaNolog -0.0514
(0.119)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 0.0512
(0.304)
Media 0.0635
(0.612)
Conf x Disc x Media 0.182
(0.247)
GDP per capita 0.423 1.846 1.946
(2.832) (3.891) (3.891)
Vanhanen index -0.0330∗ -0.0282+ -0.0300+
(0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0161)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0890 0.0936 0.0878
(0.0775) (0.0799) (0.0766)
Group protest, t-1 0.0818 0.0882 0.0850
(0.0942) (0.0958) (0.0938)
Dominant group 0.478 0.421 0.478
(0.738) (0.712) (0.713)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0295 0.00521 0.0188
(0.120) (0.110) (0.117)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.124 0.101 0.115
(0.121) (0.108) (0.120)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 0.0416 0.00279
(0.290) (0.290)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00278+ -0.00243+ -0.00251+
(0.00153) (0.00126) (0.00141)
Repression, t-1 1.817∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ 1.790∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.208) (0.206)
cut1
Constant -3.405 1.848 1.357
(8.824) (1.247) (5.011)
cut2
Constant -1.998 3.257∗ 2.762
(8.814) (1.275) (5.039)
cut3
Constant -0.736 4.515∗∗∗ 4.024
(8.825) (1.315) (5.063)
cut4
Constant 1.635 6.819∗∗∗ 6.374
(8.856) (1.461) (5.145)
cut5
Constant 3.553 8.731∗∗∗ 8.260
(8.909) (1.796) (5.270)
cut6
Constant 6.470 11.55∗∗∗ 11.11∗
(9.023) (1.938) (5.333)
Observations 745 745 745
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 5.9: Models 3 and 4 with time lag.
(14) (15)
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours, t-1 (NbConf) -0.339
(0.230)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) 0.215∗ -0.798∗
(0.0883) (0.381)
NbConf x Disc 0.0711
(0.0658)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index, t-1 (IndConf) -0.000911
(0.000907)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed) -3.247∗
(1.339)
Freed x Disc 1.494∗∗
(0.566)
IndConf x Freed 0.00169
(0.00109)
IndConf x Disc 0.000629∗
(0.000299)
IndConf x Freed x Disc -0.000793∗
(0.000404)
GDP per capita 2.054 -0.282
(2.365) (2.875)
Vanhanen index -0.0356∗ -0.0383+
(0.0173) (0.0208)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0744 0.119
(0.0785) (0.0753)
Group protest, t-1 0.0870 0.0909
(0.0946) (0.0959)
Dominant group 0.525 -0.247
(0.668) (0.737)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0173 0.0651
(0.120) (0.130)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.0987 0.0572
(0.111) (0.0995)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 0.0972 -0.143
(0.296) (0.314)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00255+ -0.00138
(0.00143) (0.000923)
Repression, t-1 1.827∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.197)
cut1
Constant 2.515∗∗∗ 0.844
(0.431) (1.188)
cut2
Constant 3.918∗∗∗ 2.207+
(0.510) (1.219)
cut3
Constant 5.193∗∗∗ 3.418∗∗
(0.632) (1.246)
cut4
Constant 7.542∗∗∗ 5.742∗∗∗
(0.800) (1.362)
cut5
Constant 9.437∗∗∗ 7.567∗∗∗
(1.163) (1.647)
cut6
Constant 12.39∗∗∗ 10.22∗∗∗
(1.365) (1.857)
Observations 745 730
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 5.10: Models 5 and 6 with time lag.
(16) (17)
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Succ) -0.0159 0.203
(0.286) (0.208)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) 0.516 0.396∗
(0.316) (0.186)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media) 0.133
(0.450)
Media x Disc 0.0489
(0.162)
Succ x Media -0.0491
(0.132)
Succ x Disc -0.0784 -0.207∗
(0.134) (0.0916)
Succ x Disc x Media 0.0154
(0.0679)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed) -0.234
(0.787)
Freed x Disc -0.00321
(0.254)
Freed x Succ -0.389
(0.298)
Succ x Freed x Disc 0.226+
(0.116)
GDP per capita -0.266 -0.000216
(2.823) (2.736)
Vanhanen index -0.0306+ -0.0399+
(0.0166) (0.0204)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0709 0.0952
(0.0794) (0.0713)
Group protest, t-1 0.0968 0.109
(0.0923) (0.0936)
Dominant group 0.421 -0.206
(0.687) (0.714)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0256 0.0721
(0.109) (0.132)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.128 0.0505
(0.110) (0.105)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.218 -0.464
(0.322) (0.310)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00263+ -0.00130
(0.00143) (0.000872)
Repression, t-1 1.832∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.206)
cut1
Constant 2.406∗ 2.193∗∗∗
(0.965) (0.535)
cut2
Constant 3.799∗∗∗ 3.545∗∗∗
(1.001) (0.586)
cut3
Constant 5.071∗∗∗ 4.763∗∗∗
(1.070) (0.731)
cut4
Constant 7.413∗∗∗ 7.079∗∗∗
(1.170) (0.899)
cut5
Constant 9.337∗∗∗ 8.896∗∗∗
(1.425) (1.184)
cut6
Constant 12.30∗∗∗ 11.73∗∗∗
(1.559) (1.386)
Observations 744 729
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 5.11: Models 7 and 8 with time lag.
(18) (19)
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours, t-1 (NbSucc) -0.762
(0.600)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) 0.255∗∗ 0.402∗
(0.0801) (0.185)
NbSucc x Disc 0.127
(0.244)
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index, t-1 (IndSucc) 0.00161
(0.00180)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed) -0.286
(0.776)
Freed x Disc -0.0160
(0.264)
IndSucc x Freed -0.00295
(0.00240)
IndSucc x Disc -0.00158∗
(0.000762)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc 0.00174+
(0.000941)
GDP per capita 1.358 0.978
(2.426) (2.618)
Vanhanen index -0.0312∗ -0.0418∗
(0.0158) (0.0200)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0849 0.0967
(0.0787) (0.0684)
Group protest, t-1 0.102 0.114
(0.0942) (0.0940)
Dominant group 0.497 -0.211
(0.671) (0.728)
Other domestic protests, t-1 -0.00542 0.0780
(0.113) (0.131)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.130 0.0538
(0.114) (0.105)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.217 -0.499
(0.313) (0.307)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00271+ -0.00138
(0.00158) (0.000918)
Repression, t-1 1.804∗∗∗ 1.709∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.206)
cut1
Constant 2.511∗∗∗ 2.164∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.531)
cut2
Constant 3.903∗∗∗ 3.536∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.585)
cut3
Constant 5.168∗∗∗ 4.751∗∗∗
(0.608) (0.729)
cut4
Constant 7.546∗∗∗ 7.061∗∗∗
(0.794) (0.894)
cut5
Constant 9.468∗∗∗ 8.873∗∗∗
(1.179) (1.182)
cut6
Constant 12.38∗∗∗ 11.71∗∗∗
(1.380) (1.394)
Observations 745 730
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Chapter 6
General Conclusions
This thesis analyses armed ethnic conflict as well as government repression targeted at
groups in order to prevent them from rebelling. The first part explores the possibility of
and mechanism behind armed civil conflicts spreading between countries. This thesis is
the first to test in a large-n study whether information about conflicts involving groups
with similar grievances can trigger conflict contagion. It is also the first to explore
the role of information transmitted via mass media in contagion processes of armed
conflict. Chapter three finds support for the suggested mechanism in the context of
the availability of media sources. Other factors that were expected to play a role for
information flows transmitted via mass media such as for example media freedom were
not found to be important. In addition, the mechanism was not found to depend on
geographical proximity.
While the findings on media availability suggest that information transmitted via
mass media plays a role in the conflict contagion process under scrutiny, the variables
used to operationalise such information flows in this study must ultimately be under-
stood as proxies for a very complex concept. In addition, the availability and quality
of the data that could be used to explore the role of information transmitted via mass
media in the proposed contagion mechanism is limited. Improving and extending data
on media availability and freedom in particular is important for better understanding
the role of the mass media in contagion processes. Nevertheless, the positive results
suggest that further attempts to operationalise media-based information flows between
states are important in order to understand the role of information flows in diffusion
processes of collective action further. The results also suggest that a measure of media
availability should take temporal dynamics into account. The introduction and using
142
pattern of new media are of the essence for understanding the role of information flows
via mass media. Taking changes in type of media available as well as user behaviour
over time into account in attempts to operationalise information flows via mass me-
dia would be fruitful endeavours in order to further understand the role of information
flows via mass media in conflict contagion processes.
In addition, the chapter explores inspiration-based conflict contagion processes on
the country level. As a result, the research design does not allow inferring with cer-
tainty that discriminated groups are indeed inspired by foreign events and rebel as a
result. Instead, more complex processes could be at work. For example, other actors
in a state might expect discriminated groups to react and mobilise pre-emptively (also
see for example Kuran, 1998). Therefore, the causal mechanisms behind conflict con-
tagion processes need to be disentangled further on the actor level. Actor level analyses
would also allow to explore the role of information flows further as some groups within
a country might have more information about foreign events than others, for example
as a result of diaspora networks and direct communications with similar groups. This
suggestion is in line with Weidmann (2015)’s call for data on group-specific patterns of
international communication to fully understand the mechanism behind conflict conta-
gion.
Finally, the findings of this chapter suggest that geographical proximity plays a
role for conflict contagion, but only under some mechanisms. Inspiration as a result of
conflict involvements of discriminated groups has not been found to rely on proximity
of capitals at all. Whether geographic proximity is relevant as a transmission channel
for conflict contagion seems to depend on the specific mechanism at play. To date the
overwhelming majority of conflict contagion literature tests arguments about contagion
exclusively in a geographic context. The findings here suggest that it is important
to make a clear theoretical and empirical distinction between different transmission
channels that specific contagion mechanisms depend on.
The second and third part of this thesis explore the relationship between repression
and conflict from a different angle than most existing literature: It considers whether
repression is also used by governments in an attempt to prevent conflict, that is against
groups that are conflict prone without actually engaging in conflict. This is the first
attempt in repression literature to empirically assess the possibility of a targeted and
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pre-emptive use of government repression. This approach differs greatly from the view
of governments in research on armed conflict. Here, the focus is almost exclusively on
potential challengers and factors that increase their incentives for rebellion while the
government’s role in processes causing conflict tends to be ignored. However, it is very
unlikely that the government is as passive of an actor as it is often assumed and explor-
ing government actions to prevent conflict more widely would be a fruitful endeavour
for future research. The most important question with regards to governments’ role in
causing conflict is whether and in how far governments are aware of factors causing
domestic groups to engage in conflict and what strategies they choose to react to them.
The second and third part of this thesis speaks to both questions.
Chapter four finds evidence that governments react to group-specific character-
istics that increase groups’ expected utility for rebellion with repression. However,
contrary to the assumption introduced here, not all governments do so but rather only
governments that are relatively strong compared to the potential target of repression.
This is probably because such governments can afford to use even large amounts of re-
pression without becoming vulnerable to other threats. Thus, the findings suggest that
repression is a pre-emptive tool for governments that are strong relative to domestic
groups.
The conditionality of pre-emptive repression is interesting as it can provide in-
sights for other types of government action as well. It is likely that weak governments
are as aware of groups’ expected utility calculations as strong ones but do not consider
repression a useful response. But what actions do weak governments resort to instead
when facing imbalances in groups’ expected utilities? They could either offer conces-
sions to groups at risk of rebelling or they might take the chance of fighting. Thus, the
theory developed here could also be tested in the context of government concessions as
well as armed rebellion actually breaking out. The findings of this chapter also suggest
that different types of government actions that can substitute for each other are ideally
understood and analysed together and not in isolation (also see Davenport, 2007a, who
calls for more holistic considerations of substitutable government actions).
The evidence found in this chapter suggests that governments are by no means
only reacting to domestic opposition. Similarly, government repression is by no means
a phenomenon that takes place on the national level and affects the whole population
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equally. Instead, governments use repression also as a pre-emptive tool and adapt their
repression level to specific groups’ situations. Therefore, fruitful avenues for future
research on government repression would be to consider the phenomenon in more dis-
aggregated ways and to take pre-emptive incentives for government repression against
specific domestic actors seriously.
The third part of this thesis analyses empirically whether information about con-
flicts by similarly aggrieved groups or their successes in other countries trigger govern-
ment reaction against domestic aggrieved groups. Again, quantitative data and research
methods are used to answer this question. Chapter five finds that governments react
with pre-emptive repression to the potential of ethnic conflict contagion as a result of
information flows via mass media between groups that are similarly aggrieved when
mass media are operationalised using the availability of media sources – but only with
a time lag. This finding is particularly interesting as this mechanism was the one found
to trigger conflict as well. As evidence from chapter three suggests that it is not the
case that conflict is in fact triggered by pre-emptive repression as a response to for-
eign conflicts, this would suggest that governments act on correct information about
the mechanisms underlying the likelihood of armed conflict. However, this conclusion
needs to be seen with some caution. After all, this chapter also finds governments to
react to discriminated groups in low media scenarios, this time instantaneously. While
this finding supports the part of the argument where discriminated groups are expected
to be particularly inspired by foreign conflicts of discriminated groups and that govern-
ments thus react to them in particular, it opens questions on what the media availability
variable measures. It is possible that this finding is driven by low media availability
being correlated with structural factors that lead to a higher chance of groups’ previous
mobilisation. If that is the case, it may be that governments expect these groups to
have such a high conflict likelihood that they either expect them to actively seek out
information about foreign conflicts or to be part of networks where they will gain this
information anyhow. This would not necessarily mean that the findings on media avail-
ability are not showing the effect of information transmitted via mass media. However,
in order to gain additional insight into whether that is the case, future research should
take group dispositions to violence into account more explicitly when exploring infor-
mation based conflict contagion and resulting repression.
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The finding that governments seem to have a good understanding of at least some
aspects of the processes causing conflict raises two question that are of fundamental
importance for research on armed civil conflict. Firstly, if governments indeed have a
good understanding on what causes conflict, then conflict research needs to be much
more conscious of the possibility that some factors may trigger conflict not directly by
affecting challengers but rather indirectly by affecting government actions. Moreover,
a new set of variables would emerge into the study of armed civil war and that is the
information on the part of the government and the preferred strategies of different types
of governments. It is likely that some governments have a better understanding of the
causes of armed conflict than others and this may be used as an explanatory variable
for armed conflict as it can proxy the success of governments’ pre-emptive strategy.
For example, governments with past experience of armed conflict may have a better
understanding of causes of conflict and use their knowledge in order to control domestic
actors. These considerations also imply that conflict research may need to be more
critical about whether information about the causes of armed civil conflict is used by
the international community to protect civilians or whether findings can also lead to
increased repression or allow governments to deter peaceful movements.
Secondly, and relatedly, the findings of this thesis raise the question of when and
what pre-emptive actions governments take in response to threats? A number of struc-
tural variables that are used to explain armed conflict could in fact explain government
strategies used when conflict is likely. If that was the case, the exogeneity of many
structural factors such as civil liberties and economic measures would need to be called
in question. Moreover, our understanding of structural factors could also reflect un-
derlying factors such as for example lack of a repressive capacity early on in a state’s
history. Once a state is on a trajectory for a preferred response to threats, states may
not be able to change this strategy easily. If that is the case, domestic as well as foreign
threats may serve as mechanisms to cement regime types and government practices
towards citizens.
Overall, this thesis suggests and finds that governments and potential challengers
interact with each other in more complex ways than both current conflict and repression
literature tend to assume. Instead of analysing these phenomena in isolation, it would
be fruitful for future research to consider interactions of challengers and governments
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in a holistic way and to consider both actors to be strategic and forward looking. In
particular, the question of governments’ knowledge and factors affecting it is of fun-
damental importance for understanding governments’ role in causing armed conflict
and thus armed conflict more generally. Understanding and analysing the role of gov-
ernments explicitly is very difficult as there is an inherent issue of endogeneity if the
government has control over most of the factors causing conflict and knows their effect.
Nevertheless, these questions cannot be ignored as without understanding the govern-
ment’s role our knowledge of causes of armed conflict is likely to be based on incorrect
assumptions of exogeneity.
Appendix A
Additional information from Chapter
3
Coding successes from Growup data
As noted in the chapter, a discriminated group advancing to any status other than state
collapse, separatist autonomy and powerless is considered a success. An advancement
to the categories dominance, senior and junior partner means that a group has become
part of the state’s government; a clear improvement over being politically discrimi-
nated. Similarly, a group with regional autonomy has gained “(...) some influence at
the substate level (...)” (Cederman et al., 2010, 100) which is also considered to be a
successful outcome for a discriminated group. A group that advances to powerlessness
is still not in a position of power but is no longer targeted with state-led discrimination
(Cederman et al., 2010). Even though this advancement constitutes an improvement
for a discriminated group as well, it is only small and not directly observable as a group
remains excluded from the government of a state. Thus, a discriminated group’s ad-
vancement from discriminated to powerless should not give other discriminated groups
reason to emulation. Groups advancing to the category of separatist autonomy have
declared themselves to be independent but the government has not agreed to this addi-
tional level of regional power (Cederman et al., 2010). This case can thus not be seen
as an improvement of a group’s situation in the sense that the government has given a
concession. Instead, this status might just be a sign that a group has entered a struggle
for more regional power.
However, this coding rule might not lead to the inclusion of all successes of dis-
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criminated groups. There are cases where a discriminated group fights the government
and subsequently disappears from the EPR data, either because it achieved indepen-
dence like in the case of Bangladesh or because the ethnic relevance of groups changes
after the conflict, like in the case of Liberia in 1989. Such cases were considered indi-
vidually and were included if the situation of the majority of the discriminated group
fighting can be considered as improved after the fight using the same criteria as for the
other EPR cases. This practice only led to the inclusion of the case of Bangladesh in
1971 as a success.
The index on the availability of media sources
The variables on radio and TV per capita contain zero values that indicate that “(...)
no data on radio or TV was available for that country” according to an email by a
data project representative. In addition, these values do not seem to be distributed in
a systematic way as on the TV variable some cases contain missing values from 1950
until a positive value is coded for them whereas in other cases the documentation starts
with zeros in 1950 until a positive value is coded. For these reasons, I recode all zero
values on these two variables to missing values.
Moreover, there are some cases where the variable on Internet carries values of 0
before 1990, the first year with cases with non-zero Internet availability. Those cases
are dropped.
The variable on media freedom
The coding system of the Freedom House data varies between the years of coverage
from 1980 to 2008. Most notably, between 1980 and 1988 the data separates between
the freedom of print media and the freedom of broadcasting. While there are several
cases in the data where print media is at least partly free while broadcasting is not, there
is no case where broadcasting is at least partly free while print media is not. Therefore,
in these cases the measure on print media is used.
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Regression tables from robustness tests
Table A.1: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (all intensities) of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: media availability and media freedom.
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, all intensities, t-1 (ConfdiscAllint) 0.0423 0.0331
(0.101) (0.0521)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) -1.015 0.244
(1.056) (0.599)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.401
(0.317)
(Media)*(Disc) 0.189+ -0.0183
(0.101) (0.0504)
(Media)*(ConfdiscAllint) 0.0105
(0.0316)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint) -0.409
(0.269)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint)*(Media) 0.0650∗
(0.0304)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.0717
(0.766)
(Disc)*(Freed) -0.587
(0.885)
(ConfdiscAllint)*(Freed) -0.0312
(0.0636)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint)*(Freed) 0.0749
(0.0765)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.252 -0.419∗∗
(0.173) (0.161)
Population (1000000s) 0.00186∗∗ 0.00199∗∗∗
(0.000665) (0.000578)
Xpolity 0.0134 0.0355
(0.0341) (0.0289)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.0526 -0.00437
(0.236) (0.270)
Peaceyears -0.0769 -0.110
(0.0691) (0.0754)
Peaceyears2 0.00147 0.00193
(0.00383) (0.00383)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000142 -0.00000937
(0.0000556) (0.0000515)
Year 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.00782
(0.00987) (0.0271)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.957∗∗ 0.653
(0.367) (0.477)
Constant -97.10∗∗∗ -15.32
(20.66) (54.22)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.2: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (all intensities) of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.
GDP Distance Index and Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted -0.00000175
by GDP, all intensities, t-1 (GDPconfAllint) (0.00000643)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.199 0.279 -0.622
(0.481) (0.258) (0.693)
(Disc)*(GDPconfAllint) 2.05e-09
(0.0000109)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted 16.28∗∗∗
by capital distance, all intensities, t-1 (DistconfAllint) (4.180)
(Disc)*(DistconfAllint) -28.39
(71.05)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted -0.000320
by index, all intensities, t-1 (IndconfAllint) (0.000414)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.495
(0.767)
(Disc)*(IndconfAllint) 0.000349
(0.000393)
(Disc)*(IndconfAllint) -0.000149
(0.000459)
(Disc)*(Freed) -1.124
(2.381)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfAllint) 0.000882
(0.00125)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.469∗∗ -0.485∗∗ -0.359+
(0.152) (0.148) (0.204)
Population (1000000s) 0.00184∗∗ 0.00193∗∗∗ 0.00205∗∗
(0.000593) (0.000556) (0.000624)
Xpolity 0.0256 0.0256 0.0486
(0.0295) (0.0280) (0.0317)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.322 0.291 -0.130
(0.240) (0.235) (0.259)
Peaceyears -0.125+ -0.128+ -0.146
(0.0682) (0.0676) (0.0908)
Peaceyears2 0.00403 0.00409 0.00358
(0.00363) (0.00352) (0.00479)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000462 -0.0000457 -0.0000304
(0.0000506) (0.0000487) (0.0000670)
Year 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ -0.00766
(0.00642) (0.00609) (0.0280)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.595∗ 0.572∗ 0.724
(0.275) (0.280) (0.469)
Constant -61.85∗∗∗ -58.11∗∗∗ 16.28
(13.19) (12.38) (55.87)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.3: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (high intensity and
onset) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination.
Information factors: media availability and media freedom.
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, 0.0143 0.125
high intensity and onset, t-1 (ConfdiscHighons) (0.183) (0.104)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.297
(0.222)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.402 0.272
(0.559) (0.529)
(Disc)*(Media) -0.0473
(0.158)
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Disc) 0.173 -0.0644
(0.152) (0.108)
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Media) -0.0163
(0.0623)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscHighons)*(Media) 0.0958
(0.0594)
Press freedom, t-1 -0.258
(0.650)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.364
(0.743)
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Freed) -0.0318
(0.144)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscHighons)*(Freed) -0.0489
(0.178)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.207 -0.404∗
(0.171) (0.163)
Population (1000000s) 0.00186∗∗ 0.00190∗∗∗
(0.000640) (0.000566)
Xpolity 0.0119 0.0390
(0.0335) (0.0298)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.0577 0.164
(0.230) (0.274)
Peaceyears -0.0906 -0.105
(0.0666) (0.0747)
Peaceyears2 0.00218 0.00165
(0.00368) (0.00374)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000229 -0.00000527
(0.0000531) (0.0000501)
Year 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.000406
(0.0104) (0.0158)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.945∗∗ 0.681
(0.364) (0.468)
Constant -91.53∗∗∗ -0.918
(21.12) (31.59)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.4: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (high intensity and
onset) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination.
Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.
GDP Distance Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups, 0.00000242
high intensity and onset, t-1 (GDPconfHighons) (0.0000135)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.411∗ 0.350+ -0.0725
(0.205) (0.209) (0.597)
(Disc)*(GDPconfHighons) -0.0000321∗
(0.0000156)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups, high intensity and 23.40∗
onset, weighted by capital distance, t-1 (DistconfHighons) (11.69)
(Disc)*(DistconfHighons) -155.5
(146.1)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups, high intensity and 0.000560
onset, weighted by index, t-1 (IndconfHighons) (0.000831)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed) -0.523
(0.649)
(Disc)*(IndconfHighons) -0.0000253
(0.000762)
(Freed)*(IndconfHighons) -0.000356
(0.00104)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.680
(0.837)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfHighons) -0.000595
(0.00139)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.468∗∗ -0.483∗∗ -0.398∗
(0.152) (0.147) (0.191)
Population (1000000s) 0.00183∗∗ 0.00190∗∗∗ 0.00203∗∗
(0.000582) (0.000541) (0.000630)
Xpolity 0.0287 0.0249 0.0497
(0.0294) (0.0281) (0.0345)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.334 0.343 -0.0556
(0.225) (0.212) (0.281)
Peaceyears -0.120+ -0.131+ -0.133
(0.0684) (0.0674) (0.0900)
Peaceyears2 0.00371 0.00419 0.00271
(0.00356) (0.00352) (0.00468)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000417 -0.0000472 -0.0000164
(0.0000489) (0.0000489) (0.0000649)
Year 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ -0.00298
(0.00650) (0.00606) (0.0169)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.593∗ 0.538+ 0.770+
(0.301) (0.294) (0.445)
Constant -61.53∗∗∗ -61.15∗∗∗ 6.424
(13.33) (12.34) (33.68)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.5: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements, in-
formation and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability includ-
ing Internet, media availability unlogged, minimum distance.
Media with Internet Media, no log Minimum distance
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Confdisc) -0.314 -0.0711
(0.391) (0.0886)
Media source availability including Internet, t-1 (MedInt) 0.207
(0.486)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (1) -2.297 0.238 0.210
(3.685) (0.243) (0.196)
(Disc)*(MedInt) -1.153
(1.291)
(Confdisc)*(Disc) 1.030 -0.0458
(1.056) (0.0975)
(Confdisc)*(MedInt) -0.214
(0.164)
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(MedInt) 0.432
(0.381)
Media source availability, t-1 (MedNolog) 0.269
(1.346)
(Disc)*(MedNolog) -1.094
(2.353)
(Confdisc)*(MedNolog) 0.138
(0.315)
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(MedNolog) 0.761
(0.676)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted 0.0201
by minimum distance, t-1 (Mindistconf) (0.0181)
(Disc)*(Mindistconf) -0.0126
(0.0214)
Natural log of GDP per capita 0.0182 -0.496∗∗ -0.485∗∗
(0.520) (0.160) (0.149)
Population (1000000s) 0.00262∗∗∗ 0.00182∗ 0.00191∗∗∗
(0.000747) (0.000719) (0.000549)
Xpolity -0.0585 0.00848 0.0257
(0.0483) (0.0349) (0.0282)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.163 -0.0240 0.285
(0.470) (0.221) (0.221)
Peaceyears 0.0752 -0.111 -0.130+
(0.142) (0.0681) (0.0680)
Peaceyears2 -0.0103 0.00324 0.00418
(0.00757) (0.00381) (0.00353)
Peaceyears3 0.000170+ -0.0000385 -0.0000473
(0.000102) (0.0000553) (0.0000488)
Year -0.149+ 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗
(0.0875) (0.00874) (0.00597)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.359 0.898∗ 0.569+
(0.552) (0.363) (0.295)
Constant 295.1+ -65.86∗∗∗ -59.89∗∗∗
(172.1) (17.28) (12.15)
Observations 957 4465 6575
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.6: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: media availability and media freedom. Colonial conflicts are excluded.
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, -0.0212 0.00794
excl col, t-1 (ConfdiscNocol) (0.211) (0.151)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.356+
(0.184)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) -0.000832 -0.0120
(0.571) (0.521)
(Disc)*(Media) -0.0850
(0.148)
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Disc) 0.398∗ 0.0181
(0.195) (0.127)
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Media) 0.0114
(0.0691)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscNocol)*(Media) 0.145∗
(0.0679)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.206
(0.611)
(Disc)*(Freed) -0.0527
(0.763)
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Freed) -0.0630
(0.172)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscNocol)*(Freed) 0.0897
(0.229)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.228 -0.415∗
(0.173) (0.162)
Population (1000000s) 0.00193∗∗ 0.00195∗∗∗
(0.000662) (0.000562)
Xpolity 0.00881 0.0356
(0.0339) (0.0290)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.115 0.107
(0.228) (0.271)
Peaceyears -0.0951 -0.104
(0.0688) (0.0726)
Peaceyears2 0.00258 0.00165
(0.00379) (0.00367)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000299 -0.00000546
(0.0000548) (0.0000494)
Year 0.0509∗∗∗ -0.00505
(0.0103) (0.0161)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.907∗ 0.627
(0.359) (0.465)
Constant -103.2∗∗∗ 10.53
(21.02) (32.28)
Observations 4465 3199
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.7: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index. Colonial conflicts are
excluded.
GDP Distance Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by GDP, 0.00000547
excl col, t-1 (GDPconfNocol) (0.0000293)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.217 0.245 -0.248
(0.185) (0.191) (0.584)
(Disc)*(GDPconfNocol) -0.00000482
(0.0000193)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted 34.43∗∗
by capital distance, excl col, t-1 (DistconfNocol) (13.07)
(Disc)*(DistconfNocol) -76.66
(129.0)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted -0.000259
by index, excl col, t-1 (IndconfNocol) (0.00124)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.540
(0.672)
(Freed)*(IndconfNocol) -0.000469
(0.00148)
(Disc)*(IndconfNocol) 0.000498
(0.000969)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.0351
(0.790)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfNocol) 0.000815
(0.00157)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.473∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.380∗
(0.153) (0.148) (0.189)
Population (1000000s) 0.00186∗∗ 0.00192∗∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗
(0.000576) (0.000540) (0.000632)
Xpolity 0.0271 0.0252 0.0458
(0.0292) (0.0280) (0.0340)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 0.301 0.280 -0.126
(0.223) (0.215) (0.282)
Peaceyears -0.125+ -0.133∗ -0.125
(0.0682) (0.0673) (0.0886)
Peaceyears2 0.00398 0.00428 0.00216
(0.00360) (0.00352) (0.00468)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000454 -0.0000482 -0.00000794
(0.0000498) (0.0000489) (0.0000659)
Year 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ -0.00192
(0.00684) (0.00601) (0.0177)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.597∗ 0.549+ 0.715
(0.292) (0.293) (0.454)
Constant -62.55∗∗∗ -60.47∗∗∗ 4.618
(13.82) (12.24) (35.19)
Observations 6505 6578 2525
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.8: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: media availability and media freedom. Repression is controlled for
here.
Media availability Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Confdisc) 0.140 -0.0396
(0.202) (0.140)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media) -0.513
(0.317)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 1.517 -0.0821
(1.581) (0.518)
(Disc)*(Media) 0.703
(0.691)
(Confdisc)*(Disc) -0.0613 0.0393
(0.394) (0.126)
(Confdisc)*(Media) 0.0913
(0.0851)
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(Media) -0.0810
(0.168)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.264
(0.623)
(Disc)*(Freed) -0.0622
(0.812)
(Confdisc)*(Freed) -0.0271
(0.165)
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(Freed) 0.0728
(0.249)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.468∗ -0.465∗
(0.220) (0.185)
Population (1000000s) 0.00222∗∗∗ 0.00189∗∗∗
(0.000539) (0.000571)
Xpolity 0.0111 0.0352
(0.0376) (0.0297)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.315 0.0473
(0.288) (0.274)
Peaceyears -0.108 -0.0806
(0.101) (0.0784)
Peaceyears2 0.00165 0.000477
(0.00509) (0.00389)
Peaceyears3 -0.00000254 0.00000983
(0.0000681) (0.0000513)
Year 0.00647 -0.0140
(0.0242) (0.0183)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.702+ 0.640
(0.413) (0.440)
Government repression, t-1 -0.00561 -0.0397
(0.0551) (0.0538)
Constant -12.82 29.08
(48.67) (36.75)
Observations 2415 3018
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.9: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of
discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Informa-
tion factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index. Repression is con-
trolled for here.
GDP Distance Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups 0.00000206
weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPconf) (0.0000271)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc) 0.0890 0.134 -0.324
(0.293) (0.318) (0.592)
(Disc)*(GDPconf) 0.000000296
(0.0000201)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted 60.51∗∗∗
by capital distance, t-1 (Distconf) (15.92)
(Disc)*(Distconf) -46.21
(148.0)
Foreign conflicts of disc groups -0.000605
weighted by index, t-1 (Indconf) (0.00122)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed) -0.666
(0.703)
(Freed)*(Indconf) -0.0000899
(0.00148)
(Disc)*(Indconf) 0.000691
(0.000990)
(Disc)*(Freed) 0.106
(0.858)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(Indconf) 0.000475
(0.00179)
Natural log of GDP per capita -0.490∗∗ -0.489∗∗ -0.438+
(0.167) (0.166) (0.225)
Population (1000000s) 0.00190∗∗∗ 0.00190∗∗∗ 0.00211∗∗∗
(0.000556) (0.000562) (0.000631)
Xpolity 0.0202 0.0199 0.0428
(0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0353)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.0347 -0.0330 -0.201
(0.270) (0.272) (0.286)
Peaceyears -0.0635 -0.0671 -0.110
(0.0776) (0.0787) (0.0978)
Peaceyears2 -0.00000830 0.000194 0.00118
(0.00384) (0.00389) (0.00510)
Peaceyears3 0.0000129 0.0000103 0.00000770
(0.0000504) (0.0000511) (0.0000701)
Year -0.00662 -0.00464 -0.0106
(0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0219)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1 0.689 0.692 0.722+
(0.450) (0.446) (0.423)
Government repression, t-1 -0.0530 -0.0519 -0.0190
(0.0509) (0.0520) (0.0532)
Constant 14.24 10.25 22.61
(34.61) (35.98) (43.61)
Observations 3084 3085 2364
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Appendix B
Additional information from Chapter
4
Additional information on variables
There is one case where the estimated group population is – slightly – larger than the
total population of a state. This is the case of Hutus in Burundi in 2003. This case is
coded as missing on the variable of the group to non-group member ratio.
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Table B.1: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group. Sample with group ratio below
median.
DV: Direction Change in repression Estimate Std. Error p-value
Discrimination level (Disc) -0.03 0.16 0.84
Member to non-member ratio (Size) -28.45 15.48 0.07
(Disc)*(Size) 9.94 5.80 0.09
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.00 0.11
Repression, t-1 -0.05 0.13 0.72
Dominant group dummy -4.60 881.79 1.00
Vanhanen index -0.01 0.01 0.65
GDP (100000s) -2.79 2.60 0.28
Change in group protest 0.05 0.08 0.59
Change in group rebellion 0.30 0.14 0.03
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.48 0.34 0.16
Change in others’ protest 0.07 0.18 0.69
Change in others’ rebellion -0.47 0.23 0.04
Cut 0.59 0.16 0.00
Constant 0.93 0.59 0.12
N 356
Log-likelihood -91.14636
Table B.2: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group. Sample with group ratio above
median.
DV: Direction Change in repression Estimate Std. Error p-value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.16 0.08 0.04
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 0.03 0.21 0.88
(Disc)*(Size) -0.04 0.08 0.62
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.06 0.03 0.05
Repression, t-1 0.00 0.11 0.98
Dominant group dummy 0.27 0.37 0.47
Vanhanen index -0.02 0.01 0.03
GDP (100000s) 2.37 1.76 0.18
Change in group protest 0.15 0.07 0.04
Change in group rebellion 0.04 0.11 0.74
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.09 0.37 0.80
Change in others’ protest -0.11 0.18 0.54
Change in others’ rebellion -0.40 0.26 0.13
Cut 0.49 0.17 0.00
Constant 0.40 0.41 0.32
N 389
Log-likelihood -117.0143
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Table B.3: Auxiliary regression on group rebellion.
Rebellion
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 0.592
(0.898)
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.172
(0.161)
(Disc)*(Size) -0.140
(0.328)
Inverse member to non-member ratio 0.00114
(0.00149)
Repression, t-1 -0.0809
(0.152)
Rebellion, t-1 2.982∗∗∗
(0.563)
Peaceyears -0.278∗∗∗
(0.0720)
Dominant group dummy 1.267
(0.965)
Territory dummy 0.704
(0.648)
Kin in neighbour dummy -0.962+
(0.556)
GDP (100000s) -4.608
(10.35)
Vanhanen index -0.0600+
(0.0323)
Constant -1.151
(0.950)
Observations 839
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table B.4: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with
low military to group ratio.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.15 0.05 0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size) 0.10 0.13 0.42
(Disc)*(Size) -0.03 0.04 0.43
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.01 0.54
Repression, t-1 0.01 0.06 0.81
Vanhanen index -0.01 0.01 0.36
GDP (100000s) -0.27 1.23 0.83
Change in group protest 0.14 0.05 0.01
Change in group rebellion 0.17 0.07 0.02
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.48 0.24 0.04
Change in others’ protest -0.12 0.12 0.33
Change in others’ rebellion -0.54 0.18 0.00
Cut 0.29 0.12 0.01
Constant -0.31 0.21 0.15
N 715
Log-likelihood -237.7883
Table B.5: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with
high military to group ratio.
DV: Direction change in repression Estimate Std. Error p value
Discrimination level (Disc) 0.11 0.08 0.15
Member to non-member ratio (Size) -3.73 3.42 0.28
(Disc)*(Size) 1.28 1.32 0.33
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00 0.00 0.16
Repression, t-1 -0.07 0.06 0.24
Vanhanen index -0.02 0.01 0.08
GDP (100000s) 0.91 1.53 0.55
Change in group protest -0.04 0.06 0.49
Change in group rebellion 0.23 0.10 0.02
Rebellion dummy, t-1 0.36 0.24 0.14
Change in others’ protest 0.09 0.14 0.50
Change in others’ rebellion -0.21 0.17 0.21
Cut 0.65 0.09 0.00
Constant 0.42 0.30 0.16
N 604
Log-Likelihood -176.0886
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Table B.6: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and
decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with
high military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups with no previous repression only.
Increase in repression
(Disc)*(Size) 58.59+
(30.95)
Discrimination level (Disc) -0.446
(0.590)
Member to non-member ratio (Size) -197.9+
(102.8)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00425
(0.00429)
Vanhanen index -0.0439
(0.0551)
GDP per Capita 0.0000147
(0.0000866)
Rebellion, t-1 -1.459
(2.507)
Change in group protest 0.0271
(0.266)
Change in group rebellion 2.850∗
(1.418)
Discrete change in others’ protest -1.162
(0.861)
Discrete change in others’ rebellion 0.0183
(0.644)
Constant -0.322
(2.250)
Observations 290
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.1: Robustness tests for model 1 on media availability and conflicts elsewhere.
Repression Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensity) (ConfAllint) 0.415
(0.691)
Group’s level of discrimination 4.926 -1.346+ 1.509
(5.275) (0.745) (1.359)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media) -1.944
(7.625)
Media x Disc 2.884
(2.528)
ConfAllint x Media 0.0758
(0.351)
ConfAllint x Disc -0.204
(0.241)
ConfAllint x Disc x Media -0.130
(0.116)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf) 0.00829 0.104
(0.199) (0.360)
Radio and TV measure (MediaNolog) -2.144
(6.239)
MediaNolog x Disc 3.704+
(1.931)
Conf x MediaNolog 0.0737
(0.515)
Conf x Disc 0.143∗ -0.0971
(0.0657) (0.123)
Conf x Disc x MediaNolog -0.320+
(0.175)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.578+ -0.804∗
(0.338) (0.364)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln) (MediaInt) -0.541
(1.780)
MediaInt x Disc 0.921
(0.589)
Conf x MediaInt 0.0383
(0.163)
Conf x Disc x MediaInt -0.0757
(0.0537)
GDP per capita 2.915 4.860 0.434
(3.461) (4.700) (3.943)
Vanhanen index -0.0271 -0.0305 -0.0392∗
(0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0196)
Group rebellion 0.271∗ 0.249∗ 0.263∗
(0.108) (0.104) (0.109)
Group protest 0.269∗ 0.297∗ 0.259∗
(0.123) (0.118) (0.124)
Dominant group 1.047 0.914 0.971
(0.731) (0.741) (0.781)
Other domestic protests 0.00728 0.0213 0.0505
(0.160) (0.134) (0.145)
Other domestic rebellions 0.196 0.0232 -0.0715
(0.235) (0.199) (0.243)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.361
(0.338)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000748 -0.000687 -0.000592
(0.000713) (0.000724) (0.000791)
Repression, t-1 1.704∗∗∗ 1.727∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.229) (0.227)
cut1
Constant 12.93 2.859 3.936
(15.10) (2.401) (3.902)
cut2
Constant 14.20 4.158+ 5.093
(15.10) (2.367) (3.905)
cut3
Constant 15.28 5.226∗ 6.116
(15.09) (2.288) (3.926)
cut4
Constant 18.17 8.008∗∗∗ 8.910∗
(15.15) (2.336) (4.082)
cut5
Constant 19.69 9.547∗∗ 10.41∗
(15.29) (2.918) (4.449)
Observations 577 577 542
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.2: Robustness tests for models 2 through 4.
Repression Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensity) (ConfAllint) 0.135
(0.290)
Group’s level of discrimination (Disc) -2.409 0.249∗∗ -0.746
(2.545) (0.0951) (0.766)
Press freedom (Freed) -1.243 -4.400
(9.358) (2.801)
Freed x Disc 2.803 2.226∗
(3.836) (1.126)
ConfAllint x Freed 0.00969
(0.426)
ConfAllint x Disc 0.114
(0.115)
ConfAllint x Disc x Freed -0.107
(0.174)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (all intensity) (NbconfAllint) -0.326∗
(0.163)
NbconfAllint x Disc 0.0476
(0.0498)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (all intensity) (IndconfAllint) -0.000377
(0.000807)
IndconfAllint x Freed 0.000855
(0.00104)
IndconfAllint x Disc 0.000292
(0.000313)
IndconfAllint x Disc x Media -0.000583
(0.000415)
GDP per capita -0.588 1.273 0.866
(2.746) (2.324) (3.625)
Vanhanen index -0.0412∗ -0.0467∗∗ -0.0132
(0.0206) (0.0173) (0.0218)
Group rebellion 0.261∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.263∗∗
(0.0765) (0.0667) (0.0957)
Group protest 0.381∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.313∗
(0.0962) (0.0917) (0.132)
Dominant group 0.780 0.675 0.807
(0.632) (0.603) (0.655)
Other domestic protests -0.0419 0.0712 0.122
(0.150) (0.146) (0.174)
Other domestic rebellions -0.0246 -0.0651 -0.0424
(0.143) (0.125) (0.202)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.469 -0.216 -0.368
(0.295) (0.290) (0.335)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000835 -0.00145 -0.0000354
(0.000797) (0.00106) (0.000713)
Repression, t-1 1.640∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ 1.617∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.202) (0.222)
cut1
Constant 5.328 2.582∗∗∗ 1.453
(6.467) (0.403) (2.015)
cut2
Constant 6.709 4.007∗∗∗ 2.692
(6.459) (0.494) (2.012)
cut3
Constant 7.953 5.341∗∗∗ 3.757+
(6.425) (0.583) (2.005)
cut4
Constant 10.27 7.749∗∗∗ 6.768∗∗
(6.475) (0.783) (2.075)
cut5
Constant 12.50+ 9.958∗∗∗ 8.240∗∗
(6.689) (1.271) (2.512)
cut6
Constant 14.95∗ 12.47∗∗∗
(6.639) (1.330)
Observations 761 769 571
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.3: Robustness tests for model 5.
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ) -0.233 0.00575
(0.212) (0.337)
Group’s level of discrimination (Disc) 0.162 0.510+
(0.172) (0.307)
Radio and TV measure (MediaNoln) -2.745∗
(1.375)
MediaNoln x Disc 0.299
(0.458)
Succ x MediaNoln 0.443
(0.496)
Succ x Disc 0.0266 0.00940
(0.0683) (0.0991)
Succ x Disc x MediaNoln -0.0141
(0.150)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln) (MediaInt) -0.358
(0.405)
MediaInt x Disc 0.124
(0.129)
Conf x MediaInt 0.0533
(0.152)
Succ x Disc x MediaInt -0.00354
(0.0483)
GDP per capita 5.113 -0.303
(4.733) (3.504)
Vanhanen index -0.0325+ -0.0415+
(0.0196) (0.0215)
Group rebellion 0.246∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.0947) (0.0956)
Group protest 0.276∗ 0.220+
(0.121) (0.126)
Dominant group 0.857 1.005
(0.804) (0.844)
Other domestic protests 0.0451 0.0761
(0.142) (0.154)
Other domestic rebellions -0.0239 -0.109
(0.196) (0.237)
Conflict in neighbour dummy -0.939∗∗ -1.086∗∗
(0.348) (0.366)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000889 -0.000767
(0.000763) (0.000765)
Repression, t-1 1.726∗∗∗ 1.666∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.219)
cut1
Constant 1.913∗∗ 2.852∗∗
(0.590) (1.082)
cut2
Constant 3.194∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗
(0.676) (1.070)
cut3
Constant 4.278∗∗∗ 5.040∗∗∗
(0.750) (1.127)
cut4
Constant 7.234∗∗∗ 7.941∗∗∗
(1.147) (1.406)
cut5
Constant 8.728∗∗∗ 9.390∗∗∗
(1.947) (2.064)
Observations 577 542
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.4: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discrimi-
nated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based
on media and freedom. High military to group ratio only.
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf) 0.282 -0.215
(0.349) (0.190)
Group discrimination (Disc) 1.793 -0.819
(1.498) (0.855)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media) -5.262∗
(2.643)
Media x Disc 2.212∗
(0.940)
Conf x Media 0.556∗
(0.279)
Conf x Disc -0.139 0.115
(0.140) (0.0713)
Conf x Disc x Media -0.231∗
(0.0965)
Press freedom (Freed) -0.312
(2.944)
Freed x Disc 1.003
(1.491)
Conf x Freed 0.0915
(0.259)
Conf x Freed x Disc -0.0851
(0.135)
GDP per capita -2.213 -2.348
(2.689) (3.660)
Vanhanen index 0.000572 -0.0232
(0.0254) (0.0233)
Group rebellion 0.730∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.0818)
Group protest 0.391∗ 0.327∗∗
(0.183) (0.126)
Dominant group -10.05∗∗∗ -19.44∗∗∗
(1.480) (1.135)
Other domestic protests 0.206 -0.0401
(0.308) (0.163)
Other domestic rebellions -0.306 -0.0691
(0.442) (0.181)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy -0.124 0.247
(0.613) (0.480)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000427 -0.00171
(0.000765) (0.00109)
Repression, t-1 3.099∗∗∗ 2.397∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.477)
cut1
Constant 7.148+ 1.918
(3.897) (2.217)
cut2
Constant 9.522∗ 4.084∗
(3.979) (2.058)
cut3
Constant 11.51∗∗ 6.041∗∗
(4.069) (1.845)
cut4
Constant 21.50∗∗∗ 9.870∗∗∗
(4.967) (1.726)
cut5
Constant 14.40∗∗∗
(2.494)
Observations 264 351
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
168
Table C.5: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discrimi-
nated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based
on proximity and index. High military to group ratio only.
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbConf) -0.519
(0.340)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.465∗∗ -1.081
(0.164) (1.208)
NbConf x Disc 0.0717
(0.0826)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndConf) -0.00359
(0.00306)
Press freedom (Freed) -4.738
(4.481)
Freed x Disc 2.329
(1.655)
IndConf x Freed 0.00429
(0.00337)
IndConf x Disc 0.00127
(0.000884)
IndConf x Freed x Disc -0.00182
(0.00116)
GDP per capita -0.549 -0.567
(2.977) (3.914)
Vanhanen index -0.0157 -0.0255
(0.0217) (0.0282)
Group rebellion 0.304∗∗∗ 0.536∗
(0.0885) (0.223)
Group protest 0.331∗∗ 0.255
(0.109) (0.202)
Dominant group -10.78∗∗∗ -10.80∗∗∗
(1.495) (1.474)
Other domestic protests 0.105 0.188
(0.145) (0.252)
Other domestic rebellions -0.174 -0.365
(0.184) (0.556)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy 0.584 -0.461
(0.428) (0.740)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00232+ -0.0000642
(0.00135) (0.000690)
Repression, t-1 2.596∗∗∗ 2.979∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.651)
cut1
Constant 4.043∗∗∗ -0.186
(0.730) (3.801)
cut2
Constant 6.480∗∗∗ 1.994
(1.016) (3.570)
cut3
Constant 8.400∗∗∗ 4.042
(1.231) (3.674)
cut4
Constant 12.64∗∗∗ 13.11∗∗∗
(1.900) (3.079)
cut5
Constant 17.09∗∗∗
(2.823)
Observations 355 261
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.6: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information
and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom. High military
to group ratio only.
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ) -0.431 -0.378
(0.320) (0.285)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.112 0.410+
(0.341) (0.240)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media) 0.279
(0.733)
Media x Disc -0.236
(0.255)
Succ x Media -0.125
(0.157)
Succ x Disc 0.154 0.0900
(0.115) (0.117)
Succ x Disc x Media 0.0449
(0.0621)
Press freedom (Freed) 0.362
(1.005)
Freed x Disc 0.0531
(0.341)
Freed x Succ 0.325
(0.377)
Succ x Freed x Disc -0.0447
(0.143)
GDP per capita -0.905 -3.394
(3.787) (4.036)
Vanhanen index -0.00151 -0.0290
(0.0294) (0.0219)
Group rebellion 0.604+ 0.355∗∗
(0.323) (0.109)
Group protest 0.424∗ 0.357∗∗
(0.168) (0.136)
Dominant group -9.180∗∗∗ -12.38∗∗∗
(1.655) (1.190)
Other domestic protests 0.216 -0.0129
(0.262) (0.177)
Other domestic rebellions -0.426 -0.114
(0.508) (0.195)
Conflict in neighbour dummy -0.867 -0.318
(0.621) (0.479)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.000663 -0.00172
(0.000787) (0.00117)
Repression, t-1 2.889∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.448)
cut1
Constant 3.676∗∗ 3.548∗∗∗
(1.400) (0.853)
cut2
Constant 5.935∗∗∗ 5.642∗∗∗
(1.672) (1.047)
cut3
Constant 7.837∗∗∗ 7.548∗∗∗
(2.021) (1.365)
cut4
Constant 15.95∗∗∗ 11.17∗∗∗
(2.953) (1.845)
cut5
Constant 15.39∗∗∗
(2.923)
Observations 264 351
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.7: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information
and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index. High military
to group ratio only.
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbSucc) 0.672
(0.714)
Group discrimination (Disc) 0.532∗∗∗ 0.505
(0.123) (0.515)
NbSucc x Disc -0.223
(0.235)
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndSucc) -0.00715+
(0.00368)
Press freedom (Freed) 1.471
(1.584)
Freed x Disc -0.216
(0.647)
IndSucc x Freed 0.00544
(0.00439)
IndSucc x Disc 0.00195
(0.00140)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc -0.00147
(0.00160)
GDP per capita -1.691 -2.656
(3.133) (4.489)
Vanhanen index -0.00749 -0.0520∗
(0.0182) (0.0252)
Group rebellion 0.278∗∗ 0.604∗
(0.0912) (0.253)
Group protest 0.372∗∗ 0.371+
(0.116) (0.217)
Dominant group -11.06∗∗∗ -9.706∗∗∗
(1.129) (1.420)
Other domestic protests 0.0501 0.113
(0.153) (0.220)
Other domestic rebellions -0.0657 -0.335
(0.159) (0.564)
Conflict in neighbour dummy -0.0626 -1.348∗
(0.460) (0.675)
Inverse member to non-member ratio -0.00213+ -0.000596
(0.00127) (0.000762)
Repression, t-1 2.444∗∗∗ 2.922∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.504)
cut1
Constant 4.141∗∗∗ 3.585∗
(0.606) (1.392)
cut2
Constant 6.473∗∗∗ 5.601∗∗
(0.962) (1.716)
cut3
Constant 8.310∗∗∗ 7.574∗∗∗
(1.201) (1.800)
cut4
Constant 12.26∗∗∗ 15.63∗∗∗
(1.693) (3.400)
cut5
Constant 16.64∗∗∗
(2.685)
Observations 355 261
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.8: Robustness tests for model 1 with time lag.
Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf) -0.00362
(0.236)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) -0.552 -0.991
(1.037) (1.944)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln), t-1 (MediaInt) -0.303 -1.059
(0.966) (2.549)
MediaInt x Disc -0.0561 0.202
(0.453) (0.135)
Conf x MediaInt 0.0500
(0.0996)
Conf x Disc 0.0741
(0.0970)
Conf x Disc x MediaInt 0.00437
(0.0439)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint) 0.108
(0.355)
ConfAllint x MediaInt 0.0579
(0.119)
ConfAllint x Disc 0.0581
(0.0842)
ConfAllint x Disc x MediaInt -0.00926∗
(0.00462)
GDP per capita -1.193 -1.208
(3.176) (3.123)
Vanhanen index -0.0368∗ -0.0376∗
(0.0179) (0.0189)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0820 0.0921
(0.0786) (0.0765)
Group protest, t-1 0.0634 0.0736
(0.0988) (0.0966)
Dominant group 0.457 0.548
(0.749) (0.793)
Other domestic protests, t-1 -0.00916 -0.0275
(0.123) (0.127)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.134 0.154
(0.116) (0.122)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.0390 -0.00377
(0.325) (0.327)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00220+ -0.00206+
(0.00124) (0.00125)
Repression, t-1 1.730∗∗∗ 1.731∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.222)
cut1
Constant 1.895 4.452
(2.385) (7.808)
cut2
Constant 3.232 5.782
(2.378) (7.788)
cut3
Constant 4.454+ 6.992
(2.406) (7.832)
cut4
Constant 6.677∗∗ 9.273
(2.458) (7.853)
cut5
Constant 8.605∗∗∗ 11.23
(2.535) (7.932)
Observations 697 696
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.9: Robustness tests for models 2 through 4 with time lag.
Repression Repression Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint) -0.319
(0.231)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) -3.558+ 0.251∗∗ -0.714
(1.970) (0.0933) (0.748)
Press freedom, t-1 -16.78+ -3.360
(8.933) (2.524)
Freed x Disc 5.539+ 1.520
(3.244) (0.925)
ConfAllint x Freed 0.722+
(0.402)
ConfAllint x Disc 0.167+
(0.0899)
ConfAllint x Freed x Disc -0.237
(0.147)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities) -0.309
in neighbours, t-1 (NbConfAllint) (0.233)
NbConfAllint x Disc 0.0299
(0.0620)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1 0.199
(0.288)
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities) weighted by index, t-1 (IndConfAllint) -0.000399
(0.000846)
IndConfAllint x Freed 0.000921
(0.00104)
IndConfAllint x Disc 0.000303
(0.000304)
IndConfAllint x Freed x Disc -0.000426
(0.000351)
GDP per capita 1.175 2.286 -0.0923
(2.814) (2.376) (2.992)
Vanhanen index -0.0354+ -0.0383∗ -0.0387+
(0.0201) (0.0174) (0.0207)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.116+ 0.0927 0.0994
(0.0699) (0.0779) (0.0737)
Group protest, t-1 0.0852 0.0745 0.0899
(0.0959) (0.0930) (0.0974)
Dominant group -0.307 0.578 -0.147
(0.806) (0.691) (0.721)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0615 0.0792 0.0379
(0.133) (0.123) (0.129)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.119 0.166 0.0991
(0.119) (0.128) (0.105)
Additional conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.104 -0.109
(0.293) (0.291)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00157 -0.00270+ -0.00154
(0.00109) (0.00148) (0.00100)
Repression, t-1 1.705∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗ 1.700∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.207) (0.204)
cut1
Constant -4.778 2.573∗∗∗ 1.115
(5.106) (0.420) (2.087)
cut2
Constant -3.430 3.980∗∗∗ 2.458
(5.118) (0.489) (2.113)
cut3
Constant -2.236 5.254∗∗∗ 3.662+
(5.123) (0.608) (2.131)
cut4
Constant 0.0771 7.614∗∗∗ 5.964∗∗
(5.208) (0.779) (2.187)
cut5
Constant 1.910 9.515∗∗∗ 7.795∗∗
(5.268) (1.150) (2.377)
cut6
Constant 4.703 12.53∗∗∗ 10.64∗∗∗
(5.322) (1.362) (2.599)
Observations 730 745 730
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table C.10: Robustness tests for model 5 with time lag.
Repression Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Succ) 0.167 -0.0807
(0.186) (0.358)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc) 0.494∗∗ 0.271
(0.171) (0.391)
Radio and TV measure, t-1 (MediaNoln) 0.183
(1.399)
MediaNoln x Disc -0.238
(0.513)
Succ x MediaNoln -0.418
(0.413)
Succ x Disc -0.177∗ -0.00239
(0.0822) (0.168)
Succ x Disc x MediaNoln 0.278
(0.218)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln), t-1 (MediaInt) 0.296
(0.486)
MediaInt x Disc -0.0676
(0.164)
Succ x MediaInt -0.0729
(0.144)
Succ x Disc x MediaInt 0.0455
(0.0709)
GDP per capita 1.304 -1.961
(3.940) (3.103)
Vanhanen index -0.0285+ -0.0386∗
(0.0162) (0.0170)
Group rebellion, t-1 0.0659 0.0654
(0.0788) (0.0813)
Group protest, t-1 0.103 0.0752
(0.0921) (0.0956)
Dominant group 0.422 0.477
(0.659) (0.693)
Other domestic protests, t-1 0.0259 0.0175
(0.107) (0.116)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1 0.106 0.119
(0.108) (0.112)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1 -0.243 -0.382
(0.322) (0.310)
Non-member to member ratio -0.00233+ -0.00210+
(0.00128) (0.00127)
Repression, t-1 1.824∗∗∗ 1.758∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.233)
cut1
Constant 2.753∗∗∗ 1.677
(0.548) (1.179)
cut2
Constant 4.148∗∗∗ 2.989∗
(0.646) (1.184)
cut3
Constant 5.414∗∗∗ 4.205∗∗∗
(0.787) (1.230)
cut4
Constant 7.745∗∗∗ 6.453∗∗∗
(0.940) (1.338)
cut5
Constant 9.656∗∗∗ 8.383∗∗∗
(1.231) (1.600)
cut6
Constant 12.60∗∗∗
(1.493)
Observations 744 696
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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